The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume III

1943

Published by
The ANTIOCH REVIEW, INC.
Yellow Springs, Ohio

General
Jason

INDEX

VOLUME III, 1943, *The* ANTIOCH REVIEW

Action for Postwar Planning, by J. Raymond Walsh, 153

Administrative Democracy, An, by P. B., 134

American Soldier Is No Joe Palooka—Too Bad, The, by G. R. G., 300

Antilabor Front, The, by Victor H. Bernstein, 328

AYRES, C. E. Technology and Progress, 6; The Twilight of the Price System, 162

BENTLEY, ERIC RUSSELL. Bernard Shaw, Caesar, and Stalin, 117

BERNSTEIN, VICTOR H. The Antilabor Front, 328

Black Man's Burden, The, by J. Saunders Redding, 587

Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions, by Will Herberg, 405

BURGUM, EDWIN BERRY. Virginia Woolf and the Empty Room, 596

BURKHARDT, FREDERICK. The War and the Philosopher, 81

Buy an Apple, Mister?, by F. C., 301

Canada Looks to the Postwar, by Eaton Maxwell, 483

CAREY, JAMES B. Labor's Interest in the Peace, 361

Christian Mythology of Socialism, The, by Will Herberg, 125

Comes the Cold, Gray Dawn, by F. C., 136

C.I.O. Girds Itself for '44, The, by Tom Downs, 448

Conflict of Fascist and Democratic Ideals, The, by Melvin Rader, 246

Contributors, 143, 303, 462, 623

COREY, LEWIS. Problems of the Peace: I. War Plants, 438

Counterattack in Congress, by Herman Schnurer, 32

CURRENT, RICHARD NELSON. John C. Calhoun, Philosopher of Reaction, 223

Democracy First, by J. D. K., 458

DEMPSEY, DAVID. War for Democracy—Or Restoration?, 271

DOWNS, TOM. The C.I.O. Girds Itself for '44, 448

Editorials, 3, 147, 307, 467

Expediency in Italy, by Gaetano Salvemini, 456

FRIES, HORACE S. World Revolution Number Five, 425

FURLAN, BORIS. Nationality in the Balkans, 97

Germany and the European Nation, by Albert Guérard, 546

GLICKSBERG, CHARLES I. Mysticism in Contemporary Poetry, 235

GOLDEN, CLINTON S. New Patterns of Democracy, 391

GRATTAN, C. HARTLEY. The Role of Australia in Pacific Politics, 54

GROSS, FELIKS. The Problem of Nationality: The Sociological Approach, 92

Ground Alfred Kazin Stands On, The, by Granville Hicks, 21

GUÈRARD, ALBERT. Germany and the European Nation, 546

HAMLIN, TALBOT. A Public Opinion for Planning, 182
Health Under the Social Security Tent, by James Rorty, 498
HERBERG, WILL. The Christian Mythology of Socialism, 125; Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions, 405
HICKS, GRANVILLE. The Ground Alfred Kazin Stands On, 21
Horrors of Total Security, The, by V. C., 133

Irenicon, by L. R. G., 459

John C. Calhoun, Philosopher of Reaction, by Richard Nelson Current, 223
JOHNSON, WALTER. Senatorial Strategy, 1919-1920: Will It Be Repeated?, 512

Labor in the War — And After, by Victor G. Reuther, 311
Labor Tackles the Race Question, by Frank Winn, 341
Labor's Interest in the Peace, by James B. Carey, 361
Lest We Forget!, 618
LEWIS, DAVID. Socialism Over the Border: Canada's C.C.F., 470
Lincoln R. Gibbs, 623
LINKE, .LILO. Literary Life in the Tropics, 574
Look to the Motive, by P. B., 298
Look to the Peace!, by L. C., 140

MARTIN, LAWRENCE AND SYLVIA. The World's Most Unbuilt Canal, 262
MAXWELL, EATON. Canada Looks to the Postwar, 483
MERCER, MAX G. That Postwar "Dream" House, 558
Moulton Economics, by V. C., 299
Mysticism in Contemporary Poetry, by Charles I. Glicksberg, 235
Myth of the 1920's, A, by V. C., 621

Nationality in the Balkans, by Boris Furlan, 97
Nationality North of the Danube, by Otakar Odlozilik, 106
New Democracy in Social Welfare, The, by Monroe Sweetland, 418
New Patterns of Democracy, by Clinton S. Golden, 391
Novel in Latin America, The, by Bertram D. Wolfe, 191

ODLOZILIK, OTAKAR. Nationality North of the Danube, 106
OTTO, M. C. Scientific Humanism, 530

Postwar Pacific Partnership, A, by Andrew J. Steiger, 372
Private Dogface Goes to College, by W. B. A., 137
Problem of Nationality, The, by Feliks Gross, Boris Furlan, Otakar Odlozilik, 92
Problems of the Peace: I. War Plants, by Lewis Corey, 438
Public Opinion for Planning, A, by Talbot Hamlin, 182

RADER, MELVIN. The Conflict of Fascist and Democratic Ideals, 246
REDDING, J. SAUNDERS. The Black Man's Burden, 587
REUTHER, VICTOR G. Labor in the War — And After, 311
Role of Australia in Pacific Politics, The, by C. Hartley Grattan, 54
RORTY, JAMES. Health Under the Social Security Tent, 498
ROSENFARB, JOSEPH. Strategy in the Pacific War, 283
Ross, IRWIN. What Price American Foreign Policy?, 209

SALVEMINI, GAETANO. Expediency in Italy, 456

SCHNURER, HERMAN. Counterattack in Congress, 32; Subsidies; or, Vitamins Are Good for You, 612

Scientific Humanism, by M. C. Otto, 530

Senatorial Strategy, 1919-1920: Will It Be Repeated?, by Walter Johnson, 512

Socialism Over the Border: Canada's C.C.F., by David Lewis, 470

STEIGER, ANDREW J. A Postwar Pacific Partnership, 372

STEINHAUER, HARRY. What Can We Do With Germany?, 66

Strategy in the Pacific War, by Joseph Rosenfarb, 283

Strength of China, The, by P. B., 139

Subsidies; or, Vitamins Are Good for You, by Herman Schnurer, 612

SWEETLAND, MONROE. The New Democracy in Social Welfare, 418

Technology and Progress, by C. E. Ayres, 6

That Postwar "Dream" House, by Max G. Mercer, 558

Twilight of the Price System, The, by C. E. Ayres, 162

Virginia Woolf and the Empty Room, by Edwin Berry Burgum, 596

WALSH, J. RAYMOND. Action for Postwar Planning, 153

War and the Philosopher, The, by Frederick Burkhardt, 81

War for Democracy—or Restoration?, by David Dempsey, 271

We Note . . ., by the Editors, 133, 298, 458, 619

We Take the Political Offensive, by H. S., 619

What Can We Do With Germany?, by Harry Steinhauer, 66

What Price American Foreign Policy?, by Irwin Ross, 209

WINN, FRANK. Labor Tackles the Race Question, 341

WOLFE, BERTRAM D. The Novel in Latin America, 191

World Revolution Number Five, by Horace S. Fries, 425

World's Most Unbuilt Canal, The, by Lawrence and Sylvia Martin, 262

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Three · · Spring 1943 · · Number One

. . . Featuring . . .

COUNTERATTACK IN CONGRESS
—Herman Schnurer

TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS
—C. E. Ayres

THE GROUND KAZIN STANDS ON
—Granville Hicks

AUSTRALIA IN PACIFIC POLITICS
—C. Hartley Grattan

NATIONALITY IN EAST EUROPE
—Feliks Gross, Boris Furlan, Otakar Odlozilik

—Others by Frederick Burkhardt, Harry Steinhauer, Eric Russell Bentley, and Will Herberg.

PUBLISHED FOUR TIMES A YEAR AT YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO
SUBSCRIPTION THREE DOLLARS A YEAR — SINGLE COPIES SEVENTY-FIVE CENTS

Renew Now and Save!

Because of increased production costs during the past year, *The* ANTIOCH REVIEW must raise its subscription rates.

But until June 1, 1943, you may still *renew* your subscription at the old rate, $2.00 a year. Your renewal will be applied at the end of your current subscription, regardless of its expiration date.

The ANTIOCH REVIEW has proved its place in the nation. It is indexed in the *International Index of Periodicals*. One of its rare short stories (Jessie Treichler's "Homecoming") is to be included in the *Best Short Stories of 1943*. Its articles have been widely quoted and discussed in newspapers, periodicals, and reference works.

Add your weight to the forces pushing forward to a democratic future. Subscribe now!

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

A PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL QUARTERLY

$3.00 a year. ($2.00 on renewals until June 1, 1943)

Box 268 Yellow Springs, Ohio

Contents

EDITORIAL 3

TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS ..... *C. E. Ayres* 6

THE GROUND ALFRED KAZIN STANDS ON ..... *Granville Hicks* 21

COUNTERATTACK IN CONGRESS ..... *Herman Schnurer* 32

THE ROLE OF AUSTRALIA IN PACIFIC POLITICS ..... *C. Hartley Grattan* 54

WHAT CAN WE DO WITH GERMANY? ..... *Harry Steinhauer* 66

THE WAR AND THE PHILOSOPHER ..... *Frederick Burkhardt* 81

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY

1. THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH ..... *Feliks Gross* 92
2. NATIONALITY IN THE BALKANS ..... *Boris Furlan* 97
3. NATIONALITY NORTH OF THE DANUBE ..... *Otakar Odlozilik* 106

BERNARD SHAW, CAESAR, AND STALIN ..... *Eric Russell Bentley* 117

THE CHRISTIAN MYTHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM ..... *Will Herberg* 125

WE NOTE ..... *The Editors* 133

CONTRIBUTORS 143

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

VOLUME III | Published in March, 1943 | NUMBER 1

Copyright 1943, by THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, Incorporated, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Contributions to THE ANTIOCH REVIEW may not be reprinted in whole or in part without the permission of the Editors.

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

- *Editorial Board* -

PAUL BIXLER

W. B. ALEXANDER
VALDEMAR CARLSON
FREEMAN CHAMPNEY
LEWIS COREY
GEORGE R. GEIGER
LINCOLN R. GIBBS
J. DONALD KINGSLEY
HERMAN SCHNURER

MAX ASTRACHAN, *Business Manager*

Indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*

Published at Yellow Springs, Ohio, in March, June, September, and December by THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, Incorporated, a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio. THE ANTIOCH REVIEW is not an official publication of Antioch College and the views expressed in its columns are not necessarily those of the College. Subscription rates: $3.00 the year; Canadian, $3.50; Foreign, $4.00. Single copies, seventy-five cents.

Contributions should be sent to The Editors of THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, Post Office Box 268, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Unsolicited manuscripts which are found unavailable for publication will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by contributors of articles.

Publication Office, 212 Xenia Avenue, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Entered as second-class matter March 22, 1941 at the post office at Yellow Springs, Ohio, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Three ·.· Spring 1943 ·.· Number 1

EDITORIAL

THE TEMPER and the tenor of the war have now perceptibly changed. So far as the military is concerned, the temper is sanguine. Led by the extraordinary recovery and the crushing advance of the Russian armies, the United Nations seem well on the way to victory. Not again, barring a miracle, can Russia spell anything to the Nazis but lost hopes. From another direction, the west, English and American bombers bring disruption and dismay to the inner workings of the German war machine. In Tunisia the Axis fights a delaying action. And in the Pacific the time of the Japanese grows definitely shorter. Although many things have been left undone that ought to have been done, the United Nations, it appears, are going to win the war.

Yet within the framework of success and the expectation of success, the core of confusion, reaction, and intrigue has been more than disquieting. For all the military victories, the "people's war" is in the doldrums. Much of the difficulty has been with us, America. Our trouble began in the State Department's relation to Vichy. It continued with our fascist collaboration in North Africa. It now stretches into the future with intrigues to set up in the postwar world a new "benevolent" Catholic-reactionary "Axis" with centers in Washington, Madrid, and Rome. Overtones to this theme are provided by such untoward events as the "misunderstanding" over how much aid Russia has been receiving from the United States. And the whole is set off by a counterattack in Congress, which began with a drive against the "bureaucrats" who are trying to win the war and which can logically end only in discrediting Congress itself as an institution. We are going to win, but what we are going to do with our victory still has no satisfactory answer.

In the new temper of the new phase, it is time for the progressives to take reconnaissance. Already there have appeared signs of weariness

and defeatism. Progressives can hardly bear lightly the new dichotomy of military success and political stalemate or defeat. For some, soothed by the warmth of superficial success and the unusual pleasures of participating in a majority movement, it may be easy to slip off into apathy. For others, encouraged otherwise, it may seem a temptation to mount their theories and ride off in all directions at once. For still others, fed up with the rigors of war and of unity, it may seem reasonable to renew old bickerings and settle old scores. All of which may be unfortunate. For the battle is anything but finished, and old fixations, old habits merely stand in the way of solid achievement.

Today as yesterday the backbone of any strategy is a united progressive front. And if anyone has doubt of the need and usefulness of strategy, let him examine the current political scene more closely. A number of factors will at once suggest themselves. For special attention here, we select four:

1. If the war is pushed to its logical military conclusion, it is going to discredit fascism fundamentally and permanently. Such a basic fact is easily assumed or disregarded without being thought through. When the enemy goes down to defeat in an ideological war like the present one, its ideas go down to defeat also—an utter defeat if the decision is pushed through to the bitter end. Yet ideas are not smashed immediately, even by war, in the way that buildings and men are smashed. They are destroyed only by the constant after-pressure of victorious public opinion. It is just here, in the pressure of opinion, that the progressive has his opportunity. The Vichyites and the fascists of North Africa, for example, had been counting upon a few more shifts in the military situation and a growing war weariness to make the lions of the left subside and forget. But they did not subside and already the reactionary wall has been breached. Other chances to affect the situation will come, and those chances must be taken advantage of. So also, even more clearly, is the case with India. There the United Nations have run an enormous risk in not rallying more of the people to their side. India apparently is not now to be attacked by the Axis, and any change will have to wait upon the peace. The postwar opportunities there—and they will occur—must not be muffed. North Africa and India are dramatic cases, but there are plenty of others.

2. In this country (barring certain congressmen and certain members of the National Association of Manufacturers), it is now clear that there is to be planning for and in the postwar period. The controversy initiated by the recent report of the National Resources Planning Board is proof enough that its core idea is vital to the American public.[1] The struggle over planning does not abate on that score, however, but only shifts to a new plane. Questions still remain as to who is to do the planning, how much is to be planned and what for. Is private enterprise, in one way or another, to control the field? Is planning to be national in the broadest sense and for the majority of the people? The area of struggle is large, and one of the immediate hazards is the ignorance and even suspicion which frequently meets the general idea. But progressives start off with one initial advantage. Planning has been their baby, and they know more about it than anyone else. If their strategy is equal to their subject knowledge, on percentage alone they should take the lead.

3. It is now almost as clear that there is to be international planning as well. The best recent evidence for this conjecture is the stirring within the Senate which produced a proposal asking, among other things, for the establishment of an international agency to preserve peace after the war. The agency is not established by that move, but the way is opened for greater progressive effectiveness. The four senators sponsoring the proposal have said that they want the nation to discuss it and "to register their reaction with the Senate."

4. The progressives are not going to get all they want or ask for out of the war, but that is no reason for going defeatist. War speeds change but it never speeds it to the point where one can say, "Here it is—this is *it*!" or where one can hold victory in his hand like a shot bird. The process is continuous and is beset with frequent defeats. One has to remember that it has taken twenty-five years for the Soviet Union to prove its living value to the world at large and that even now a majority of the world's leaders are not certain of the full outlines of its new idea. There is glory in the single battle, but for progressives there is also the need for buckling down to the drive and hardship of a campaign which will run through war weariness and well past the first peace table. The campaign will stretch over a generation, and there will be no place in it for the summer soldier.

[1]For a discussion of the report, see the leading "We Note . . . ." in this issue.

TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS

By C. E. AYRES

TECHNOLOGY is organized skill. As a definition this formula is both inadequate and misleading, but there is no better way to explore and clarify the meaning of technology than by discovering the inadequacies of common-sense conceptions such as this one. All skill is organized, of course, and all behavior skilled in some sense or other. We commonly distinguish between the skill of the artisan and the mastery of the scientist or the "creative" artist, and these distinctions are important. But do they distinguish between skill and non-skill? We do not ordinarily think of the scientist or the artist as "unskilled."

However important they may be, such distinctions are between kinds of skill. An artisan is one who performs operations which a scientist has devised. Much of the same distinction is made between the artist who is a "mere" performer and one who is a "creator." But differences appear even within the field of creation. In one of his later essays Roger Fry retracted his earlier declaration that Sargent was not an artist but repeated his earlier judgment in this form, that Sargent was an "applied" artist. The distinction was more than a slight. What Fry meant was that Sargent had adopted the color chords which the Impressionists had "created" (or discovered, or invented), and had used them in painting portraits of rich sitters. Whereas Sargent, according to Fry, had "learned something" from the Impressionists, later painters stood to learn nothing from his canvases.

A similar distinction is made between pure and applied science. A man who knows no mathematics is only a mechanic, however good a mechanic he may be. If he knows and uses the common branches of mathematics, he is an engineer. If his scientific training is sufficient to enable him to understand and reproduce the experiments of scientists, putting them to use in the fashion in which Sargent used the palette of the Impressionists in painting portraits, he is an applied scientist. If he masters the work of earlier scientists in such a way as to be able to carry it on, putting their discoveries to the same sort of use to which they in turn had put the discoveries of still earlier scientists, then he is a scientist, too, in the same sense as they. Considerations of social prestige enter into these dis-

tinctions and give feeling-tone to judgments such as Fry passed upon Sargent, but they are irrelevant to the analysis of technology. The distinctions exist independently of the invidiousness which has been associated with them.

But they are not distinctions between skill and non-skill. What they distinguish is types of skill. The word "technique" is generally employed by musicians and other artists to refer to the finger dexterity of the instrumentalist or the hand-and-brush dexterity with which the painter applies his pigments to the canvas. Such techique is a more or less indispensable part of the equipment of every artist; but it is often mentioned sneeringly, and for this reason. A player may have acquired great finger dexterity and still be musically illiterate. Nearly all the great composers were at one time eminent performers, but most of them let their "techniques" run down as they became increasingly absorbed in composition. Does this mean that playing the piano is a matter of skill but that composing music is not? By no means. At another level of generalization it is customary to speak of "the techniques of the composer," meaning such things as skill in using scores. Many a musician who has acquired great skill in reading music, that is in thinking from printed notes to sounds, would experience the greatest difficulty in writing out the notes even of a quite simple tune which he had just heard for the first time. Mozart's celebrated feat of writing out in full an unpublished and closely guarded "Miserere" after hearing it once in the Sistine Chapel was not only an act of "sheer genius"; it was a technical achievement which was possible at all only because even at the age of fourteen Mozart was master of the techniques of the composer. He was indeed "very good at it"; but what he was good at must not be overlooked.

The conclusion toward which all these reflections lead is that all acts of skill involve the use of tools of one sort or another. Such distinctions as we have been considering are made in terms of the differences between these tools. An artisan is not a person of inferior dexterity. He is a person whose tools, however dextrously they may be used, are commonplace. But the skills of scientists and artists—even pure scientists and creative artists—are no less contingent on the use of tools. A mathematician or a composer may "have an inspiration" when he is wandering in the woods or (as in the case of Henri Poincaré) when he is catching a train. At the moment he has in his hands nothing which could be identified as

a tool of his profession. Nevertheless his profession is a tool-using profession, and his "inspiration" could never have occurred to a man who had never used those tools. In the case of the composer they are such things as the diatonic scale, musical notation, existing instruments, and the like; but even more important to the particular inspiration of the individual composer is the literature of music: the works of other composers existing as physical objects in the form of printed scores over which he has pored most of his life. The same is true of the mathematician. At any given moment he may be without paper and pencil and not need them. But mathematics as a science could not have come into existence in the absence of paper and pencils (or any substitutes). Teachers of mathematics try from the beginning to impress upon their pupils that a "point" is not a chalk mark on a blackboard. (In *Mr. Fortune's Maggot* Sylvia Townsend Warner has written a very amusing account of the efforts of a lover of mathematics to convey this distinction to an aborigine.) Mathematicians have been able to define a point as "that which has" neither length nor breadth nor thickness, whatever "that which has" may mean in such a formula; but they could never have done so without using physical objects as tools. More important for present-day mathematics are of course the symbols which have been devised as the notation of complex mathematical operations. Here also the symbols are not themselves the operations; but here also it is still true that the operations could not be conducted without symbols, and that no one could learn to think mathematically without having spent years poring over the printed record of the symbolically denoted operations of earlier mathematicians. The current issues of the mathematical journals are perhaps the most important tools of the trade of the practicing mathematician, and they are physical objects which must be used with skill, no less than wrenches and hammers.

This absolute mutual contingency of skills and tools is of supreme importance for an understanding of technology as a function of human behavior for two reasons. In the first place, technical activity can be indentified in no other way than by its uniform, unvarying association with tools. In some cases identification is easy. When a primitive community is fashioning a dugout canoe we observe that two sorts of activity are going on. While a number of men are engaged in hollowing out the log, one rattles sharks' teeth, and roars what are obviously incantations. We identify the former as technological activity and the latter as something else. But the

distinction is not so apparent to the tribesmen, since they recognize all these practitioners as members of the same "holy order" of canoe-builders and know that all are following the sacred liturgy of their order, the "workers" no less than the roarer. To us hollowing out logs is a secular activity, but intoning is something else; and we apply our own distinctions as an a priori classification to the other people.

Other cases are not so easy. We recognize astrology and alchemy as pre-sciences; but the whole activity in which their practitioners engaged was that of necromancy. Furthermore, as we have learned to our sorrow, certain ways of thinking have been carried over from the earlier activity into what we have regarded as the age of reason, so that our own science at least in its early stages has been contaminated by foreign elements. How are these to be distinguished? Categories such as "truth" and "knowledge" are disconcertingly inconclusive. It is precisely the "knowledge" of early modern times that is most dubious. The only reliable distinction is provided by what we call "experimental techniques," that is to say the tools of science. Even the necromancers employed "laboratory" techniques and were scientists insofar as they did so, in spite of the romantic names they gave their instruments and operations.

The case of the fine arts is even more confusing. Like science, all the arts were originally sacerdotal. All design and pictorial representation was at first cabalistic; all rhythm and tone patterns, all the gestures and postures of the dance and drama, were at first the literal enactment of mystic rites. Modern anthropological studies have left no doubt on this score. And in this case we have emerged from the savage state only very incompletely. The arts are still associated with ecclesiastical activities and their contemplation and creation are still generally regarded as "spiritual" experiences in a sense that is not true even of science. The effect of works of art is still generally conceived to be a sort of "seizure," and the creation of "masterworks" is still attributed to "inspiration" of a sort that is not vouchsafed to even the greatest of scientists. People repeat Wagner's hyperbole about "God and Beethoven" as though it were a literal transfiguration—and all this in spite of the constant insistence of practicing artists that their achievements are the result of "taking pains."

In this case also there is only one solution to the enigma: that provided by technical analysis. Popular reputations wax and wane. The "seizures" people feel in the presence of great "masterworks" are of the

nature of self-hypnosis induced by expectation. Their subjects are usually awe-struck by such things as "the marvelous colors," although the actual pigments may have been renewed half-a-dozen times by quite mediocre and anonymous restorers. To the annoyance of musicians the enthusiastic public admires Mozart for his "quaintness" and Bach for the intricacy of his counterpoint, although what they call Mozart's quaintness was a characteristic of all eighteenth-century music, while Bach's great distinction was that he added to the contrapuntal intricacies of his day a harmonic richness which music had never known before. The achievements of the great creative artists are genuine achievements, but they are technical achievements which can be understood and genuinely appreciated only by a certain amount of study, a certain amount of knowledge of what is actually, technically going on. This understanding and appreciation is understanding of the tools—color and design, tonal structure and texture, and the like—with which artists actually work. In the tangled web of human life technical activities are almost inextricably blended with activities of another sort. The enthusiasm which they merit is almost indistinguishable from religious ecstasy. Nevertheless all tool-using activities have something in common which can be understood by virtue of the tools.

It is the peculiar character of all technology, from chipped flints to Boulder Dam and Beethoven's quartets, that it is progressive. It is inherently developmental. This circumstance which gives technology its peculiar importance in the analysis of culture—and most of all for economists—also can be understood only in terms of tools. If we limit the conception of technology to "skill," we are at once subject to great risk of conceiving technological development as the growth of skills; and since skill is a "faculty" of "individuals," we are preconditioned to think of the growth of skill as in some sense an increase of this faculty on the part of individuals. But we know nothing of any such increase.

That is what makes it so hard for economists of the traditional way of thinking to understand the technological principle. They understand the crucial importance of the issue. Since Veblen first began to write it has been apparent that some sort of claim was being made for technology as a master principle of economic analysis. This claim was seen to rest on the peculiarly dynamic character of technology as itself inherently progressive and the agent of social change, in particular the agent of indus-

trial revolution. As one of the most thoughtful of contemporary economists has remarked, this whole way of thinking "assumes for technology some kind of inner law of progress of an absolute and inscrutable character," as well as "some equally absolute and inscrutable type of 'causality' by which technology drags behind it and 'determines' other phases of social change."[1] The whole issue between the old and new ways of thinking in economics comes to focus here. The new way of thinking does indeed rest on some kind of inner law of progress. But there is nothing absolute or inscrutable about it. What makes it seem inscrutable is the inveterate predisposition of orthodox economists to think in terms of a conception of human nature as that of the uniquely individual "spirit." Thinking so, they think of technology as a skill faculty of the individual spirit; and thinking so, they find the principle of technological development quite inscrutable—as indeed they must. For the developmental character of technology is implicit not in the skill faculty of the human individual but in character of tools. The whole analysis must proceed on the level of generalization of culture rather than of individuality in order for the principle of technological progress to be understood at all.

On that level it is perfectly obvious. As a result of the rapid advance of machine technology in recent years the process of invention has attracted general attention and has become the subject of a considerable literature.[2] These studies have given the *coup de grâce* to the "heroic" theory of invention—the myth which attributes inventions to the sheer magnitude of soul of the "Gifted Ones." It is now generally agreed that all inventions are combinations of previously existing devices. Thus the airplane is a combination of a kite and an internal combustion engine. An automobile is a combination of a buggy with an internal combustion engine. The internal combustion engine itself is a combination of the steam engine with a gaseous fuel which is substituted for the steam and exploded by the further combination of the electric spark. This is speaking broadly, of course. In actual practice the combinations are for the most part much more detailed. What is presented to the public as a "new" invention is usually itself the end product of a long series of inventions.

---

[1]Frank H. Knight, "Intellectual Confusion in Morals and Economics," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLV (1935), 208-209.

[2]Outstanding in this literature for clarity and cogency is a little book by S. C. Gilfillan, *The Sociology of Invention* (1935).

In this process materials—what economists have so misleadingly designated as "natural" resources—function as devices. According to the principle of indestructibility of matter there is no such thing as a "new" material. Helium gas must have been present in the earth of the Texas panhandle geologic ages before man first invaded the Western Hemisphere some thousands of years ago. Nevertheless helium was not a "natural resource" of the republic of Texas, inasmuch as helium was not identified in the sun for many years after the end of the republic, nor isolated from the earth's atmosphere for many years after that, nor discovered to be a component of Texas natural gas until still later, nor treated as a resource until it was used in balloons only a few years ago. The history of every material is the same. It is one of novel combination of existing devices and materials in such a fashion as to constitute a new device or a new material or both. This is what it means to say that natural resources are defined by the prevailing technology, a practice which is now becoming quite general among economists to the further confusion of old ways of thinking (since it involves a complete revision of the concept of "scarcity" which must be regarded as also defined by technology and not by"nature").

Furthermore, as regards the nature of the process there is no difference between "mechanical" invention and "scientific" discovery. Scientific discoveries also result from the combination of previously existing devices and materials, laboratory instruments and techniques. It was by combining a magnet with a Crookes tube, for example, that J. J. Thomson discovered that the stream of incandescence in the tube was in fact a stream of physical particles and was even able to calculate the mass of the electrons. It was by combining a prism with a telescope that astronomers were able to identify elements (such as helium) in the sun. Even in the fine arts "creation" comes about in the same way. Leonardo's great achievement illustrated by the famous Mona Lisa, about which so much nonsense has been talked,[3] was that he applied techniques which the monks had devised for the portrayal of angels to the portraiture of living subjects. Cézanne characterized his achievement as resulting from the application of Pissaro's studio technique to painting from nature. In every innovation analysis reveals the combination of previously existing devices. That is what the achievement is which in different fields we call invention or discovery or creation.

[3]See Rockwell Kent's comments on this work in *World Famous Paintings* (1939).

This principle of combination is important by virtue of the light it throws on previous obscurities. One of these is the role of chance in discovery and invention. An extraordinary number of the most significant discoveries have been made by chance. Columbus discovered America by accident. Ostensibly he was sailing toward the Indies. The discovery of the X ray resulted from the exposure of sealed photographic plates by their accidental juxtaposition to a Crookes tube. Ehrlich's "magic bullet" treatment for syphilis eventuated from the accidental relation between the spirochete of that disease and the trypanasome which Ehrlich had much earlier selected for experimental purposes because it was easily identified under the microscope and could be bred in laboratory animals. In the case of mechanical inventions the role of chance is even more notorious. Adam Smith relates the tale of the invention of the automatic valves by which the steam engine operates from the trick of a lazy boy who tied the control string to a moving part which then opened and closed the valve automatically.

But what do we mean by "chance" or "accident"? These words are of course relational. In a sense nothing occurs by chance, but some events are less relevant than others to any given point of reference. In all these cases the point of reference is the previous activities of some individual. The discovery of America was "accidental" with reference to the intentions of Columbus; but it was not accidental that it should have occurred in 1492. The arts of shipbuilding, seamanship, and navigation being what they were by the end of the fifteenth century, somebody was "bound" to have "discovered America" within a decade or so; and this also is true of inventions and discoveries generally. The lore of science and mechanics is full of simultaneous discoveries, often by several agents and as a result of strikingly similar combinations. The simultaneous development of the infinitesimal calculus out of the same mathematical materials by Newton and Leibnitz is a case in point. So is the simultaneous enunciation of the theory of biological evolution by Darwin and Wallace. In this case the identity of the materials which entered into combination and the extreme separation of the agents of discovery are equally striking. Although Darwin thought out his statement in England and Wallace in Malaysia on the opposite side of the world, both were practicing naturalists concerned with the problem of species, and both received definite stimulation to this particular formula from reading Malthus' *Essay on the Principle of Popu-*

lation. Instances could be multiplied indefinitely. The Patent Office is engaged in a perpetual struggle with the problem of simultaneity. But what seems utterly mysterious so long as invention is regarded as an act of individual inspiration is easily explained in terms of the principle of combination.

These combinations are physical not less than ideational. To be sure they are achieved by men, usually by men of great ability. But the things they put together are physical objects. The coexistence of these objects constitutes a possibility of combination which transcends the acts of any individual. It is in this sense that inventions seem "bound" to occur. As we look back on the recent history of devices for the transmission of sound it seems most remarkable that the audion tube should have been used for years to amplify long distance telephone currents before being applied to "wireless" technology, which had been struggling along all this time with the now utterly obsolete coherer; or that the phonograph should have languished for years after the introduction of radio before it occurred to someone that audion tubes would amplify pick-up currents too. It is no disparagement of genius to recognize that certain combinations would almost necessarily have occurred in somebody's hands sooner or later. Individual genius not only places its possessor in the front rank of pioneers; it also determines when a discovery is made. Often this happens "before its time." That is, some inspired Mendel works out a given combination, the laws of inheritance among sweet peas, years before other combinations have occurred in the field of cytology to which those laws are supremely relevant. The over-all determinant which defines the universe of discourse within which genius is at play is an objective actuality—the tool pattern.

Another anomaly of the inventive process which also is resolved by the tool-combination principle is the extraordinary role of tyros and amateurs in science and mechanics and even the fine arts. The number of important discoveries and inventions which have been made by juveniles and by such people as lawyers and clergymen whose professional training is wholly unrelated to the field in question is strikingly large—too large to be attributed to the peculiar talents of the individuals concerned who in many cases have done little or nothing else to attract attention. In mathematical physics, for example, the Nobel prize has been given to so many men of such extreme youth as to give rise to the saying that in this field

a man has passed his peak by twenty-eight. Why is this? Doubtless precocity has something to do with it in certain cases. Children learn languages easily, including the special languages of mathematics and music; but it is notorious that most prodigies peter out, and in any case the prodigy theory does not explain the discoveries of the clergyman, Joseph Priestley, or the paintings of the stockbroker, Paul Gauguin.

The explanation which follows directly from the tool combination analysis of invention is the one which accounts for the annoying facility with which an intruder often finds a solution almost instantaneously for a jigsaw puzzle with which the player has been struggling for hours. Where the solution is a matter of putting together existing pieces, it may be impeded on the part of the regular player, by fixed ideas, preoccupations, and other behavior "sets" from which the intruder is free. Consequently he sees at once the possible combination which has been hidden from the player by his own intense preoccupation. Innovations are often made by people who are so innocent as not to realize how outrageously novel they are. It is even said that important scientific discoveries have been made as a direct result of ignorance on the part of a discoverer who simply did not "know" that the thing he did "could not be done," and so just went ahead and did it. This is the explanation of the importance of detachment for scientific research and other creative achievement, what Veblen called "idle" curiosity. Obviously (though it has not been obvious to hostile critics, perhaps because they lacked detachment) he means "detached" and not "indolent." Excessive preoccupation of any kind—pious, financial, uxorious, or even professional—is inimical to the "free play" of the imagination in the course of which combinations somehow occur. Discoveries are not made by punching time clocks, and closing laboratories and libraries on Sunday is an excellent way to inhibit creative activity.

These corollaries of the analysis of invention in terms of the combination of existing devices, in which Mr. Gilfillan and his colleagues are interested for their own sake, assume increasingly great theoretical importance as they proceed from the particular to the general. If technological development results from the combination of existing tool-material devices, and if such combinations follow the pattern of existing devices and often do so in the hands of people whose peculiar advantage it is to be free from inhibiting preoccupations, then it would also seem to follow that innovations are likely to occur at any time and in any region in which

devices are brought together which have hitherto existed in separate regions. This is an observed fact. The diffusion of culture traits from one culture area to another is quite generally accompanied by innovation. Indeed, so striking is the stimulus which results from culture contacts that it has been called the "cross-fertilization" of cultures. But it is the tools themselves, not the people, that have been hybridized. Such innovations—and they include some of the most important technological advances in history—are not to be explained by any special excitation of the imaginations of the people among whom they occur. As a matter of fact the people most directly concerned are usually quite unaware of the importance of what is going on; and furthermore, once the mutually conditioning devices have been brought together no sublime inspiration is necessary to the recognition of the pattern. The combination occurs almost "of itself," often quite anonymously. That is one reason why the history of mechanical inventions is so difficult to trace. No one has bothered to record the event because no one is aware that an act of "heroism" has been committed. It remains for later historians gradually to become aware of the transcendent importance of these almost surreptitious developments. Regarding them, as it is their habit to regard all history, as the sum of the acts of individual men, they are at a loss for an adequate explanation. But on the cultural level of generalization, regarded as combinations of physically existing devices, these innovations are not only explicable but inevitable. Where cultures meet, cross-fertilization is to be expected. It is a direct result of the physical embodiment of technical behavior patterns in tools and physical materials.

We have here the explanation of the "inscrutable" propensity of all technological devices to proliferate. This propensity is a characteristic not of men but of tools. Granted that tools are always tools of men who have the capacity to use tools and therefore the capacity to use them together, combinations are bound to occur. Furthermore it follows that the more tools there are, the greater is the number of potential combinations. If we knew nothing of history but had somehow come to understand the nature of our tools, we could infer that technological development must have been an accelerating process, almost imperceptibly slow in its earlier stages and vertiginously fast in its most recent phase. This is, of course, the observed fact. Mr. H. G. Wells, with his gift for dramatizing history, has remarked that the entire development of civilization (as distinguished

from "savagery") has occurred within roughly one hundred generations, which is perhaps not more than one one-hundredth part of the experience of the race. The machine age occupies not more than one-tenth of this period; the mass-production age, one one-hundredth. The old stone age was of prodigious length; the new stone age much shorter but still many times longer than the whole of subsequent history. Archeologists and historians are well aware of this fact. Indeed, it is one of their persistent puzzles. But it is a puzzle to which the analysis of mechanical invention now provides a key.

For the tool-combination principle is indeed a law of progress. If we suppose that tool combinations occur in the same fashion as that in which digits are combined in the mathematical theory of permutations, then the resulting series is a progressive one in the mathematical sense of a series each member of which is derived from each preceding member by the same operation. In such a case it would be sharply progressive in the sense that the number of combinations would increase very rapidly, that is by squares:

$$x;\ x^2;\ (x^2)^2;\ ((x^2)^2)^2 \ldots \text{ or } x;\ x^2;\ x^4;\ x^8 \ldots .$$

Obviously this supposition at once calls for a number of reservations. We do not know that tool combinations occur according to the mathematical law of permutations. Indeed we have no way of knowing for any given set of tools, devices, or materials, how many combinations are possible. We know only those that actually occur, and even these present a problem of enumeration which is perhaps insoluble, as is the initial enumeration of the given set. The mathematical analogy also takes no account of time, although time is of the essence of an actual historical sequence. Does the completion of each stage of the progressive series represent a year or a thousand years? Does the time span increase for successive stages as the magnitude of the sets increases? Clearly the mathematical representation of the actual process of technological combination can be nothing more than illustrative, and illustrative only of one aspect of the process, that of increasing magnitude.

Nevertheless the analogy is highly suggestive. Although no one supposes that history conforms to any simple mathematical series, the idea that the actual technological process is progressive and accelerating has occurred to a number of students in widely separated fields of inves-

tigation.[4] This principle is not teleological, any more than the physical principles of gravitation or centrifugence. It need not be supposed that any given invention is "bound" to occur. Certainly it will not occur if the solar system is obliterated by the collision of the sun with a wandering comet, nor will it occur if the human species is suddenly and completely obliterated by disease. It will not occur at any given time in any given community if all technological development, or even that particular strain of technological developments, is inhibited by contrary forces at work in that community at that time. No one supposes that the technological process is the whole of culture, any more than anyone supposes that centrifugence is the only physical force to which inhabitants of the surface of the earth are subject. On the contrary, all students of technology have recognized that it is but one aspect of culture and that culture exhibits another aspect which is inhibitory to the technological process just as gravitation inhibits centrifugence. In some communities, apparently, technological progress has been totally arrested. Stone-age culture is still extant in certain regions. There is no community whose history does not reveal periods in which technology has been virtually stationary for long periods of time. But these facts do not deny the existence of technology nor invalidate the analysis of technological development in terms of a continuous, cumulative, progressive process, any more than the fact that we do not fly off at a tangent to the earth's surface invalidates the principle of centrifugence. It means that other forces also are at work, not that technological progress is an illusion.

---

[4]For example, Alfred (Count) Korzybski, *The Manhood of Humanity* (1922), p. 20: "' . . . the spectacle we behold is that of advancement in scientific knowledge and technical power according to the law and at the rate of a rapidly increasing geometric progression or logarithmic function"; R. D. Carmichael, *The Logic of Discovery* (1930), pp. 144-5: "(Man's) law of progress seems to be that of the geometrical ratio. As equal intervals of time are added to his experience he seems to increase his wealth of thought in an approximately fixed ratio. . . . The recent rapid development of mathematical science gives support to the law of geometrical progression as the law of man's growth. This body of doctrine has increased at a rate which itself has an increasing rate so that the total body of it in our day has become larger than anyone two generations ago could have contemplated as possible"; George Sarton, *The Study of the History of Science* (1936), p. 20: " . . . the progress of science is constantly accelerated and hence . . . more and more is accomplished in shorter and shorter periods."

Granting all this, some students of the social sciences hesitate to identify technological development with progress for another reason. The concept of progress is in bad odor at the present time, and rightly so. In the past, progress has been conceived in terms of the prevailing transcendentalism as movement toward a preconceived end or consummatory state. This consummatory state, as we now realize, has always been a projection, or "collective representation," of prevailing culture. That is, every people has conceived "heaven," or perfection, as the pure essence of its own prevailing institutions or mores, just as Dante pictured paradise and purgatory in terms of his own (community engendered) preferences and prejudices. We know today—it is a ground principle of modern social science—that such conceptions have no general validity, and students of the social sciences are therefore chary of any assumption which embodies them.

But when they insist that any conception of progress must be transcendental, they go beyond scientific caution. Why "must" it? What does "must" mean in this connection? It cannot mean that no other conception is possible, since another actually exists. It has been employed in mathematics since ancient times without demur. It is entirely clear and definite. Why, then, should its employment in the analysis of technology arouse resistance? But social progress, we are told, "must" be movement toward a preconceived end. Why "must" it? There is only one answer to this question. Although modern social studies have convinced us that human behavior exhibits no such "end" and therefore no such movement, we are still sufficiently obsessed by traditional ways of thinking to retain the conviction that if we are to think about social progress at all, we must do so in terms of transcendental "ends." We "must" because that is the traditional way of thinking.

This sense of intellectual compulsion to follow traditional ways of thinking is bound up with our whole conception of value and our emancipation will certainly not be complete until it has included that category. But the analysis of technological process by students of mechanical invention and of the history of science and the arts is already sufficient to indicate the existence in all culture of a dynamic force, a phase of culture which is in itself and of its own character innovational, one in which change is continuous and cumulative and always in the same direction, that of more numerous and more complex technological devices. It may be objected

that the very word "direction" implies an "end," but this is not so. Direction is implicit in the nature of a series. The series of cardinal numbers is directional, since the numbers continually grow larger as we count. It would be ridiculous to say that in counting we are striving to approximate infinity, or that counting is meaningless except as infinity is preconceived to be its end, and it is just as ridiculous to insist that no continuous process can be conceived in the realm of culture except in terms of a preconceived end.

Indeed, the restoration of the concept of progress is one of the crying needs of contemporary social science. The truth is, our agnosticism has gone too far. In ridding our minds of the naïve collective representations of the past we have gone so far as to deny the intelligibility of any sort of pattern in cultural development. But the development of culture exhibits pattern. The successive layers of artifacts which are laid bare by the digging of the archeologists are not a sheer hodge-podge conglomeration. Each successive layer is somehow related to those below and those above, and the relationship exhibits some sort of continuous process. Whatever the function be called which differentiates one from another, it is a continuous function and still further differentiates the second layer above from the second layer below.

To economists this problem of pattern is presented in the form of industrialization. It is a real problem. Something or other has been going on continuously. Whether good or bad, purgatorial or paradise-approximating, it is the same process in each generation. What is this process? Traditional economic thinking has attributed this continuous development to the agency of business enterprise, and this attribution has been one of the basic postulates of that way of thinking. But its technological character has been suspected all along by intellectual mavericks. It is now strongly substantiated by all the studies which have contributed to our present understanding of the technological process. Students of economics are therefore confronted by a challenge. In spite of traditional assumptions, the origin and development of the industrial economy remains a mystery. Can the technological principle of explanation resolve this mystery? It is to this challenge that we should address ourselves.

THE GROUND ALFRED KAZIN STANDS ON

By GRANVILLE HICKS

THE JUDGMENT of contemporary literature is always difficult, for it is our own and it speaks to us in a special way. Justice Holmes, if I remember correctly, once said in a letter that nobody could be interested in a book that was more than a year old, and the truth in the exaggeration cuts through a good deal of cant. In music Mozart and Beethoven are still in active competition with Shostakovich and Aaron Copeland. In literature the majority read almost nothing but the literature of the present while a small minority read almost nothing but the literature of the past. The latter necessarily have nothing to say about modern literature, and the former cannot measure it easily by the standard of past achievement.

The task of a contemporary American critic is peculiarly hard, for today there is a great body of work that has unmistakable merit and that deserves and demands his attention. Even if the critic bears in mind that certain authors of the past have written better books than these current works, he is likely to feel that there is little profit in his repeating, "Not quite first-rate, not quite first-rate." Therefore, if he is honest and serious, he tries to illuminate the virtues without obscuring the defects. The result, however, is often curiously false: the critic, trying hard not to be injudicious, only succeeds in exaggerating the shortcomings of his contemporaries in relation to their achievements, while at the same time giving a general impression that they are considerably closer to greatness than anyone is likely to think a decade or two hence.

In certain ways our period has been highly favorable to the growth of literary talent. In the course of the triumphant battle against the taboos, the writers of the middle generation created a reading public (large enough to be taken into account by the publishers) that is friendly to experiment. Literature is taken more seriously than ever before in America, and America is taken more seriously than ever before in the world. But at the same time the strains to which writers—and not merely American writers, of course—are subjected are peculiarly hostile to the highest literary achieve-

ment. The writer struggles against the symptoms of disease in himself and in his world, and the sense of strain is the hallmark of our literature.

We have critics who can comment acutely on this book or that or even on this or that author, but few of these men and women have tried to generalize about modern literature as such, and those few have chiefly served to underline the difficulty of the task. That is why one turns eagerly to Alfred Kazin's *On Native Grounds,*[1] which surveys the whole of American prose of the twentieth century, and one's eagerness is naturally increased by the high praise the book has received.

II

If Mr. Kazin's book limits itself to fiction, criticism, and some works of philosophy, economics, and journalism, and if it suffers by the omission of poetry and drama, it does embrace the entire modern period, from the later Howells to the latest Steinbeck. By thus taking into its province the three generations whose works constitute American prose literature of this century, it exhibits such continuity as this literature has as well as its abrupt discontinuities. In this age, as has often enough been pointed out, one generation has come quickly after another, usually with foot raised for a contemptuous kick, and when one of these generations is considered by itself, as in Beach's *American Fiction, 1920-1940* or Geismar's *Writers in Crisis,* the effect is to exaggerate the isolation. Mr. Kazin knows that each generation has belligerently set itself apart from its predecessors, and he makes all that needs to be made of the absence of a sustaining tradition, but his book permits one to see the framework within which the sudden changes have taken place.

The book is divided into three parts: "The Search for Reality (1890-1917)," "The Great Liberation (1918-1929)," and "The Literature of Crisis (1930-1940)." Mr. Kazin is twenty-seven, and his age, though in most ways irrelevant, does influence his attitude towards his three groups. The writers of the first generation are, obviously, a long distance away from him; they are writers he has "worked up," read only, or chiefly, for research purposes, and he maintains toward most of them a slightly disinterested curiosity, occasionally touched by surprise. On Howells—for whom he has so marked and so sound a feeling that I hope he will do the full-length study he has talked of doing—he is illuminating, but about the

[1]Reynal & Hitchcock, 1942. 541 pp., with index. $3.75.

younger writers of the '90's and the early part of the century he says mostly what has been said before, though he often says it well and sometimes, as in the paragraphs on Stephen Crane, brilliantly. Apart from the discussion of Howells, the most interesting section is the chapter on Edith Wharton and Theodore Dreiser, in which Kazin seems to be trying to say something new about both writers and not quite succeeding.

The second generation he approaches with more freshness and vigor. These are the writers whose reputations were still shining brightly when he reached, no doubt precociously, the age of serious reading. He witnessed the sudden decline of those reputations, but he merely witnessed it, taking no part in the critical battles that it involved. He can afford, therefore, to be sympathetic and generous, and he is generous, too generous, I think, to Cabell and Hergesheimer, and generous enough to Lewis and Anderson. It is perhaps only on Anderson and Ellen Glasgow that what he says seems to be definitive, but he writes about all the novelists of the '20's with a good deal of warmth and with substantially the right tone. As for his general feeling for the mood of the '20's, it is wholly sound, giving his comments a great superiority to the bizarre distortions of Maxwell Geismar's first and last chapters.

Good as Part II is, however, one senses in its concluding chapter, as in the whole of Part III, a sharp quickening of the author's critical pulse. Here at last he is talking about the books he grew up with, read as they came from the press, argued about with his friends. Here is the warmest feeling, and here are some of the finest insights. Nothing better, I think, has been written about Scott Fitzgerald or James T. Farrell, nor has anyone commented more wisely on the quality of the lost generation's disillusionment or described more eloquently the fierce, vengeful brutality of recent naturalism. On the other novelists of the '30's—Dos Passos, Hemingway, Steinbeck, Faulkner, and Wolfe—he seems to me somewhat less impressive, but there is not one of these novelists about whom he has not something new and discriminating to say.

Here, then, is a book that considers in detail as many as fifty writers of the twentieth century. With almost startling intensity Kazin has given himself to scores and scores of novels and books of criticism, relentlessly demanding of himself the fullest response of which he is capable. And rarely has he come away from them without some penetrating thrust of the imagination. This is the least that can be said of *On Native Grounds.*

III

If the majority of reviewers have said more than that, the reasons are easy to see. Whatever they have said—and some of them have made very extravagant statements indeed—they have in effect been acknowledging that this is an amazing book for so young a man to have written. Unquestionably it is, and a book that, regardless of the author's age, deserves generous praise. But no writer who has so exalted a conception as Mr. Kazin of the function of criticism would want his book to be examined only in the light of other persons' failures or to be measured only by the hasty enthusiasms of daily journalism. In speaking of other critics, he himself is always exacting, and it is perhaps no favor to him that most of those who have commented on his book have demanded of criticism far less than he demands.

It is, as it happens, by way of examining the demands he makes on other critics that we can best approach his conception of criticism and thus undertake a more fundamental analysis of his own work. Let us start with his section on V. L. Parrington. In the fifteen years since the appearance of the first two volumes of *Main Currents in American Thought,* it has been pointed out again and again that Parrington was indifferent to writers who did not have "ideas" and that in commenting on such writers he sometimes displayed not only indifference but also bad taste. But Mr. Kazin must belabor him again, bewailing Parrington's "indifference to the problems of art" so hotly that his qualified praise of Parrington as a student of intellectual currents, which after all was his own definition of himself, is wholly outweighed. He calls Parrington's "a mind that performed a notable service but was not notable in itself, one that was militant, occasionally moving, and significantly narrow." Surely one could not surmise from this that Kazin's debt to Parrington is so great that the first part of his book could not have been the same if Parrington's work had not appeared and that even the latter parts are frequently given much of their substance by a reliance on Parrington's methods. He scolds Parrington, but he uses him nevertheless, just as—in this section on Parrington—he borrows sentences from a lesser critic for whom he has a greater contempt.

Kazin's obligations to Van Wyck Brooks are more fully acknowledged, and I was not surprised to find in the first chapter many echoes of Brooks in the mournful contrast between American absence of tradition

and European richness. What did surprise me, however, when I reached page 181, was to find Kazin reproaching Brooks because "the directness of his attack on native standards also led him to associate everything at home with an absolute standard of European achievement." More seriously and more justly he attacks Brooks's latest work for its censoriousness. "There is sickness in contemporary literature," Kazin says, "a very great sickness; but it is hardly self-willed." Yet I wonder if there is anything in *The Opinions of Oliver Allston* more ill-naturedly censorious than Mr. Kazin's chapter, "Criticism at the Poles."

He can make allowances for a novelist's faults but seldom for a critic's. Even Edmund Wilson—whose very laundry checks, Kazin, as he once said in a review, would be glad to read—is given a "minus" after his "A." "What one missed in this criticism, of course," Kazin states, "was a positive affirmation, the intensity of a great conception." That, as it happens, is a good deal to miss, and the striking thing is that one misses it quite as much in Kazin as in Wilson. Indeed, one misses it more, for Wilson, with perhaps regrettable modesty, has always limited his themes, whereas Kazin, taking prose literature of five decades as his subject, presumably had something to say about that literature and not merely about particular authors and books. Yet there are no positive affirmations, and there are not even fundamental clarifications. Though Kazin is quick to complain of the philosophical confusions of others, he never reveals his own philosophy. He finds fault, for instance, with John Dewey for regarding evil "only as a problem, a hurdle to be overcome; never as a clue to man and his experience in nature"; but he does not set forth a view of the universe that would give such a comment meaning. Similarly he condescends to the progressives and abuses the Communists, but if there is a political theory behind these assaults, it is well concealed. One looks in vain in his preface for anything like the cool candor and precision with which F. O. Matthiessen in *American Renaissance* states his faith in democracy.

What, then, are the bases on which *On Native Grounds* is written? One of them, I think, is quite clearly a determination not to do certain things. "It may be sufficient to say here," Kazin writes in his preface, "that I have never been able to understand why the study of literature in relation to society should be divorced from a full devotion to what literature is in itself, or why those who seek to analyze literary texts should cut off the act of writing from its irreducible sources in the life of men." This is

well said, and even though Kazin in his Chapter XIV may exaggerate the "twin fanaticisms," he has been wholly right in seeking to avoid these opposing dangers. Yet the mere avoidance of error is far from "positive affirmation."

Then there is what Kazin calls "the greatest single fact about our modern American writing," by which he means "our writers' absorption in every last detail of their American world together with their deep and subtle alienation from it." On this theme he has good things to say, especially in the section on Thomas Wolfe, but in a last chapter, in the course of which he talks about the journalistic exploration of America—the W.P.A. guidebooks, the photographic studies, the books of travel, and so forth—he seems to overlook the more obvious explanations of the new interest in the American scene of the present and past, while striving for a subtlety that in the end becomes mere confusion.

The real organizing principle of the book is a faith—and I would call it a blind faith—in the importance of literature. I call it blind because it seems to me that Mr. Kazin does not know why he feels so intensely about books and their authors. His emotion is so vague, so diffuse, so out of proportion to his sensibility—which is nevertheless very real—that there is a painful contrast between what he says and the way he says it. The evidence is in the style, as two passages—one the conclusion of the section on Dreiser, the other the conclusion of the section on Robert Herrick—will show:

> An artist creates form out of what he needs; the function compels the form. Dreiser has been one of the great folk writers, as Homer, the author of *Piers Plowman,* and Whitman were folk writers—the spirits of simplicity who raise local man as they have known him to world citizenship because their love for him is their knowledge of him. "It was wonderful to discover America," Dreiser repeated once after another, "but it would have been more wonderful to lose it." No other writer has shared that bitterness, for no other has affirmed so doggedly that life as America has symbolized it is what life really is. He has had what only Whitman in all the history of the American imagination had before him—the desire to give voice to the Manifest Destiny of the spirit, to preserve and to fulfill the bitter patriotism of loving what one knows. All the rest have been appendages to fate.
>
> ✦ ✦ ✦
>
> In the end Herrick was caught between the materialism of the age—the materialism of reformers, politicians, journalists, and big business alike—and the ethical standard which oppressed him by its intensity, but which he could

> not successfully apply. If his novels seem to lack some final excellence, it is not so much because he occasionally compromised, but because his case histories of American business were moralities that he could not resolve plausibly for others. He could suffer with the best spirits in his books, but he could not liberate them; the climax in even his best novels is always a little absurd . . . . Herrick could not rise in his books to a naked *O Altitudo!* He had no supermen. The dream is always there, and the reality is always Chicago.

There are many such passages, passages that mean nothing at all or at any rate considerably less than Mr. Kazin must have thought they meant. They are not the product of wilful obscurity, the kind of pretentiousness with which some writers conceal their emptiness, for Kazin is always honest. They are the result of a violent emotion that has no clearly defined object. Kazin is seeking not to impress the reader but to express himself. His failure not merely to say what he wants to say but in some cases to say anything at all comes because he has nothing to say that is commensurate with what he feels.

IV

I ought to acknowledge before I go further that I am one of the critics with whom Mr. Kazin quarrels, that he refers to *The Great Tradition* as "not so much a bad book as a book of monumental naïveté," and that he calls me "a profoundly earnest but essentially unimaginative scholar" and "a little Calvin of the left." I don't particularly like those phrases, but my objections would not be worth recording if I did not feel that the entire section on Marxism is inadequate. Mr. Kazin has, I feel, a rather special animosity toward Marxism, an animosity that makes him see only one aspect of the rise of revolutionary sentiment in the '30's—its narrowness and bitterness. Here—and, as a matter of fact, in the whole chapter called "Criticism at the Poles"—the critic is fighting battles of his own, and I think he is less sure of himself than he tries to pretend. Mr. Kazin had good reasons for keeping aloof from the revolutionary movement in literature, but perhaps he had bad reasons too, and they may be on his conscience. Certainly he is quite wrong when he says that Marxism grew "increasingly narrow as time went on," for its tendency, as he in effect admits when he talks about my *Figures of Transition,* was in the other direction. But he must have his dichotomy—the growing fanaticism of the Marxists and the growing fanaticism of the formalists.

Yet in much of what he says about Marxism—and, for that matter, about my work as a Marxist—he is right. It is true, for instance, that the

vast generalizations and terrible impatience of Marxism acted like strong drink on the converts of the '30's. It is true, also, that the economic and philosophic generalizations of Marx and Engels, even insofar as they were sound, were so remote from literary experience that we Marxist critics could function only by improvising a whole new apparatus of cultural analysis. We were like interior decorators who might set out to furnish the top story of an apartment house that was as yet merely a structural frame. That was why, of course, whatever substantial work the Marxists did was in the field of the history of ideas. In the introduction to *Figures of Transition* I said, "In writing about the eighties and nineties I try to use history as an aid to the understanding of literature and literature as an aid to the understanding of history, and I am interested in both parts of the process. It would not occur to me to deny that there are many valid ways of writing about literature. I only maintain that this is one of them." I am therefore not greatly troubled when Kazin says that, "for all its quiet reasonableness, its clarity and many valuable insights, the book was essentially a study in social change rather than in literature." If we had contented ourselves with writing studies in social change, we might have made in the long run a contribution to criticism, and we would have little now for which to apologize. But the strong drink was acting upon us, and, especially in the early stages of our intoxication, we attempted tasks for which we were unprepared. Though there was considerably more sense than Mr. Kazin admits—he obviously has not looked for it—there was a good deal of foolishness written in *The New Masses* and other left-wing periodicals. There was also a good deal of stupid sectarianism, but this, far more often than Mr. Kazin admits, was the sectarianism of strong feeling rather than the sectarianism of the party line. Against this latter sectarianism most of us struggled, and the cause for regret is not that we succumbed, as Mr. Kazin would have it, but that we spent so much energy in resistance, and were so often distracted by irrelevant conflicts.

And whatever the justice of certain rebukes, it remains true that he misses the whole spirit of the left-wing movement in the '30's. He can see only the anger, the fear, and the partisanship. They were there, but so also were compassion and hope. If Mr. Kazin had studied more carefully the changes of tone in the novels of Dos Passos, Farrell, Steinbeck, and Hemingway, instead of treating the work of each author as a static whole, he would have perceived how, at that moment when they could believe,

they were lifted up. I know that what lifted them seems now—to them and to most of us—to have been an illusion, but it is a phenomenon not to be overlooked by the historian of literature that, as they felt themselves moving, not alone but with others, toward a society cleansed of foulness and disease, the most sensitive and acute of our novelists seemed to be freed of their own sicknesses. This is what a critic might look at, not the failures of the lame little men who hobbled along on dogmas.

All of this might be worth saying simply because I am the only person likely to say it, but there is another reason for my paying some attention to Mr. Kazin's treatment of Marxism. Although he grants that the Marxists asked certain important questions, he himself seems only mildly interested in those questions and the answers to them. He knows as well as anyone that we have a sick literature in a sick society, but he never squarely asks himself whether the literature can be cured without the cure of society. If I make him out correctly, he demands of writers solely that they be true to themselves as writers, that they use their talent, through the serious cultivation of their art with all its traditions, for the full rendering of what sense and sensibility yield. Perhaps this is enough to ask, and yet, when a Farrell or a Faulkner renders back nothing but the symptoms of disease, Kazin shakes his head forbiddingly, almost as if, like Brooks, he would require of them that they pull themselves up by their bootstraps.

It is a predicament in which anyone finds himself who asks of literature more than it can give. At one point Kazin says that the life of reason in our day survives only in literature. This is nonsense. The life of reason, by his own account, survives feebly in literature as it does in all the arts. It survives, also feebly, in education, government, science, and so forth and so on. One need not give literature a low place because one refuses to give it a uniquely high one among human activities. In ascribing to it a peculiar eminence Kazin falls into the faults of the formalists, but without so much justification as they have, for at least they have evolved a rationale that can be examined whereas he is operating upon the basis of unanalyzed emotion. This is why *On Native Grounds* is bookish. That is also why, though his comments on contemporary authors accurately recognize their defects, Kazin's discussion of them has the effect of making them seem more important than they are: he knows the faults of Wolfe and Faulkner and Dos Passos and Hemingway, but he cannot keep from turning their shortcomings into the blemishes of Titans.

The critic, if he is to perform his full function, must contrive to see his contemporaries in perspective without losing his interest in them and his awareness of the special importance they have for their readers. He must also be able to understand the limitations imposed by the times without either minimizing those faults for which writers cannot be held responsible or condoning those for which they can. Conversely, he must be able to demand of them their highest achievements without falling into impertinent peevishness. Mr. Kazin is not often peevish—though I am afraid he sometimes is—but one would be at a loss to say how he expects writers to make themselves better, except by gritting their teeth and clenching their wills.

I wish he had looked more resolutely at the whole problem of the writer's behavior in a diseased civilization. He seems to have been so horrified by the extravagances and follies of the left-wing movement in the '30's that he is unwilling to discuss directly the question of the writer and politics. Although I have said much on that subject that I would not repeat now, I was never foolish enough to suggest that there is a necessary connection between political beliefs and literary merit. But, whatever may be true of this writer or that, I doubt that the majority of writers are likely to be nonpolitical in times like these. If there are authors who can quietly and successfully go about their work while the world crumbles around them, that is the thing for them to do, but most writing men and women cannot deny their responsibilities to their fellow human beings without some vital loss to themselves. I believe that our writers would be stronger and better if they had today what some of them thought they had five or ten years ago—unity between themselves and their readers based on faith in and action for a social organization less viciously defective than ours. Even if they were only camp followers—as a decade ago Dos Passos wisely defined their role—they might lose the sense of frustration and helplessness that is so apparent in their work today. I am not saying that writers ought to go out and found a political party, but merely that Mr. Kazin as a critic might have lifted his nose for a moment out of his books.

Much of the time critics seem to be fighting the wrong battles. Mr. Kazin's "full devotion to what literature is in itself" and his protests against "driving criticism into a corner of sociology" would have been a splendid corrective half-a-dozen years ago. Now the need is for someone to say that writers do not have to choose between writing war slogans and pull-

ing themselves into a hole, that the people are listening for voices. And with all his insight and all his seriousness, Mr. Kazin says neither that nor anything else that quite justifies the emotional tone in which the book is written. At the end of his book, speaking against Brooks, he makes a just appeal for the tolerance of divergences in literature, but then he lapses —and this, I fear, is typical—into one of those possibly cryptic but more likely meaningless passages of which I have complained: "For the rest, the past is what it is; the record of modern literature in America is what men have made it. *They will have seen the new truth in larger and larger degree; and when it shall have become the old truth, they will perhaps have seen it all.* [His italics] We have seen it become the 'old truth.' We have not even begun to see it all—and what it may become." Perhaps he would have done better to wait until he knew what he meant.

COUNTERATTACK IN CONGRESS

By HERMAN SCHNURER

THE NATURE of the postwar world is being shaped not only by fighting men deployed all over the globe, but also by Messrs. McKellar, Smith, Fish, Cox, Knutson, Jonkman, Nye in the United States Congress, by them and their associates and by the pressures behind them. If these gentlemen are allowed their way, they may well disorganize the war effort; they are almost certain to concoct a monstrous peace which will be the prelude to a third war to end all wars.

The whole civil service is on its way to methodical decapitation. Public officials of skill and integrity are being lynched legally, while in the House of Representatives the majority rises to its feet and cheers the ineffable Mr. Dies to the echo.

A cabal of self-righteous Southern politicians who think they are living in 1855, brazenly announces its intention to subvert radically the whole character and function of our presidential elections. Governor Dixon can declare war on our institutions because he knows the Republican party needs him and his accomplices and thinks it can use the Southern bloc to advantage.

Labor and the small farmer are being subjected to a scientific and ruthless blitz, complete with both classic and streamlined tactics, war of nerves, shifting slogans *et tout le tremblement.* We are witnessing the accelerated tempo of a campaign which was well on its way before Pearl Harbor.

This paper will describe specifically what the reactionaries have done so far in the 78th Congress.

How to Scuttle the Peace

"Look to the motive," said Mr. Wilkins.
David Copperfield

The opponents of the New Deal were quick to sense that for the time being its peace program could not be met frontally. Accordingly, they slid into position by stages. These are the successive lines of attack:

1. Let us win the war first. This is no time for "theory."
2. Security is a fine thing. The economy of abundance is great. But nothing that the administration brings up in the concrete is practical.
3. Not only is it impractical, it is also excrutiatingly funny. Isn't it a little crazy?
4. The economy of abundance is bad in itself. Insecurity, hate, and bloodshed are inevitable. Let us proclaim our cynicism. Human nature never changes.

All these attitudes persist today, sometimes singly, at other times in combination. But even the pretense of acquiescence to the Atlantic Charter is on the downgrade. Fundamental hostility to the things we tell the world through our Office of War Information is much bolder today than it was, say, in November, before the results of the election had jelled, before the African campaign, before the mighty sweep of the Russian armies. We are being faced with the political climate of 1919.

Says the Honorable Mr. Gifford:

> There are two opinions . . . . One is that we need to formulate the peace now or else the United Nations might not continue to fight. But some of the nations might not fight because the peace plans might not suit them. Therefore, I say, let us first win the war and be content with the general aims of the Atlantic Charter. It will take many years to formulate a plan for a United Nations of the World. Let us give this attention. Even if you be misunderstood and accused of lack of idealism, urge caution in our leaders and better control of their enthusiasm to involve our country into the maelstrom of world politics.

It is apparent that Mr. Gifford is fighting a prehistoric war and not this one. Even Clausewitz—certainly not a Utopian, but a soldier, a he-man—even Clausewitz, in the eighteenth century, knew that diplomacy is a powerful weapon of war and goes hand in hand with military operations. One dramatic event after another demonstrates that we are already "in the maelstrom of world politics," that we must plan fully, specifically, intelligently; if possible, quickly. We can't lose a minute, and we need every expert we can find. The Hindus fail to co-operate with the United Nations; the Burmese mount a colossal fifth column against the British. Why? On the other hand, the Filipinos believe us when we promise them their independence. Why? Mr. Middleton of *The New York Times* has told us vividly what food meant to the Algerian population and to the course of the African campaign. Bottles of milk and first-aid kits make powerful weapons. Immediately after the first World War, these weapons were used in one way in Belgium and in Poland; they were used far differently and with startling and deadly effect in Finland, Hungary, and Russia.

These things should be platitudes were it not that systematic obfuscation is on the march today. A person like Mrs. Luce, who is relatively literate, professes to accept these truisms. But the Luce Board of Strategy having decided that the gentlewoman from Connecticut was henceforth to become an expert in aviation, she elegantly (and, oh, so wittily!) maintains that Mr. Wallace, poor dear, is really a Babe in the Woods when it comes to *her* specialty. How can there be freedom of the air without hurting American interests? "One usually finds," she says, "that the higher the plane on which Mr. Wallace puts his economic arguments, the lower (it turns out) American living standards will fall." Thus runs the second attitude outlined above: Say something, do something. We'll fix you.

Reasoning from a basic assumption, the economics of scarcity, it doesn't occur to Mrs. Luce that we are facing something completely new in the history of the world when we double the prewar productive capacity of the country; that our surplus can help the rest of the world to its advantage and to ours. In modulated, hystrionic tones, she calls upon us "to take henceforth in the skies that position of enlightened democratic leadership which Great Britain held and still holds on the seas."

I have said nothing about "globaloney." If we had more space, an analysis of Mrs. Luce's forensic style would throw a rather interesting light on her temper. I simply want to point out that she is not entirely responsible for the use of her rare find at the hands of Messrs. Hearst, Gannett, Patterson, and McCormick. Mrs. Luce is not an intellectual heavyweight; she is not devoid of either vanity or meretricious ambition. But she does not belong to that clan. Her speech drives her into their arms, but it isn't because she wills it; she certainly has better taste, and, I believe, a better conscience. I do have one very serious charge to level against her: she has completely failed to resist the contagion of waggishness which has greeted Mr. Wallace's speeches. Of all the horrors of war, this is not the least difficult to bear.

The *Congressional Record* is replete with skittishness; it is full of capers, gambols, and puckish deviltry. Would you like to examine a couple of samples? First, let us listen to the Hon. Mr. Knutson:

> I like to think as one with Henry Wallace, coming, as I do, from one of the great dairying sections of the country. It thrills me to think that after this war is over, Uncle Sam, with millions of cases of milk, will visit the underprivileged families in all the world and set a bottle of Minnesota milk down in front of each

member of the family every morning. It certainly would create a market for milk, and that is good news out in Minnesota. Little has yet been said about cake and butter, but they will get around to that oversight soon. Of course, if we are going to do all these things for all these people, what will be left for us Americans? As I understand the program, the plan is to set up a glorified W.P.A. with a glorified Harry Hopkins to administer it. I presume we will set great, big tables with what we Scandinavians call *Smörgasbord,* where they may go round the table and help themselves—not you, but they . . . .

I hope we will not spend all that we have in this war. Let us save something to spend in making this a better world for those who have not and do not miss what they do not have.

Next, let us hear the Hon. Mr. Hoffman, of Michigan. His colleague, Mr. Bradley, from the same state, had introduced two bills for the protection of dogs and had just finished a touching address on the admirable virtues of his Springer spaniel, who is ten years old and who has his American Kennel Club number tattooed on the inside of his ears. Mr. Johnson, of Oklahoma, having objected to the propriety of Mr. Bradley's outburst at this time, the Hon. Mr. Hoffman rose to his feet and addressed the House as follows:

. . . May I say to the gentleman who protests the remarks of the gentleman from Michigan that the gentleman from Michigan does love dogs, and I never knew this to be a crime . . . .

Now that we are in this war, of course, our first business is to take care of the people, but I suppose that before the war is over, some of these doers of good, like Harry Hopkins and some others of those people down there, will be taking care of the dogs, the Chinese dogs, and the dogs of all those people down in South Africa, and in India, Europe, and Asia. If they are going to take care of those dogs all over the world, why should my colleague from Michigan be criticized for advocating a measure which he thinks will conserve dogs, when they are being sought by the Army for war service and for thinking that maybe the dogs here in America should be protected? Congress has been treated like dogs. During the last campaign, we were treated worse than cur dogs . . . .

I regret to say that at this point Mr. Hoffman loses his elfin touch and begins to remind one of Signor Gayda. But the excerpts I have adduced will give you an idea of the humor which is being inflicted on us. The tactics behind this buffoonery are clear enough: Wallace is crazy. Q. E. D.

Now for the fourth, the fundamentalist, the cynical attack: human nature never changes. Judging from the frequency of its occurrence in

the *Congressional Record* and in the press, I fear that it is by far the most prevalent view among the opposition today.

As the Hon. Mr. Calvin D. Johnson of Illinois makes his debut in the House, he announces that he has taken fourteen pledges. Here is number 7:

> I pledge that I shall check carefully all postwar plans which tend to create a fanciful Utopia among all nations, as history has taught us that in Europe the classes of divided people have fought incessantly since the dawn of history and will, in my opinion, continue until the end of time.

Thus, too, the Hon. Mr. Woodruff:

> The war in which we are engaged will teach the world nothing. I have no doubt that strong men, greedy men now in high places, and others of like character seeking high places are already intriguing, scheming to secure for themselves and for the nations to which they belong those things which will give them an unfair advantage over others. This has been human experience since time began, and to me, it seems both wishful thinking and folly to believe there can overnight be a complete transformation of individuals, singly and collectively, growing out of this struggle.

A realist, you see.

Let us finish with the Hon. Mr. Jonkman:

> . . . I say to you, my friends, the so-called "four freedoms" of the Atlantic Charter are a myth and a snare to shackle the unwary, the bait for which is greatly extended social security, and unless the American people are vigilant, the bureaucrats will have the shackles riveted on their limbs before they realize it. For these "four freedoms" are exactly the freedom of the slaves of the totalitarian states . . . .
>
> A constantly increasing number of the people are becoming awake to these trends and dangers, and there can be no doubt but that the last election constituted a mandate to the Congress to beware of foreign freedoms and especially the "four freedoms" of the Atlantic Charter and similar ideologies.

It should be perfectly clear by this time that the National Resources Planning Board was bound to get short shrift when its appropriation came up. And it had to happen at a tragic time, when the country is in dire need of its services.

"Look to the motive," Mr. Wilkins was wont to repeat in *David Copperfield*. That motive isn't hard to find: fear. Mr. Wallace had called the turn:

> We cannot go back to the past complete lack of economic responsibility and insure full employment at the same time. I hope that some kinds of easy money-

> making are gone for good—money made by old-fashioned manipulation of security markets and of speculative commodity markets, or by the unrestricted use of business monopoly powers which strangle trade, kill competition, and cut down production of jobs . . . . Government can and will accept the major responsibilities for filling in whatever gaps business leaves.

To the Tory mind this is horrific: production, not scarcity and depressions; planning, not anarchy; equality of opportunity and of sacrifice, not loaded dice. Insurance companies, the personal loan business, real estate, consumption industries, advertising, teaching, and medicine—everything is affected.

The opposition is motivated by stupid, frenzied fear. Their own people tell them that this is a revolution. Even Mr. Hoover talks in those terms. They can find nothing better to do than to bat down, indiscriminately, ragingly, incoherently, anything the administration proposes.

It remains to be seen whether the more intelligent and moderate among the conservatives—the Willkies, Burtons, Stassens, Luces—can do anything with them. For the time being, it looks grim. It is so much easier to destroy, so much harder to pick up the pieces!

How to Decapitate the Civil Service

> *Calomniez! Calomniez! Il en reste toujours quelque chose.* (Slander away! Slander away! There is always a residue.)
>
> Beaumarchais—*The Barber of Saville*

Six weeks after the 78th Congress had assembled, Mr. Sabbath of the House Committee on Rules, who was laboring under the impression that he was there to serve his country and not for the purpose of conjugating the verb "to investigate," said in lamentable accents that he was very, very tired. Mr. Sabbath had done his honest stint in the House of Representatives for thirty-six years. Never in all his experience had he seen anything like the avalanche of investigations, universal in scope, loose in definition, vindictive in purpose. The occasion which brought about the Congressman's despondency was that the Committee on Appropriations was proposing to become a part of the judiciary arm of the government. That is the outstanding trait of all the spiteful investigating committees set up under the aegis of the Southern bloc; they are judiciary in function without any judiciary safeguards to the thousands of individuals whose careers and reputations are now to be at their mercy. The investigators see no

need to listen to any of the people branded as reds and crackpots. Why consider evidence? "The average man on the street knows these bureaus are run by Communists or that they have Communistic influences, and he does not want us to appropriate money to further that course," says Mr. Curtis of Nebraska. Oh, that man in the street! "How I appreciate these lawyers," says Mr. Gifford of Massachusetts, more in sorrow than in anger. "Thank God I am not a lawyer. I can look at things with some balance, I think. But a lawyer wants a jury. He accepts no ex parte accusation."

It was Mr. Cox of Georgia who first gave the nation a foretaste of the balanced outlook. What follows comes straight out of Mr. Cox's own speech on January 11, 1943. In the town of Albany, Georgia, there had been a broadcasting station for some time. But it seems that a lifelong friend of the Congressman, Mr. McIntosh, who is also editor of the *Albany Herald,* wanted another station. Mr. Cox, by his own admission, made numerous *démarches* to the Federal Communications Commission and another radio station was then built in Albany. But the Congressman soon became aware that in addition to the duplication of radio services in the same town, another factor was likely to jeopardize Mr. McIntosh's station; the Commission, to quote Mr. Cox, was "hostile to newspaper ownership and operation of radio."

Apprized of this strange prejudice, the management of Mr. McIntosh's station decided to circumvent the Commission by issuing stock in an entirely new corporation. This corporation presented a $2500 check to Mr. Cox. He says it was all done without his knowledge and at the suggestion of Mr. McIntosh. The Congressman, however, endorsed the check. He bought stock in the company with it, and "turned it over to a private little charity." Thereupon the Commission sent investigators into Albany. They "rifled" the files of the *Herald,* the station, and counsel for the corporation. They looked into Mr. Cox's income tax returns, and into the transactions of his secretary. They even approached the Department of Justice about the matter.

This is the way Mr. Cox tells it. He never went near the Federal Communications Commission after buying that stock; the actions of the "spies," "snoopers," and "gestapo" who work for the Commission headed by Mr. Fly, all show definitely (according to Mr. Cox) that the whole agency ought to be investigated. The gentleman from Georgia said that

he was holding himself back; were he disposed to go into Mr. Fly's record, he could "cover him with filth." He would simply content himself with the assertion that "this Commission as run by Fly is the nastiest nest of rats to be found in the entire country."

A committee was accordingly

> authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of the organization, personnel, and activities of the Federal Communications Commission with a view to determining whether or not such commission in its organization, in the selection of its personnel, and in the conduct of its activities, has been, and is, acting in accordance with law and the public interest.

The Hon. Mr. Cox is chairman of that committee.

Now I know nothing about that $2500 except what the gentleman from Georgia has told us. But it is evident from his own explanation that whether he knew about the gift of the check or not, he endorsed it; that he gave the stock he purchased with it, to a charity—a fact which is either irrelevant or an indication that he did not consider it proper to keep the securities; and that thereafter he kept away from the Commission. This, too, seems clear: if it was unethical to go to the Commission after the receipt of that money, can it be ethical for him to investigate an authority which has jurisdiction over a corporation so friendly to him? And if the language he used about Mr. Fly and the Commission is a sign of his restraint, can you imagine how disinterested and constructive that investigation is likely to prove?

This was the character of the curtain raiser which served to announce the arrival of the virtuoso in the art of legal lynching, the Hon. Mr. Martin Dies[1] himself.

Nothing can give even a faint idea of the violence, the scurrility, and the sheer malice of his smear speeches except first-hand examination of the *Congressional Record*. The press usually reports them in very general terms and only rarely with critical overtones. On Monday mornings when news is scarce—the statesman from Texas has a very good sense of timing—the press finds space for his fulminations. This time he outdid himself; so much so that there were more protests (outside the liberal press) than

[1] ". . . hissing through his teeth, rending the air with bloodcurdling yelps, freezing the very marrow of our bones with his tales of fearsome, ferocious government clerks who read the *New Republic*." Harold Ickes, *New York Times*, February 13.

there had ever been. *The New York Times,* which is not exactly noted for its Stalinist views, had this to say:

> Mr. Dies . . . profers a list of persons holding Federal jobs whom he appears to consider allies of Communism. Concerning some of those mentioned, the imputation is sheer nonsense. About others, one simply doesn't know. If Mr. Dies is going to make these charges. he ought just as publicly to produce his evidence. It is not evidence to establish that Mr. X, a self-styled liberal, knows Mr. Y, a Communist sympathizer, who is acquainted with Mr. Z, a Communist Party member. It is not evidence that a name is found on a left-wing or right-wing sucker list. If Mr. Dies believes in the old American principle of fair play and fair trial, he ought to bring forth some real evidence or stop blackening people's names.

Anyone can see at once that Mr. Dies doesn't make charges just to amuse himself. The threat he presents is that he is playing a part in a general campaign. The plan is simple. Denunciation comes first. If the agency isn't intimidated into firing the men he calumniates, then the next step is either to cut the appropriation of that agency or to abolish it altogether. If an executive branch of the government can not be starved out, the next thing to do is to offer an amendment to the bill appropriating money for that branch. This is what happened in the case of William Pickens, an employee of the Treasury Department. The amendment specified that no money allocated to the department could be used to pay Mr. Pickens and 38 other people included by the most arbitrary method in the death sentence.

It was the first intention of the Congressional terrorists to guillotine these men by the cartful; to try them en masse without any hearing. The maneuver failed and the accused had to be considered separately. The point was duly made that every employee of the government must take an oath of loyalty, the infraction of which entails drastic penalties. The Department of Justice is the proper agency to call in if there is any question concerning the opinions of a given official. "Ah," say the inquisitors, "the man claims that he isn't a Communist now, but what is to guarantee that he wasn't a Communist ten years ago?"—a Communist being defined as a man "accused of carrying concealed ideas on his person." It's the story of the wolf and the lamb all over again.

> The wolf and the lamb are drinking in the same stream.
> "Hey you! You're muddying the stream," says the wolf.
> "How can I?" asks the lamb, "You're upstream from me."

"Well then, you did it last year."

"I wasn't born last year."

"Well if it wasn't you, it was your father or your uncle or somebody who reminds me of you."

If you believe things like that only happen in Aesop's *Fables,* then you haven't listened to the Hon. Mr. Cannon of Florida. Quoth that distinguished jurist:

> Whatever this Congress can create, this Congress can destroy, be it authority, an appropriation, or any other thing—including a job any person may hold. Therefore, if a man's character has come into question, be he Communist, be he white, black, green, or yellow, I say to you that arbitrarily, based again on our wisdom or lack of it, we can lop off the salary of any person as we see fit and particularly are we bound in duty to do this when the loyalty of a person involved has been questioned. That is what I have done today. I did not of necessity believe the charges that I have heard. I may or may not believe them. I do believe that sufficient question has been raised to announce to this country that a man or woman does not have a property right in any Federal job. If their name or associations have led any prudent man to believe that they may have now or may have had in the past, any Communistic tendencies to overthrow our form of government with force and violence. [*Sic*] That being true, we can certainly vote them out of any job that we see fit.

Again:

> . . . Any man who has ever willfully with knowledge or without knowledge had his name appear in some funny organization that turned out to be not what they proclaimed, I say that in itself is quite enough for me insofar as my vote is concerned to strike his name from any taxpayers' payroll.

Aesop's wolves, like von Tirpitz' submarines, traveled alone. *Autres temps, autres moeurs.* The modern way is to hunt in packs. The latest quarry is the Bureaucrat. He is a sinister fellow. He is solely responsible for tire, gas, sugar, and bean rationing. He is solely responsible for taxes, irritations, and the weather. He has an associate known as Absenteeism to whom we shall come around very soon. Between the two of them, they are the cause of all the privations and rancors which every war entails.

We have seen Mr. Cox and Mr. Dies in action. Let us take a look at Mr. Smith of Virginia, who from the very first resisted the Wagner Act with implacable hatred and sabotaged everything from the Minimum Wage Act to the Fair Employment Practice Committee. At the bottom of the depression, when wages in the state of Virginia were shockingly, criminally low, and when his actions earned him the epithet "Dime-an-hour

Smith," the gentleman from Virginia appointed himself the champion of the Constitution and freely incited the industrialists in his district to flout the law: he was sure that all this legislation would be declared null and void by the Supreme Court.

As the Supreme Court was very thoughtless about the whole thing, Mr. Smith has been waxing more and more wroth with the passage of time. And as it is a little impractical to indict the Supreme Court (though that has been tried, as witness the juristic essays of Westbrook Pegler) Mr. Smith has been compelled to change his tactics. This is his big moment. He is now chairman of a committee whose scope is simply "to conduct investigations of any action, rule, procedure, regulation, order, or directive taken or promulgated by any department or independent agency of the Federal Government." You can readily see that Mr. Dies is a piker. Mr. Smith alone is in a position to carry out the full implication of Mr. Gifford's great slogan, "Make the Communists say, 'Never say Dies.' " (Mr. Gifford is very proud of that slogan and he doesn't fail to remind the House that he is its original source.)

So much for Mr. Smith. In the Senate we have the Byrd Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. While services are being eliminated *in toto* through committee action, and while forms, questionnaires, investigations and the cost thereof furnish the pabulum for so much patriotic fervor, Senator Byrd, up to the present, has met with only one rebuff. On January 5 he was interrogating Major General Philip A. Flemming, administrator of the Federal Works Agency. The General, who is a polished man, turned smilingly to the Senator and pointed out that the questionnaire which his agency had just been compelled to fill out for the committee, had cost the people $2520.17. He also pointed out that the questions were so loaded as to furnish a wholly erroneous picture of his agency. *The New York Times* story which reported this incident did not specify the effect of the General's observations on Senator Byrd.

If one set of questionnaires designed to eradicate questionnaires costs all that money for one agency, Senator Byrd's economy committee bids fair to belie its title. But what is one to say about Senator McKellar's resolution whose purpose is no more nor less than to have the Senate investigate and pass upon every Federal employee who makes $3800 a year or more? These employees are estimated by the press to number 70,000. Overlooking for a moment such sordid details as the pork barrel possibilities of the

resolution; overlooking also its inquisitorial aspects; overlooking the confusion and uncertainty which this terroristic procedure can not but bring at a time when precision and foresight are essential to the war effort, one is led to anticipate the Bigger and Better Economics which are in store for us.

At the time of this writing, Senator McKellar has graciously consented to remove the salary specification. His "Commandos"—the martial description is the brain child of Representative Dirksen—can now be hurled against the following four classes of officials:

1) Anyone who makes policy.

2) Anyone who issues regulations.

3) Any economist (Economist: related somehow to Bureaucrat and to Absenteeism).

4. Attorneys.

Who is to stop these valiant "Commandos"? They control the party machine. They have garrotted committee after committee. And there is every indication that the Republicans are determined to play ball with them. Thereby hangs a tale.

How to Fiddle While Rome Burns

"See what the boys in the back room will have."
Marlene Dietrich, in *Destry Rides Again*

It does not take a Mark Hanna to see what the boys are up to. The war is far away. It is being fought in Gafsa, Akyab, Lae, and Staraya Russa. Viewed from the Mayflower Hotel, the things that happen in those outlandish places are of secondary interest. The presidential elections of 1944 are something else again.

I want to call attention to three related events:

1) Governor Frank M. Dixon's speech before the Southern Society in New York, on December 11, 1942.

2) Minority Leader Joe Martin's speech, which answered it in effect.

3) Mr. Edward Flynn's Waterloo in the Senate, a defeat which transcends his failure to get to Australia.

This is what Gov. Dixon had to say:

> The position of the Southern people has always been difficult. Through the generations of Republican rule following the war between the States, they

achieved the practical way of life, practical because, although not perfect, it nevertheless worked.

Today their position is anomalous. It is their own party that is dynamiting their social structure which is arousing bitterness and recrimination, which is attempting to force crackpot reforms on them at a time of national crisis. It is their own party administration which has sought to knife them with Federal control of elections, with the Fair Employment Practice Committee, and with the policy of employment service.

How long will they put up with it, I don't know. Suggestions are rife as to the formation of a Southern Democratic party, the election of unpledged representatives to the electoral college. Ways and means are being discussed daily to break our chains. We will find some way, and find it regardless of the effect on national elections, if this senseless attack keeps up.

For the Federal Government, in Democratic hands, is now tampering with the one thing we cannot permit, will not permit, whatever the price to ourselves.[2]

Thus the knightly defender of white supremacy. There are a number of things about this sinister declaration which immediately compel attention. This is no amateur, like Eddie Rickenbacker, talking. This man is crafty and efficient. He works with an organization which, in and out of Congress, knows every trick, every chicane in the book.

The reader will undoubtedly be struck by the tone of aggrieved innocence which permeates the discourse. You see who is being persecuted: it is those who are forced to hold honest elections—even though, as happened in Tennessee, federal judges can be found who punish the guilty by imposing a three-cent fine and then suspending the sentence. The administration threatens the repeal of poll taxes. Horrors! Persecution! The administration tries to utilize colored help, at a time when man power is critically short. Persecution!

Beyond that, beyond the legalistic justification of brutality (states' rights and all that), there is more than one resemblance between the Governor and the fire-eaters who precipitated the Civil War. He sounds for all the world like Mr. Yancey of Alabama at the Democratic National Convention in Cincinnati, in 1861. He sounds like Toombs, like Calhoun. The language, the recklessness, the threats, the hate are the same. Even the charming proposition to send uninstructed electors to Washington and so to deprive the people of a direct voice in the choice of their President, even that subversive device has its parallel in the secessionist background:

[2]*The New York Times,* December 12, 1942.

didn't Calhoun propose two Presidents, with veto powers upon each other?

But it is the way these statesmen time their action which brings up Calhoun redivivus. You may remember that he wanted to act quickly, while his cohorts were "stronger than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally." It fits to a nicety.

So much for the program and some of its mainsprings. Mr. Martin's speech, which followed it, alluded, as was to be expected, to the situation which gives him so much aid and comfort. He stretched out his hand in a grand gesture: "We have been given the job of saving the American way of life . . . and we shall find others in Congress not of our political faith who will unite with us in those common objectives," said the helmsman of Lincoln's party.

He wasn't jesting. The coalition took shape with such celerity as to suggest earnest and precise prearrangements. The Southern bloc lost no time in assuming control of the steering committees in both Houses. By dint of seniority, the bloc has always commanded immense advantages in the standing committee. The boys then proceeded to upset all precedents by defying House leadership in the matter of appointing Representative Marcantonio to the Judiciary Committee. By all rights, he should have been given his seat because of the support the American Labor Party had extended the Democrats in New York. But Mr. Marcantonio had some embarrassing poll tax legislation to bring up, and so he was *persona non grata* to the new masters. Between the Republicans and the Southern bloc, the initial channels of legislation were under almost perfect control.

It now remained for the Southern cabal to weaken the National Democratic organization and more in particular to deliver the New York party organization into the hands of Mr. Roosevelt's enemies. New York State, with its seventy-two electoral votes is of huge importance in a presidential election and is particularly strategic if Governor Dixon's little scheme is to be carried out successfully. Here is where the unfortunate Mr. Flynn comes in. He was the chairman of those two organizations, and is by all accounts extremely astute and competent.

Mr. Flynn was first given to understand that it wasn't quite cricket to be considered for the post of ambassador to Australia and still retain the chairmanship of the National Democratic Committee. He, therefore, resigned and Mr. Walker, then Postmaster General, was appointed in his place. Then some of the boys checked with the party bosses back home—

notably Mr. Crump of Tennessee—and conveyed to Mr. Flynn their scruple against considering him, if he remained chairman of the New York State organization. He complied with that suggestion also. Thereupon, Mr. Farley's power grew in the Empire State. To repay Mr. Flynn for his confidence in political engagements, members of the bloc either refused to confirm him or were so lukewarm about it that he withdrew his application.

I have no space for a discussion of Mr. Flynn's qualifications for the job. Nor can I say anything about the debate on the floor. It presents some funny aspects and some very dirty ones. All I want to set down is that it is rather ironical to see a McKellar looking down his nose at Flynn.

These, then, are the deals that the Southern bloc has worked out: control of Congressional machinery, alliance with Democratic conservatives in the North, alliance with the Republican Party. The latter is jubilant. It thinks it is doing the leading. Perhaps it is. If so, it is leading the country into a negative and destructive direction. The Southern bloc is exacting a *quid pro quo*. It has served notice on the country that it has no intention to take the war seriously; that it means to paralyze executive action; that it intends to subvert the electoral system, which has in effect, become a part of the living constitution of the land; that it purposes to wipe out, root and branch, all the social gains we have made in the last ten years; and that it is determined to wage pitiless war on organized labor.

How to Block Out Organized Labor

Old times dar am not forgotten.
Dixie, D. D. Emmett

It would be ingenuous to suppose that Governors Dixon and Jones, Mr. Garner and Mr. Crump, Messrs. Hobbs, Smith, O'Daniel and Company are primarily worried about giving Negroes the vote. To be sure, it is a nuisance to keep them intimidated; and the Department of Justice might prove annoying. But experience in the Southern states which have already repealed the poll tax shows that where there is a will there is a way. On that point I would invite the attention of the reader to a very penetrating article by Carroll Kilpatrick in the March issue of *Harper's*. Mr. Kilpatrick is Washington correspondent of the Raleigh *News and Observer* and of the Birmingham *Age-Herald*.

What worries the party bosses is that the poor whites might get it into their heads to turn out at election time. And there are twice as many of them to contend with. Elections responsive to all the voters in the land of cotton spell the political doom of the powers that be.

But the specter that terrifies them even more is economic rather than political. Negroes are useful to depress the wage scale in the South and in the country by extension. The operation of the Wagner Act and of the Fair Employment Practice Committee and the inevitable orientation of the War Manpower Commission combine to swell the ranks of organized labor. When Governor Dixon extols the virtue of that Republican rule which was dominant in the country for so many decades before the depression, he speaks from the heart. That was indeed a "practical" *modus vivendi*—for a narrow class. It was likewise quite "practical" for those Northern interests which had, and have, so generous a share in the barbecue. It is therefore more than a fortuitous political combination which brings Mr. Farley of New York and Governor Bricker of Ohio (accompanied by his trusty factotum, ex-Governor Cooper, also of Ohio) to the sunny South. Anything like a people's war does threaten to "dynamite their social structure"; and the blasts are not confined to one locality.

That these worthies are fighting bitterly against the diminution of their privileges goes without saying. One mechanism has consistently worked in the past and is doing effective damage today. It consists in fanning the flame of race hatred. The presence of Northern Negro troops and the relative independence of a class of people who are no longer all compelled to work as menials make it easier to unleash the passions of a population which is easily stirred to violence on the issue.

The other counter moves to the logic of the times are far more national in character. They are the wholesale relaxation of state labor practices; the war on Mr. McNutt and indeed against his whole Commission; and the pressing of antiunion legislation.

Concerning the first, state labor practices, the situation had become so vicious by the first of the year that seven important officials felt compelled to issue a joint warning. They were James P. Mitchell, Director of Civilian Personnel and Supply, War Department; Ralph Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board; Emory Land, Chairman of the U. S. Maritime Commission; Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor; and Joseph B. Eastman, Direc-

tor of the Office of Defense Transportation. These key people are in a position to estimate the material and psychological stake which is involved in the maintenance of reasonable labor practices, at a time when production must not only be continued at its level of today, but must be stepped up to new records.

Space does not permit me to say much about Mr. McNutt's unhappy predicament. It soon became evident that he meant to interfere with the pirating of labor and that the 48 hour week was not going to do away with contractual time and a half for overtime. From that point on, things began to look bad for the handsome Hoosier. Congress refused to appropriate money to implement the vastly extended functions of the War Manpower Commission and it appeared as if Mr. McNutt himself was going to be harassed into resigning unless unforeseen forces came into play.

The drive on labor unions didn't take long to get under way. Mr. O'Daniel of Texas ("Pass the biscuits, pappy") addressed the Senate on February 15. Basing himself on the scientific and constructive researches of his friend Howard W. Smith, Pappy proceeded to give his colleagues the benefit of his unbiased findings:

> I do not believe any member of the Senate could read this report [Mr. Smith's] without reaching the opinion that the actions of the National Labor Relations Board, under authority of the National Labor Relations Act, when viewed collectively, constitute the blackest chapter in the history of governmental agencies in the United States . . . . There are in the records of this investigation facts to show that the administration of the Board was absolutely soaked with Communism.

He was reintroducing legislation

> designed to protect the right of every man in this country to join a labor union or stay out of a labor union as he might see fit.[3]

[3]In this connection, Senator Wagner introduced into the *Record* a strange piece entitled "The Closed Shop," by one Roger Babson—a strange piece, that is, considering the source. It went like this, in part: "Stockholders already have a 'closed shop.' That is, one stockholder cannot act apart from the others except once a year at a stockholders' meeting. If a stockholder does not like the policy of the company, he can sell his stock and get out. The same privilege is granted to all members of a closed shop labor union. If they don't like their job, they can resign and work elsewhere.

"Stockholders always have been represented by their president, who exclusively speaks for them, which is what the labor unions have had to fight for. Both groups should equally have the right to employ outside counsel. Hence, when looked at impartially, the labor union members are not asking for any more privileges than stock-

The thing that perturbs Mr. Reynolds of North Carolina is what he calls "alienologies." Accordingly, he is introducing Senate Joint Resolution 9, which forbids labor unions to elect officials who are not citizens of the United States (as, for example, Harry Bridges) or who are or have been Communists or Fascists. It also requires the registration of labor unions together with a vast mass of information to be supplied to the Department of Labor, including the "names, titles and salaries of its officers"—an ideal blacklist, especially at the stage when a union is in the process of getting organized.

In the House, Mr. Howard W. Smith is offering H. R. 1031, a bill to amend the N.L.R.A. Senator O'Daniel has told us what it is. But an unexpected and horrendous nightmare is besetting the Congressman. "A definite move is on the way to organize into existing unions foremen and other supervisory officials." That is too much. For one of the neatest ways of blocking out the noncommissioned officers of a union is through promotion. An active and able steward finds it exceedingly hard to resist the bait, especially if he is in straightened financial circumstances. Making him a foreman always presents a difficult dilemma to the leadership of the union: should they resign themselves to the loss of a good man or should they persuade the steward to stay with the union, a potential malcontent? To be sure, a promoted unionist does not always lose his erstwhile sympathies. But they are rendered relatively harmless by cutting him off from the rest of the men. Organizing this class of employees raises new questions. What is an "employee," Mr. Smith wants to know. He had thought it meant "worker" in a very narrow sense. The broadening of the term fills him with anxiety. Why, "even the highest officers of a corporation" might come within its scope. This, of course, is unlikely, but the organization of intelligent employees, placed in strategic positions, is indeed a poser for management, and even more so for absentee ownership.

"This creates an intolerable situation from the standpoint of management. If there is to be collective bargaining, there must be somebody to bargain on each side of the table." So he is going to take care of that matter by excluding from the provisions of the act "any employee employed [*sic*] in a bona fide executive administrative, professional or local retailing capacity." I suppose all these terms mean something to Mr. Smith.

---

holders now have. The big question is whether or not the labor union officials are as wise, fair, and frank as the company officials."

Mr. Hobbs of Alabama has chosen racketeering in labor unions as the object of his legislation. Purporting to regulate interstate commerce, among other things, the Hobbs bill makes a felon of anyone who "obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use or attempt to use or threat to use force, violence or coercion, money or other valuable consideration"; or who "commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property" in the acquisition of such money or consideration.

Now everybody is agreed on the evils of racketeering though the examples of it which are adduced in the press are often distortions, or wholly unrepresenative. Still, any racketeering should be ruthlessly stamped out. It is true that there are laws on the books which cover extortion, assault, destruction of property and so forth. I am not prepared to say whether they are adequate to deal with racketeering, though there is competent legal authority to that effect. What is certain is that the Hobbs bill is an instrument which can be used to outlaw strikes. Couldn't an increase in pay, or the improvement of working conditions be defined as "considerations"? Couldn't a strike "threaten to commit physical violence" to property, say in the produce business? A little bird tells me that judges can be found who will reason in that fashion; and that even in the event of the Supreme Court's nullifying such a law, its mere existence while litigation is pending could do damage to the right to strike.

There are more bills of the same character, but those we have mentioned ought to give the reader a fair idea of the temper of our lawmakers at this stage. Summing them up, one can note, first of all, that they are put forward by the Southern bloc. That needs no elaboration. The next characteristic they present is typical of economic controversy—double talk. These gentleman say "racketeering" when they mean to outlaw strikes. They say "alienism" when they want to obtain blacklists. Finally, they exhume the usual collection of hoary chestnuts. This is the authentic playground of the cliché expert.

There is one word which is relatively streamlined, however. It is "absenteeism." In the minds of all too many people, thanks to congressional utterances and even more to lurid newspaper accounts, the shibboleth has become synonymous with the depravity of labor. It evokes fat pay envelopes, giddy sprees, obscene hangovers. It stands for the frenzied pursuit of pleasure and for treacherous selfishness. The whole business has

a familiar ring. It is the thinking of Giraud about the Third Republic and of Pétain about the days of the Popular Front.

It is true that some observers have noted the relationship between the condition they deplore and crowded, sordid, depressing quarters in slums, tents, and trailer camps. Some have noted the effect of improvisation, bad planning, of sickness, and the like. A few, mindful of British experience, blame long hours, fatigue, and the necessity to shop *some* time when the desired services are available.

Almost nowhere is the main cause of absenteeism emphasized. That cause is morale.

To badger workers with punitive legislation, to begrudge them contractual pay for extra effort at a time when net corporate profit is unprecedented in the history of the nation, to discourage systematically legitimate hopes of social gains, to put the onus of failure on little people while lush advertisements bought with the taxpayers' money sing the praises of management, to do all that is not exactly the way to inspire men with the will to achieve greatness. What we need is unity of purpose, positive action, and belief in the people.

A Program, A Policy

Now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their party.

Anonymous

The most heartening thing that has happened in months is the President's report on the work of the National Resources Planning Board. It constitutes in effect an arsenal of practical ideas. It goes far beyond the Beveridge plan and it presents a challenge which can't be met by lofty cant and by inflammatory invective. To the choleric reactionary who can only deny, persecute, and uproot, the President's report is an insurmountable stumbling block. The more progressive among the opposition can only follow it or set up a counter-program which will have to be mighty good to match it. The evident strategy of the left should be to spread the ideas in the report, to translate them for the public constantly, vigorously, specifically. Full employment; democratic control of basic industry; psychological and social security; free education from nursery school to college; health services and decent housing for everybody: there is powerful political ammunition in that.

The Democratic party isn't the only one which is split wide open on an issue such as this one. As the people in the country become familiar with the precise features of the plan, it will be apparent that a Republican party which allows itself to be taken into camp by the destructive elements in Congress, or out of it, is committing political hara-kiri.

This is no time for doctrinaire bickerings. They are intolerable on the left. The climate is favorable again, in the face of common dangers, to set up a practical version of the Popular Front.

This is no time for bickerings among labor factions. The initiative of the A. F. of L., the C. I. O., the Railroad Brotherhoods, and the Farmers' Union to combine their legislative services in Washington is an intelligent move. Equally hopeful is the organization of C. I. O. legislative committees in each local. Those are integrated into larger legislative committees along congressional district lines. This is all to the good: the locals cannot help receiving a liberal education; they will co-operate far more realistically with their state legislative services which have had to bear the brunt of political attacks. If now the other big unions take parallel action, the way can be cleared for the organization of a farmer-labor party with a political orientation.

In numbers alone, the potentialities of such a party go beyond the wildest dreams of old LaFollette. Labor is said to comprise between twelve and fourteen millions. The expansion of our productive capacity will increase their number further. There are great dangers in the situation. A recalcitrant core of newcomers who have taken no part in the struggle for union gains may lead to reactionary rebellions within unions and is, indeed, doing that now. It will not do to brand them as chiselers and let it go at that. They must be made to understand clearly the similarity between a shop unit and other political units; they must be told about the history of the movement and the perils of individualistic action. There is no better use for union funds than a daring and imaginative educational program, especially in view of the effort which will undoubtedly be made to exploit ignorance and dissatisfaction within the unions. The risks are great; pointing with alarm won't lessen them. The very proximity of the newcomers is an opportunity to dissolve their prejudices as well as a challenge to the statesmanship of labor leaders.

The progressives must form new alliances. The Citrine formula to have American labor sit down with the British and the Russians should

not only be realized, but broadened, so as to include organized labor everywhere. The experience of the International Labor Office should be used to the fullest extent.

The two areas which progressives have largely neglected are the churches and the rural population. The first is not always easy to reach, since churches often depend for financial support upon the wealthier members of the congregation. The attempt should nevertheless be made; this is a church-going nation. The appeal is simple: the case for a decent society rests upon an ethical basis. We must say that, say it often, and say it with text and chapter.

As to rural sentiment, there is no inherent reason why it should operate, at this time, as the N. A. M. would wish. Carey McWilliams, in his "Farms Into Factories: Our Agricultural Revolution," has shown with irresistible force that the production, ownership, and marketing of food is in the hands of a constantly shrinking minority; that agriculture is being industrialized; that the same conditions prevail for large masses of rural workers as for their fictitious antagonists in the cities. Farm laborers, farm tenants, small farmers who look on helplessly while the Farm Security Administration is being hamstrung are potential allies in a progressive realignment of political and economic forces.

Rural journalism, often incompetent and ignorant of the events which take place under the nose of the editor, hasn't helped very much. Here again, as in the case of newcomers in the unions, the crying need is for an aggressive educational campaign. The unions have the funds for such a campaign. Let them start it without delay. They should set aside at least five million dollars for a press service geared to inform the rural population of the facts which bear on its real interests.

This, then, is the progressive line: a program, a valid and appealing program; and to implement it, a strategy of unity, organization, and suasion.

THE ROLE OF AUSTRALIA IN PACIFIC POLITICS

By C. HARTLEY GRATTAN

AUSTRALIA plays a complementary and supporting role in international affairs, rather than a determining one. Even in its area of particular interest, the Pacific region, it is not powerful enough to lay down the decisive line.

Historically the policies of the United Kingdom, both as a world and Far Eastern power, have given Australia its international cues. Insofar as it sought to advance its own views, it attempted, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, to exert pressure on the United Kingdom Foreign Office. Indeed, the intensity of the pressure it should exert on any given issue has been an outstanding cause of dispute among the few Australians who have sought to influence foreign policy at all. But even when strong pressure seemed warranted, frustration did not lead Australia into acting independently. Graceful or awkard acquiescence necessarily followed. The great prestige of the United Kingdom and the superior power of its navy acted to enforce concurrence. Against these, mere argumentation could hardly prevail.

But to imply that really divisive differences ever arose between Australia and the United Kingdom on foreign policy is really to falsify the record. Differences were never carried to the point of division—or even real alienation. When Australian public leaders advocated policies with international implications which appeared to run counter to Imperial policies, they were always prepared to allege an identity between Australian and Imperial needs. If this was not always apparent to the Imperial authorities, it was, the Australians said, because they were, from their offices in London, unable to see the actualities of the southwest Pacific. Australia, after all, grew up on the periphery of the Empire. Its chief contribution to British foreign policy for many years was an insistence that, so far as possible, the islands near Australia be kept out of the hands of active or potential British enemies. Often the Australians asked Britain to take over islands when she was extremely reluctant to assume additional

obligations. At various times they campaigned against French and German plans and activities in the islands. For example, they unsuccessfully opposed the coming of the Germans to New Guinea. But in the end most of the South Pacific islands passed to British sovereignty. Germany was finally ejected from New Guinea during the first World War.

It is rather difficult to write about Australian foreign "policy" in historical terms. It is more a matter of detailing general attitudes. True, the Australians often evolved domestic policies with foreign implications. Their immigration policy, known as the White Australia policy, under which black, brown, and yellow peoples are discouraged from becoming permanent settlers, was conceived as a domestic matter. The international implications were left to the United Kingdom which interfered chiefly to insist upon a politic wording and administration of the acts in their original form. The attitude toward the islands was also in essence conceived domestically; it was designed to insure Australia's isolation within the Imperial fold. The burden of governing the islands was transferred to Britain. Indeed, suggestions from London that the costs be shared were always shrugged off. A study of Australia's early role in defining British policy in the southwest Pacific illustrates how and why the British Empire grew by reluctant accretion as much as by deliberate aggression, and also how complex the forces of accretion really were. "Isolation within the Imperial fold" defines Australia's position very adequately, for when we turn from Australia and its immediate neighborhood to Europe, the policies which could be considered peculiarly Australian disappear altogether. The Australian view completely merged into the Imperial view. No peculiarly Australian view of Europe has ever been defined. Indeed, for many years Australia's need to safeguard her position in her own immediate neighborhood did not lead her to dissent from Imperial policy even in the Far East. The world had little need to know what Australia thought. What the United Kingdom Foreign Office thought was the all-important consideration.

II

All this is now changing. The change has been slowly maturing over the last three decades. But the second World War has speeded up the rate of change; and the outbreak of war in the Pacific has brought policies to maturity with a rush. They are not rootless policies improvised for a desperate occasion. Rather they are the theoretical projections of the in-

telligentsia which have suddenly become the practical policies of the government. The "practical skeptics" who doubted the utility of the theoretical exercises have been confounded with unusual suddenness. The transition from theory to practice has been much more rapid than anyone could possibly have forecast even five years ago.

Not unexpectedly the basic cause of the change is Australia's geographical position. That is the foundation on which all arguments for peculiarly Australian polices have always rested. Before the war it was pointed out again and again that Australia, located in the far southwestern Pacific on the edge of Asia, had problems unlike those of the United Kingdom and little apt to be met by too slavish acceptance of United Kingdom policies. To the United Kingdom the Pacific is geographically remote and peripheral, however vital it may be from the standpoint of investment and trade. The United Kingdom homeland remains far away in Europe. But the Australian homeland is inescapably in the Pacific. The Australian past, present, and above all, future, is inescapably there. Conceivably the United Kingdom may withdraw from the Pacific—at least as far as governmental responsibility goes—and still exist quite comfortably. But the Australians cannot withdraw. If they were forced to do so, they would be another unhappy wandering tribe on the face of the earth. Whatever happens they must, to be a viable nation, live out their history in the Pacific Basin. This is not laboring the obvious. It is a point often overlooked by those who have wondered why the Australians, a British people, have been as vociferous and emphatic in rejecting the theory that the Pacific war can wait until Hitler is defeated, as have the Chinese, an Asiatic people. In both cases, it is because the homeland is at stake.

As long as Pax Britannica was a living reality, the Australians had no doubts about their future and the steps necessary to preserve it in case of danger. Mostly they felt perfectly secure. They felt practically isolated from all menaces in much the same way that the Americans felt isolated and secure. The "internationalism" in their outlook was circumscribed by the boundaries of the British Empire. They sought to keep within the orbit of British power and were prepared to support Britain, as a *quid pro quo,* when her politics collapsed into war. Even when the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth, and Pax Britannica began to be less and less an all-sufficing reality, the great power of Britain remained a cardinal article of the Australian creed. The first World War did not really

shake it, for never at any time during it was the Australian homeland directly menaced. Indeed, after the war the building of the Singapore base rather strengthened the conviction that British power would always protect Australia. Only those few who could look at the world objectively had any real doubts. The reason the intelligentsia made so little impression with its projected policies was simply that most Australians could find no objective warrant for the worries implied with regard to a world they thought they knew and thoroughly understood. Actually, they were drugging themselves with nineteenth-century clichés while living in a twentieth-century world. Sir Frederick Eggleston, now Australian Minister at Chungking, and for many years one of the most astute of Australian students of foreign affairs, saw the facts more clearly than most Australians. He saw that world evolution had undermined the material foundation—the naked power—on which Pax Britannica rested, particularly in the far Pacific. But even he failed to envisage the rapid collapse of 1941-42.

The obscure disquiet which seized the Australian intellectuals really had little to do with any feeling that they might, on some dreadful tomorrow, suddenly be thrown back on their own resources for defense. For years they speculated fearfully on what Japan might one day do. They even talked of a Japanese invasion of Australia. But did they really believe it? Or was it merely a gruesome fantasy? It is difficult to say now. Similar fears long beset Americans, especially on the West Coast. Today they seem less fantasy than murky forebodings of a dreadful reality. Australia produced no Homer Lea, but it had some minor prophets of similar ilk. But the Australians were always reasonably sure that should the Japanese southward drive really reach their vicinity, the defense of their homeland would be accomplished in collaboration with the United Kingdom's naval forces.

One of the motivating ideas behind the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901, which federated the six hitherto independent colonies, was the need of strengthening Australia's defenses. The Commonwealth consistently from its founding gave thought to and spent money on defense. Australia's *per capita* defense expenditure exceeded that of Canada for many years. But as the situation in the Far East worsened, and Australia's economic interest and stake in Eastern trade increased, there was a rising demand for special Australian trade and diplomatic representation there and in the Pacific countries generally. It was felt that more extensive

trade would, on the one hand, solve Australia's problem of finding new outlets for her export surpluses and, on the other, improve Australia's political relations with her Far Eastern neighbors, especially Japan. The sending of Ministers to the more important Pacific countries would underline Australia's desire to cultivate friendly relations, enable Australia to learn more directly the attitudes toward her entertained by her neighbors, and present more firmly her own ideas on Pacific problems. Australia's special interest was in the Pacific. She did not feel the need to follow Canada, South Africa, and Eire in sending Ministers to European countries.

This was what was behind the highly significant speech made by Robert Gordon Menzies when he became Prime Minister. In April, 1939 he said:

> In the Pacific we have primary responsibilities and primary risks. Close as our consultation with Great Britain is, and must be, in relation to European affairs, it is still true to say that we must, to a large extent, be guided by her knowledge and affected by her decisions. The problems of the Pacific are different. What Great Britain calls the Far East is to us the near north . . . . With this in mind I look forward to the day when we will have a concert of Pacific powers, pacific in both senses of the word. This means increased diplomatic contact between ourselves and the United States, China and Japan, to say nothing of the Netherlands East Indies and the other countries which fringe the Pacific.

But even after this clear definition of policy had been made, there was no haste about translating it into practice. War had actually broken out before the first Australian Minister was sent abroad. This pioneer diplomat was appointed to the Washington post at the end of the year, but he did not take up his duties until March, 1940. During the following two years Ministers went from Australia to Tokyo, Chungking, to the Netherlands Government-in-Exile in London with the East Indies chiefly in mind, and to Moscow last of all. The latter appointment was made by the Labor Government which came to power in October, 1941.

The fact that the first Minister sent abroad went to Washington was inevitable. The Australians saw very clearly that from their point of view, the country of primary importance in the Pacific was the United States. Its Pacific policies gave more promise of working directly to Australia's advantage than those of any other nation. Australia is, in essence, a European-American country, politically and culturally. No matter how much one may emphasize the significance of her geographical

position, this must be kept in mind. She is, moreover, the principal country with such a fundamental character within the Asiatic area. The only other is New Zealand. It highlights the situation to say that Australia falls to the care of the State Department's Western European Division, not its Far Eastern Division. This cultural-political orientation is paralleled by her trade-financial orientation, which is overwhelmingly toward the United Kingdom, not her Pacific neighbors on the continent of Asia. Australia must, therefore, associate herself with those countries that have major Pacific interests and that also have the same essential cultural-political character and outlook on world affairs. The tie to Britain is traditional and needs no further elaboration. But as things stood at the outbreak of the present war, the significance of American policies in the Pacific was increasing, that of the United Kingdom policies declining. Australian self-interest dictated a policy of strengthening her ties with the only great Pacific power—the only great power whose shores were actually washed by the waters of the Pacific—whose policies either actually or potentially promised to strengthen her position. There was every reason to think that Australian-American relations could readily be strengthened, but the nature of the problem was widely misconceived in Australia, as the writer discovered during his 1940 visit to the Commonwealth.

The cultural-political similarities between the United States and Australia arise from a similar historical background. Australia is a British overseas country with a history of a pioneering character. The direct American influences at work can readily be exaggerated. But the end result of a history in an overseas environment, even after only 100 years, is to produce a version of British civilization which is moving, and will continue to move, toward a form closely analogous to, but not identical with, the North American. To safeguard her cultural integrity Australia will be well advised to resist any general move to imitate the North American culture too sedulously, as some of her citizens are tempted to do. But she nevertheless will never emerge as Asiatic, or Latin, or Germanic. She will always be European- or British-American. The cultural affinity will be a permanent factor in Australian-American relations.

But what Australia lacked in 1939 was intimate trade-financial relations with the United States. At this level her ties were to Britain. There is little prospect that the ties to the United States will ever be of great magnitude, though their significance will probably increase as time

goes on. A great deal will depend upon the consequences of Lend-Lease and the character of the American economic foreign policy after the war.

Australia has, therefore, strong reasons for cultivating close relations with the United States. The basic character of her culture made it easy for her to appeal to the American people. The economic factors had hardly any weight at all, but they were not, as it turned out, of great importance in any case. What the Australians quite generally overlooked was that, put on the plane of Australian-American relations *in vacuo,* abstracted from the politico-geographical context, it was difficult to see how anything more than mutual good will could result. Barring catastrophe in the Pacific, the interest of America in Australia simply could not be very great. Because some Australians recognized this, consciously or unconsciously, they were either, during 1940, engaged in a frenetic and highly irritating campaign to cultivate American good will by main force, generating their enthusiasm out of their own fears for their future, or pessimistically assessing the matter as a hopeless puzzle no mortal man could solve. But even the pessimists had in their minds a kind of dark hopefulness that *something* would turn up to clarify the problem. The need for close relations was greater than their ability to point the road to it. Especially did they fail to grasp the dynamic character of American policy, its ability rapidly to meet new situations.

That something the Australians were rarely able even to adumbrate. When the writer tried to expound a theory about it in a magazine article in the spring of 1940, the Australian newspaper press greeted that particular effort with startlingly irrelevant but hostile or sorrowful remarks. What I tried to say was that the real foundation of a viable Australian-American relation in the Pacific was *strategic.* This point most Australians muffed. Arguing that any war between Japan and the United States would probably result in a naval stalemate in the central Pacific, I forecast that the effort to break it would involve hard fighting in the South Pacific among the islands near the equator. That would be where Australia would come in, for her self-interest would indicate that she co-operate with the United States against Japan, and America's self-interest would dictate acceptance of such co-operation in full measure. Later in the year I put the same case to numerous individuals and groups in Australia. This required taking the rather unflattering line that Australian-American relations *in vacuo* were an unprofitable conception. The

vital point for Australians to watch was American-Japanese relations. If those relations deteriorated into war, as I assumed they would sooner or later, then Australian-American relations would cease to be merely a matter of mutual good will, but would become of vital importance to both countries. That is what happened when war came. The United States assumed "primary responsibility"—the Australian Government's phrase —for the safety of Australia (and also New Zealand), because, I think, *their safety was absolutely required in the American campaign against Japan.* Their safety, in short, became an *American* interest of vital significance. The intimate political relations so many of the Australians had desired all along became a consequential reality.

Of course no one forecast at all accurately the catastrophic environment in which this development finally took place. No one foretold that Japan would overrun Thailand, Malaya, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies in such a short time. Nor was the inglorious fall of the Singapore base predicted, though in some quarters its significance, in the absence of a powerful fleet and air force, had been discounted heavily. It was the suddenness with which the long anticipated Japanese menace to Australia's security became a horrifying reality that made what happened to Australian-American relations so extraordinary. It was also the suddenness with which arrangements had to be "finalized" if Australia was to survive, that led to a contretemps both amusing and indicative of the attitude of an important sector of Australian sentiment. In a newspaper article by Prime Minister Curtin, published before the Japanese drive had been halted, but when its terrific momentum was obvious to all, he said: "I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs about our traditional links of friendship to Britain." Mr. Curtin was immediately attacked by the conservatives for proposing to "run out" on Britain! Read in the context of events, his words simply meant that the time had come to cement Australia's relations with America. But so long had the conservatives lived in "isolation within the Imperial fold," and so little had they taken in the meaning of Australia's American policy, that when the moment came to give it reality they were shocked. They could not believe that American relations had become of such fundamental importance. They could not believe that "primary responsibility" for Australia's safety was about to pass to the United States. Nor could they quickly understand that this did not mean that an either-or choice had

arisen as far as Australia's fundamental allegiance went. It was not a case of either Britain or the United States at all. Australia was under no compulsion to abandon her close relation with Britain. But she did need to draw closer to the United States. If the theory of the need had not existed, events would have dictated that course. In any event Australia and the United States did enter into close relations.

III

Australia's position in the Pacific is defined for the duration of the war. She is a major collaborator with the United States in the war against Japan. She has entered into relations with the United States far more intimate than any she has ever had with a foreign nation in her whole history. (The United Kingdom is not a "foreign country" to her and will not become one.) She will stand or fall with the United States. But because she is geographically contiguous with Asia, and because her outposts and Japan's outposts are today the battlelines between them, she has never accepted the theory that the Pacific war is subordinate in urgency and importance to the Atlantic (or European) war. It was Australia that pressed for the Pacific War Council in Washington, and gained its establishment. The purpose in mind was to keep the Pacific war in the foreground of the attention of the American authorities. The Australians are closer to the Chinese in their view of the Pacific war than to the official American-British view. This could be illustrated by many quotations from official statements. Sir Frederick Eggleston, Australian Minister at at Chungking, declared in a dispatch to his government that:

> All those nations whose destiny is involved in the fate of the Pacific area must be constantly on the alert to see that the strategy necessary to secure their safety is not forgotten in European preoccupation and that the machinery for ensuring that decisions in this area are properly taken is kept functioning with adequate interest and support. I believe it is to the credit of His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia that vast improvements have been made. Why it should have been necessary for you to fight for it with such insistence I do not know, for more than nine million British people live on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and they have made most important contributions to the cause in this and the last war. The idea that Britain can survive if she loses all her resources and people in this area is a fallacy.

The Australians must have applauded when they read that Mme. Chiang Kai-shek had told the United States Congress on February 18th:

> . . . the prevailing opinion seems to consider the defeat of the Japanese as of relative unimportance and that Hitler is our first concern. This is not borne out by actual facts, nor is it to the interests of the United Nations as a whole to allow Japan to continue not only as a vital potential threat but as a waiting sword of Damocles ready to descend at a moment's notice.
>
> Let us not forget that Japan in her occupied areas today has greater resources at her command than Germany.
>
> Let us not forget that the longer Japan is left in undisputed possession of these resources, the stronger she must become. Each passing day takes more toll in lives of both Americans and Chinese.
>
> Let us not forget that the Japanese are an intransigent people.

These are also things the Australians do not want forgotten. Their homeland, too, is directly menaced by Japan. They will not cease emphasizing their point of view, no matter how excessively annoying the insistence may be to persons of a different mind. The Australian government has a primary responsibility to Australia, and it will meet that responsibility in full measure.

The rapid redefinition of Australia's international position will also have permanent consequences. Never again will she retire into "isolation within the Imperial fold." The war has conclusively demonstrated that she must, from here on out, have a Pacific policy and must try to realize it in practice. But she will not tomorrow, any more than yesterday, be in a position to determine policy in her part of the world. Her position will continue to be complementary and supporting in relation to the policy of the major power in the area with a character and interests similar to her own. That power, most Australians are now convinced, will be the United States. Hardly a considered discussion of Australia's future now appears that does not emphasize that point. Most Australian projections of policy are today contingent—the contingency being American policy. Australia's traditional policy is to be compared, Professor K. H. Bailey of the University of Melbourne has suggested, "with the new Australian penny . . . : It bears on one side the King's head, on the other a Kangaroo. The King's head stands for close Imperial ties. The Kangaroo symbolizes distinct nationhood, fronting the Pacific." But as I have elsewhere written in commenting on this, there is now the "pull of another 'penny' which has Lincoln's head as its distinguishing ornament." Lincoln's head will

never, I went on, "fade out of the Australian picture again. As a positive or negative force, it is there to stay."

What are the Australians hoping for with regard to American policy in the Pacific? They are hoping for a strong, free China, bent on raising her living standards. They are hoping for a purged Japan which will follow a peaceful trading policy. They will probably welcome collaboration with the United States in maintaining permanent bases in the southwest Pacific, should the Knox suggestion become official. They will probably also welcome an American administration in what are now the Japanese mandated islands. They will perhaps ask for administrative responsibility in the South Pacific islands of the United Kingdom and maybe full responsibility for some of them. But that they will ask the United States permanently to undertake responsibility for their defense, as the English publicist Lionel Curtis suggests they should (for the reason that the United Kingdom can no longer meet the responsibility) strikes me as unlikely. They will collaborate, but they will not beseech. Above all, they are hoping for a thoroughgoing application of the Atlantic Charter, especially in southeast Asia. On September 3, 1942, after his return from his visit to the United States and the United Kingdom, Dr. Herbert Vere Evatt, Commonwealth Minister of External Affairs, made a vitally important report to Parliament. In the course of it he declared:

> . . . the name *Atlantic* Charter which has been given to this declaration does not refer only to the Atlantic region or to powers having interests in the Atlantic. The Charter derives its name from the place where it was signed. The twenty-eight nations which have subscribed to it extend around the globe, and the declaration is universal in its scope and application. It follows that the future of the regions of the Pacific and of southeast Asia are to be governed by the broad principles of the Atlantic Charter.
>
> Some consequences of this may properly be suggested. The first principle which must be applied is that of security. Accordingly, in keeping with the eighth principles of the Charter, there should be established a system of general security which will be as effective in these Pacific and Asiatic regions as in all other parts of the world. Pending the establishment of such a system, the aggressor must be disarmed. And that aggressor is Japan—the only Pacific power which since 1931 has systematically employed its armed forces for the purpose of territorial aggrandizement.
>
> While security comes first, the Charter also assures the peoples of Southeastern Asia and the Southwest Pacific that they shall be able to live out their lives in freedom from want as well as in freedom from fear. These peoples cannot be

excluded from the system of economic collaboration which the United Nations have envisaged. Again, it is elementary that the future development of the people of China will no longer be obstructed by such restrictions on their self-respect and their right of self-government as are involved in the almost exploded doctrine of extra-territoriality. Equally we look forward to the people of India developing into a truly self-governing nation. It is to be hoped that they will soon understand that self-governing British Dominions like Australia are none the less self-governing because they owe allegiance to the King or because they are associated together as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations or because they are resolved to resist the invader to the death. Australia, as one of the countries of the Southwest Pacific, will have a particular interest in closer economic relations with her nearer neighbors. For some years past, Japan has propagated the notion of a co-prosperity sphere. But, ever since 1931, and increasingly so since she commenced to exploit the newly-occupied areas in Malaya, the Philippines and the East Indies, it has become plain that the so-called co-prosperity sphere means only this—that Japan is to get the prosperity while the subject peoples get a lower standard of living and the status of serfs or slaves.

In the postwar world, reorganization of these regions cannot be on the Japanese system. We are now fighting to end that system. Moreover, our postwar order in the Pacific cannot be for the sole benefit of one power or group of powers. Its dominant purpose must be that of benefiting the peoples everywhere. If "freedom from want" means anything, it means that the age of unfair exploitation is over. If the attainment of a higher and better standard of life for all the Pacific peoples involves any changes in forms of government or administration, either as a means of progress or as a consequence of it, the United Nations must be ready to make the necessary changes. In short, we must found future Pacific policy on the doctrine of trusteeship for the benefit of all the Pacific peoples.

That sums up what Australia is looking for in the Pacific after the war. If the United States strives to bring it to pass, it can count on vigorous support from the Commonwealth. If not . . .?

WHAT CAN WE DO WITH GERMANY?

By HARRY STEINHAUER

DURING the "phoney" stage of the present war those who guide our public opinion assured the world at large that we were not fighting the German people but only the Nazi gangsters. When it became evident that the conflict would not be brought to a speedy conclusion by a revolt from below in Germany, and when the German armies began to practice their horrors in belligerent and neutral countries alike, these molders of opinion changed their tune and proclaimed that this is a German, not a Nazi war, implying that when the day of reckoning comes every German will be called to account. The distinction between Nazis and Germans is vanishing; the belief is growing that all Germans are Nazis and that all Germans have always been Nazis. If these views were confined to the street corner and the barber shop, there would be no real cause for alarm. But the educated, and even the makers of opinion, are falling victims to this product of war hysteria. Anthologies and histories of Nazi "thought" have been released by British and American publishers, proving that the Nazi state of mind goes back to Luther and even Arminius. A distinguished member of the British Foreign Office, an eminent British historian, prominent publicists and scholars are lending support to the thesis that Hitler is a creature of Nazism rather than its creator. Phrases like "the ancient Prussian tradition," "centuries of Prussian domination" are gaining currency. A recent contribution to this school of thought is Peter Viereck's *Metapolitics,* which has been widely publicized by Dorothy Thompson in her syndicated column. His thesis is that the barbarities of Hitler's henchmen are the natural fruit of German romanticism. Shades of Professor Babbitt! If it be objected that romanticism is a general European phenomenon, of English (or Italian) origin, Mr. Viereck has his answer ready: German romanticism is different—it is the pure essence, of which the English and French brands are but watery dilutions. Throughout his book Mr. Viereck charges with dismaying insouciance through the china shop of German history and thought. Here a fact is trampled

underfoot, there an idea is wrenched out of its setting. Novalis, who dreamed of a united Christian-Catholic Europe, becomes the godfather of Hitler's stormtroops; Rousseau is classified as a "German" mind. One of the above-mentioned anthologists, as if to clinch his argument, has discovered a lurid Nazi past even in Thomas Mann, who is usually regarded as the incarnation of German liberalism and democracy: are not the *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* a very textbook of Prussian militarism and German *Kultur*?

The moral of it all is that the German case is hopeless. The only solution to the German problem is variously given as 1) a permanent occupation of the country by Allied troops; 2) the splitting up of Germany into the numerous petty sovereign states of pre-nineteenth-century history; 3) the extermination of every German within the bounds of the Reich.

In cold logic the last of these alternatives cannot be taken seriously. And as for the other two, anyone who knows a little history can prophesy that, ten or twenty or thirty years after peace has been concluded, there will be no foreign army of occupation on German soil, and that a united Germany is as inevitable as a united Britain, France, Canada, or the United States. When peace has been concluded and the memory of Nazi brutality and our own suffering has been dulled by time, it will generally be recognized that any attempt to hold Germany down by force alone will merely sow the seeds for a second Hitler and a third world war.

Sooner or later Germany will have to be taken back into the council of nations and treated as an equal. The question is: can she ever be expected to live at peace with the rest of the world or will she be a perpetual menace? There can be no doubt that for more than half a century Germany has been a threat to the development of Western civilization. How old is this pathological condition? Is it the product of specific causes or the expression of a native barbarism? Is it true that all Germans are Nazis? If not, how large is the saving remnant?

These are not merely academic questions; the world of tomorrow depends on the answer we give to them. We must have a definite, planned attitude toward Germany and we must be prepared to act upon it, if necessary in the teeth of public opinion. The lack of such a clear-cut policy toward Germany during the Weimar years—our wavering between sympathy, indifference, hatred and revenge—was one of the important factors in Hitler's triumph. We dare not repeat the same mistake again. If we

accept the view that the Germans as a race are incapable of acting like civilized human beings and attempt to police Germany permanently after the war, we are likely to be faced with the same difficulties that Hitler's *Gauleiter* are experiencing in occupied Europe today. In 1923 the French undertook such a policing job on a small scale when they invaded the Ruhr; the Germans made it so uncomfortable for the invaders that the latter withdrew in dismay.

It would be a black outlook indeed if the pessimists were right about Germany. Fortunately they are not. A dispassionate examination of the facts yields a very different answer to our questions. Such an examination is attempted in the following pages. Much of what I say will sound embarrassingly elementary. But that is just the alarming aspect of the present situation: that the basic facts are being forgotten and their place taken by sweeping generalizations which appeal to the emotions of the moment but are loaded with danger for the future.

II

First of all it is essential to clear away some of the folklore that has gathered about this subject. In times of great crisis like the present, we tend to imagine that our problems are unique. It is therefore worth while pointing out that the Nazi state of mind is neither new nor rare. On the contrary, it is as old as organized society itself, something which has recurred again and again, but which has been outlived by civilization. Modern European history alone shows many variations on the Nazi pattern of conduct. To take but one example: the last aggressor nation before Germany was France. For two centuries the French were regarded as the scourge of Europe, keeping the continent in perpetual turmoil by brutal wars of conquest for the aggrandizement of dictator-kings. Here is an example of French barbarism as seen by a German:

> Scarcely was the peace [of 1648] concluded when the struggle for the Spanish succession once more made Germany the theatre of war for Europe. In order to hamper the military operations of the Imperial Australian armies, French troops laid waste the whole Palatinate and the principality of Baden-Durlach. All the cities and villages from Heilbronn on the Neckar to Heidelberg and from Mannheim to Baden-Baden were burned, the fruit trees felled, the vines torn up, the wells filled in. On the 16th February 1689 the wonderful Renaissance castle of the Counts Palatinate in Heidelberg went up in flames. Two months later Speyer, Worms, Dürckheim, Deidesheim, Bingen and many other places burned down to their foundations.

WHAT CAN WE DO WITH GERMANY?

It is fashionable nowadays to draw analogies between contemporary events and the great upheaval of the Napoleonic era. Such parallels are valuable, provided the proper comparisons are made. For instance, it is well to remember that during the French Revolution, *the more moderate elements* in France were ready to declare war on all Europe as a means for achieving national unity at home. The "Invasion Number" of the *Studio* (July, 1941) shows, by a series of French cartoons from the years 1802-3, that Napoleon was for the Europe of his day what Hitler is to us. At the opening of the nineteenth century Germany was very much in the position of France today. Her territory was overrun by the Napoleonic hordes. Berlin was occupied by French troops; the rulers of the various German states were "collaborating" in a new "world order" proclaimed by the Corsican *Führer,* who conquered and plundered most of Europe, set up puppet governments in the subjugated territories and ruled with the help of a ruthless *Gestapo.* Who would have believed at that time that bellicose France, which had been a menace to world peace for two centuries, was on the eve of becoming one of the bulwarks of world order? Yet this is exactly what happened. The Napoleonic "incident" finished France as a great military power. It is more than probable that the Kaiser and Hitler between them have done the same for Germany.

Because we have been brought up in a democratic tradition and environment and find any form of autocratic government intolerable, we are apt to forget that the democratic way of life is a very recent acquisition of our civilization. Names like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Richelieu, Carlyle, Gobineau, Sorel, Seeley, Kipling, Rhodes, Mussolini, Moseley, Lord Londonderry, Coughlin should remind us that autocracy, belief in violence, chauvinism, racial arrogance, the Kultur-Messiah complex are no German monopoly, either in the past or in the present. Nor does it help to bandy about such phrases as "centuries of Prussian domination." For any history textbook will tell us that Prussia became a great power in the eighteenth century and a predominant influence in German affairs only after 1870. The Prussian militarism we hear so much about is a phenomenon of the later nineteenth century. After the death of Frederick the Great, soldiers and soldiering were extremely unpopular all over Germany, and nowhere more than in Frederick's own Prussia. This sentiment was a reaction against the militarism of the previous era—a reaction which recurred during the Weimar Republic and which is likely to repeat itself

once more when the Nazi nightmare has lifted from the brow of the dazed German Michel.

So much for the folklore of our subject. Once we realize that the German problem is not unique or eternal, but a phenomenon of fairly recent date and one which has many antecedents in history, we should be in a position to examine it in something like a judicious frame of mind. A brief survey of recent German history will be of immense help to us.

III

The principal event in the political history of Germany during the nineteenth century was the transformation of the country from a "geographical expression" into a unified Reich. This transformation was achieved in 1871 after a struggle which lasted half a century. The opposition to a united Germany came from the princes and conservatives, who feared the loss of their privileges; for the liberals who were agitating for a united Germany also demanded political reform along English or French lines—ranging all the way from a constitutional monarchy to a republic. Twice—in 1830 and in 1848—the German people fought for these ideals, though they fought feebly and submitted too easily. In the end unification came but liberty and democracy did not. Why?

The answer is: Bismarck and his Junkers. Bismarck is commonly pictured as a great, powerful statesman, who brought about German unity through his iron determination in the teeth of the fiercest opposition. It was H. G. Wells, I believe, who first suggested that this is pure myth. What Bismarck did achieve was to delay German unity by a whole generation and to force it into a reactionary Junker mold. The passage from the *Outline of History* is worth quoting:

> In 1848 all Germany, including German Austria, was for a time united under the Frankfort parliament. But that sort of union was particularly offensive to all the German courts and foreign offices; they did not want a Germany united by the will of the people, they wanted Germany united by regal and diplomatic action—as Italy was being united.
>
> In 1848 the German parliament had insisted that the largely German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, which had been in the German Bund, must belong to Germany. It had ordered the Prussian army to occupy them, and the king of Prussia had refused to take his orders from the German parliament, and so had precipitated the downfall of that body. Now the king of Denmark, Christian IX, for no conceivable motive except the natural folly of kings, embarked upon a campaign of annoyance against the Germans in these two duchies. Prussian

affairs were then in the hands of a minister of the seventeenth century type, von Bismarck . . . and he saw brilliant opportunities in this trouble. He became the champion of the German nationality in these duchies—it must be remembered that the king of Prussia had refused to undertake this role for democratic Germany in 1848—and he persuaded Austria to side with Prussia in a military intervention.

Denmark had no chance against these great powers; she was easily beaten and obliged to relinquish the duchies.

Then Bismarck picked a quarrel with Austria for the possession of these two small states. So he brought about a needless and fratricidal war of Germans for the greater glory of Prussia and the ascendancy of the Hohenzollern dynasty in Germany. He consolidated Germany under the Prussian Hohenzollerns. German writers of a romantic turn of mind represent Bismarck as a great statesman planning the unity of Germany; but, indeed, he was doing nothing of the kind. The unity of Germany was a reality in 1848. It was and is in the nature of things. The Prussian monarchy was simply delaying the inevitable in order to seem to achieve it in Prussian fashion. That is why, when at last Germany was unified, instead of bearing the likeness of a modern civilized people, it presented itself to the world with the face of this archaic Bismarck, with a fierce moustache, huge jackboots, a spiked helmet and a sword.

It may seem to many that this view detracts unduly from Bismarck's greatness as a diplomat. But the main point it makes is sound. In any case, this much is certain: Germany got unification without democracy and the Bismarck legend of which Mr. Wells speaks grew up even during Bismarck's lifetime. The conviction spread in Germany that only in Bismarck's way, through blood and iron—which in plain English means brute force—could a nation achieve greatness, and that the destiny of the new Germany was indissolubly linked with the Hohenzollern dynasty and the Junker caste.

But it is important to remember that large sections of the German people were not prepared to accept the Bismarckian system of Junker rule. The history of Germany from 1871 to 1918 shows an increasingly powerful opposition to the Junkers, culminating in the overthrow of the Imperial regime, and the establishment of the liberal democratic Weimar Republic.

IV

At this point we again run into folklore. Since the seizure of power by the Nazis in 1933, so much falsehood has been absorbed in foreign countries about the Weimar Republic that one despairs of redressing the balance of fact over propaganda. Current opinion outside Germany has for

some time tended to minimize the importance of the German experiment in democracy. We accept the Nazi view that the Republic had no deep roots in German life. Mr. C. V. Wedgwood recently stated this position drastically but clearly. He writes:

> It is a misreading of German development to assume that the Weimar Republic corresponds to anything organic or vital in the nation. In the perspective of history the Third Reich must appear as the outcome of a hundred and fifty years of struggle, the Weimar Republic merely as one of many setbacks on the path towards its realization.

This is exactly what Hitler, Goebbels and company have been telling us for years. And its corollary too: that, throughout the dark years of the Republic, the Germans yearned for a redeemer and that when this redeemer finally came to them in the figure of Adolf Hitler, the whole nation received him with open arms. In other words: National Socialism is, and was from the beginning, a great mass movement.

Other items in the Nazi mythology include:

The Stab in the Back: that the German people as a whole has accepted the myth of German invincibility on the field of battle in 1918.

The *Diktat* of Versailles: that the German people has blamed all the misfortunes of the Republican period on the iniquities of the peace treaty.

The Bolshevist Conspiracy: that in 1933 Germany was on the eve of a great Communist revolution, which would have spread to the rest of the world had not the Nazis intervened just in time to stave off this great disaster.

Now any attempt, at this date, to judge the Weimer Republic and the Third Reich, "in the perspective of history" is a bit premature; the events of the future will have something to say on this score. But the other contentions are flat lies—the big lies that Herr Hitler recommends in *Mein Kampf*. It may be that today, as a result of ten years of intensive propaganda, the German people has accepted the "stab in the back" legend. But before 1933 one did not hear this view outside the Nazi sphere of influence. The Germans knew they had been beaten in the war and beaten soundly. Nor were they inclined to blame all their troubles on the Treaty of Versailles. It would be idle to pretend that they liked the Versailles settlement; and they had little reason to do so. For, while one need not swallow all the Nazi rantings against the *Diktat,* there is enough unbiased evidence to prove that the postwar settlement was a grave error. But that

the German people as a whole did not blame all their troubles on Versailles is shown by the fact that years of Nazi agitation against the treaty bore little fruit.

The considered opinion of competent observers who were on the spot is that, in spite of Communist strength in 1933, there was no danger of a Communist revolution in Germany. This legend was sent abroad by the Nazis to win the help of all who feared the Red bogy. And it worked extremely well. Incidentally, it is well to note that the fiction of the Communist danger squares badly with the picture of a Germany yearning for National Socialism.

This last myth of National Socialism as a mass movement, arising out of the depths of the German psyche, can be simply disproved by statistics. In their fourteen years of popular agitation, the Nazis obtained a real hold on the German people only twice: in 1923 and 1929-32. Both were times of economic and mental distress. The first was the year of the inflation and the invasion of the Ruhr by the French, when the whole social structure of the country collapsed. The results were favorable for the Nazis, who felt strong enough to attempt the famous Munich beer-hall *Putsch*. When the crisis passed and Germany, with foreign help, began to enjoy some measure of prosperity, the Nazi influence dropped sharply, so that in the general election of 1928 the Nazis won only twelve seats in the Reichstag. Then came the world depression, which hit Germany sooner and harder than the rest of the world. Within a year and a half the twelve Nazi seats became one hundred and thirty, for the simple reason that the Nazis, with the generous co-operation of German and foreign industrialists and bankers, were able to feed the growing army of outcasts and entertain them with dreams of power, just as their brother fascists did in other countries.

In 1932, at the height of the world depression, that arch intriguer Franz von Papen fell out with Hitler and persuaded his industrialist friends to stop the flow of funds to the Nazi treasury. Immediately the Nazi influence declined sharply. At a general election held late in 1932, the Nazis lost two million votes and it was generally felt throughout Germany that the Nazi danger was over. Unfortunately for the rest of the world Hitler and Papen patched up their difference; the funds began to flow again; and Nazi power rose once more. When Hitler finally became Chancellor of Germany, he called a general election. During the electoral campaign the Social Democrats and Communists found it virtually im-

possible to carry on their propaganda. Outdoor meetings were forbidden them, most of their newspapers were suppressed, their posters torn down. Göring, who was now in command of the Prussian police, appointed his storm troopers as auxiliary police and gave the Nazis full protection in their bloody attacks on their enemies. Then occurred the notorious Reichstag fire, which was made the pretext for further and more drastic suppression of potential opponents. In addition to all these methods of physical persuasion, the Nazis made full use of the subtle weapon of vague threat, intimidation, whispering of dire consequences to "traitors." And what was the result? After years of agitation, after a month of bullying and beating, the Nazis polled 44 per cent of the total vote; without the 9 per cent of the Hugenberg nationalists they would have lacked a legal majority in the Reichstag. Does this support the contention that the German people embraced Hitler as a long awaited savior?

Before we undertake to judge the Weimar Republic in the perspective of history, it would be well to draw up a ledger of its difficulties and achievements. German democracy came to birth in an atmosphere of defeat and revolution; of economic dislocation resulting from loss of territory, resources, and foreign trade; of unemployment, heavy indemnities, reparations, and hostility from France and neighboring states like Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the face of these and a thousand more problems, the positive accomplishments of the various republican governments are truly notable. This is not the place to enumerate the many specific achievements of the Weimar Republic. But two facts stand out beyond challenge:

1. Germany had a most democratic form of government—and not merely on paper.

2. There was a completely new orientation in ideals, a serious and systematic program of teaching liberal democracy at all social levels, especially in the schools.

The chauvinism and sabre-rattling spirit of the Wilhelmine era was driven out of the schools and replaced by an intensive indoctrination in the ideals of Western civilization. Anyone who is familiar with the literature and thought of these years knows that a genuine national conversion took place, of which Thomas Mann is a living symbol. True he had been a Prussian; and the *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* are profoundly un-Western, illiberal in spirit. But they were the swan song of the older

Thomas Mann. This collection of essays, written during the first World War, appeared in 1918; from then on one can see a new Thomas Mann emerging, gradually moving to the position which he now holds as the finest representative of German liberal democracy. There is no more reason to doubt the sincerity of the collective German conversion than that of Thomas Mann. The reactionaries were still there, of course; but their croakings of doom in the chauvinist press prove that they had no grip on the national mind. Indeed the fulminations of the reactionaries in the Nazi and semi-Nazi press are a striking testimony to the profound penetration of liberal ideals into the German psyche.

Why, then, did the Republic fall? A hundred reasons have been given for this phenomenon, most of them probably contributing factors. One of the most common explanations—that the Germans are constitutionally incapable of governing themselves—is a misleading half-truth. The same could be said of almost any people. The democratic experiment in Germany worked better than in many other countries and Germany resisted dictatorship longer than many of her Central European neighbors.

It seems to me that German democracy succumbed to two fatal diseases which, incidentally, have endangered the existence of even the old democracies:

1. The mistaken belief that a democracy is in duty bound to allow its avowed enemies complete freedom of speech and action. After the Revolution of 1918 the Prussian Junkers, high military officers, and reactionary bureaucrats expected to have a very rough time of it at the hands of the commoners and lived in terror of the future. Very soon, however, it became evident that under the new regime they would not only remain unmolested, but enjoy much more freedom than under the Empire. They were permitted to retain their posts, to make their influence felt. Instead of feeling grateful to the Republic for such magnanimity, these reactionaries used this leniency as a God-given opportunity for intriguing against the Republic, abusing democratic institutions, undermining public morale. As long as things went well, all this rotten intriguing had little effect on the people as a whole; but when a crisis arose, this wretched fifth column was on hand to do its work.

2. But the fundamental cause of the collapse is undoubtedly the world depression of 1929. The earliest and perhaps the best book on the National

Socialist Revolution—Calvin Hoover's *Germany Enters the Third Reich*—proves this theorem with a finality which precludes any further discussion of the subject. Neither Mr. Hoover nor the present writer subscribes to the Marxian or economic interpretation of history; but the correlation between economic conditions in Germany and the fortunes of the Republic is so close that no other interpretation of events seems possible.

V

The argument so far has been that German history in the nineteenth century followed the same course as European history in general. There was the same movement toward larger units in government, the same industrialization, with the resulting need of raw materials and markets, the same three-cornered struggle between the privileged aristocracy (reinforced by big industry), the bourgeoisie, and the class-conscious proletariat. It was Germany's misfortune that the natural development toward democracy was checked by Bismarck and the Junkers. But the setback was only temporary. Democracy came in 1918 and found loyal support among the German people. I do not say that the democratic tradition was as strong in Germany as everywhere else. But it did exist and was waiting for the right leadership. Given the proper economic and mental atmosphere, it would and will flourish. What I am anxious to combat is the dangerous belief—dangerous for us—that the Germans are by nature and centuries of tradition incapable of living democratically. It seems to me beyond dispute that German democracy has been a reality and that its failure can be traced to specific causes which would have produced, and did produce, the same results elsewhere.

However, one important question still remains to be discussed. What has happened to the German mind during the last eight years when it has been at the mercy of the Nazi propaganda machine? What of the 99 per cent majorities which Hitler has regularly obtained in his plebicites? Does not the absence of large-scale sabotage indicate that the German people is behind Hitler? We know that the young generation which grew up since Hitler's accession to power is rotten with the virus of Nazi philosophy, corruption, and brutality. What hope is there of playing ball with a generation of such Calibans, who, moreover, regard themselves as supermen?

The problem of the older generation need not worry us overmuch. It is true that Hitler commands the support of a majority of Germans. The mass of Germans would obey him even without a Gestapo, simply because Hitler represents authority and order; and it is the nature of the average citizen to support the government in times of crisis, however much he may disagree with it. The Russian masses are fighting heroically and desperately, not because they approve of Stalin's Communism, but because Russia is in danger. The peoples of North America are supporting the war effort whether they approve of their respective governments or not. Similarly the vast majority of Germans are carrying out the orders of Hitler and company because these fellows represent the only government they know at present. As long as the Republic represented the authority of government, they were loyal to it. Establish a Republic again and they will transfer their allegiance once more.

Even the inhuman brutalities which the young Nazis are perpetrating on the millions of their helpless victims in conquered Europe should not dismay us. These bestial youths, too, are merely following the prevailing fashion in totalitarian lands. Harriet Beecher Stowe, after describing a ruthless hunt of a Negro, remarks, "People . . . can get up just as much enthusiasm in hunting a man as a deer, if it is only customary." Fascist mores, as expounded by Vittorio Mussolini, encourage young men to feel the beauty of war, to experience the exhilaration of wiping out a thousand human beings with one bomb. Under the Republic German youth did not think or act brutally, because official doctrine endorsed the Western ideals of humaneness and chivalry. As soon as the wheel turns full circle again, German youth will turn with it.

But there is an additional reason to explain the support which Hitler is getting from the German people just at this time of greatest suffering. We must face the unpleasant fact that our past attitude toward Germany has played directly into Hitler's hand. From 1935 on we have steadily yielded to Nazi blackmail; is it surprising, therefore, if the average German concludes that perhaps Bismarck and Hitler were right after all; that force or the threat of force alone brings results in international intercourse? Moreover, our present formula—not the Nazis alone, but all Germans—gives Germany no alternative but to fight to the end. And Dr. Goebbels is making good use of this weapon which we have forged against

ourselves. He tells the Germans that what lies ahead of them is either victory or total annihilation.

However, there is comfort even in this sad situation. The allegiance which Hitler is getting from the mass of Germans is in itself not as significant as the spirit in which it is given. Now there is one report which every recent visitor to Germany has brought away with him: that the mass of the German people do not want this war, not even its victories. There can be no doubt of the fact that the German masses, like our own foolish appeasers, believed Dr. Goebbels when he repeatedly assured the world that a powerfully armed Germany was the best guarantee of world peace. The rank-and-file German believed with a mystical faith that, by some miracle, the *Führer* would make Germany great without bloodshed. According to all accounts there is a feeling of dazed despair all over Germany at the prospect which lies ahead. Should Germany lose the war and the Nazi tyranny be replaced by a humane democracy like that of the Weimar Republic, there is reason for believing that the masses of Germans will cooperate eagerly in a new world order of our (not Hitler's) design. If the Germans were sick of war in 1918, they will be doubly sick of it at the end of the present conflict. There will be a general revulsion of feeling against Nazism as there was against Wilhelmine imperialism in 1918 and once more the reactionaries will scurry for cover. Then will come our chance.

VI

It seems to me that after this war there will have to be a short- and long-term settlement with Germany. The short-term settlement will of necessity be brutal. The untold suffering which the Nazis have inflicted upon the conquered peoples cannot go unpunished and the retribution is likely to be terrible.

Only let us, as far as possible, wreak our vengeance on those who were most guilty of Nazi outrages. A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Office has suggested that the 300,000 *S.S.* and *Gestapo* men should be shot. An excellent idea. At the end of the last war Mr. Lloyd George won an election on the slogan "Hang the Kaiser." We have smiled at this as a piece of demagogy. But I believe it was a really statesmanlike solution to the psychological problem of allowing an escape for our feelings of hatred against the enemy. Would to Heaven we had hanged the Kaiser and his war lords! We might then have been more ready to deal wisely with the

German people; and the effect on the reactionary elements within Germany would have been most salutary. But we allowed the Kaiser to settle comfortably at Doorn and his generals to intrigue within Germany itself against the democratic regime. The pent-up hatred of four years, finding no other outlet, directed itself against the mass of Germans, so that a statesmanlike solution of the German question was impossible.

Let us not make the same mistake again. Already we hear about plans to send Hitler to Saint Helena. Nothing of the sort; a gibbet for the *Führer* should be our aim; and let every European capital have the pleasure of showing like hospitality to some Nazi leader. Then, when we come to make the permanent settlement, we may be in a mood to think like statesmen and there will be some hope of establishing a world order deserving of the name.

The principal dangers of current opinion are:

1. German brutality is dictating a policy of retaliation in kind and degree, not only during the war (which is natural) but even after victory is won. The advocates of vengeance forget that, no matter how brutal the Germans are, there will come a time when we will inevitably forget their barbarism and again treat them as human beings. The experience of the first World War should be a salutary reminder to us on that score; as well as some of the emotional somersaults which we have done since 1939. It would be wise to prepare for that inevitable change of heart.

2. There is too much talking in terms of pure power politics and not enough about economics. It is alarming, for instance, to find so acute a thinker as Professor W. D. Brogan endorsing Mr. Lionel Gelber's plea for a permanent coalition to keep Germany down, because Britain and the United States will use power for peace, whereas Germany has used it for war. Not a word about raw materials, world markets, unemployment!

3. There is a widespread conviction that Germany was given a fair chance to "reform" at the end of the last war and failed to do so. So she must now take her medicine. I have attempted to refute this erroneous belief; but I realize that the opposition will smear my views as appeasement, sentimentality, or pacifism. Well, no one will apply these names to Winston Churchill, who wrote in 1935:

> Hitler's success, and, indeed, his survival as a political force, would not have been possible but for the lethargy and folly of the French and British Governments since the War, and especially in the last three years [1932-35]. No sincere

> attempt was made to come to terms with the various moderate governments of Germany which existed under a parliamentary system. For a long time the French pursued the absurd delusion that they could extract vast indemnities from the Germans in order to compensate them for the devastation of the War. Figures of reparation payments were adopted, not only by the French but by the British, which had no relation whatever to any process which exists, or could ever be devised, of transferring wealth from one community to another. To enforce submission to these senseless demands, French armies actually reoccupied the Ruhr in 1923 . . . . I have always laid down the doctrine that the redress of the grievances of the vanquished should precede the disarmament of the victors. Little was done to redress the grievances of the treaties of Versailles and Trianon.

It is not for sentimental reasons that we should attempt to make a fair settlement with Germany, but out of a conviction that it will be sound statesmanship and good business.

But even if we adopt the lowest estimate of German intentions, even if we are completely skeptical of Germany's will or power to live like a civilized nation, we should still remember the moral of Lessing's fable of the old wolf:

The big bad wolf had come up in years and resolved to live at peace with the shepherds. He went to them and put before them various proposals for a *modus vivendi,* ranging from outright blackmail to the sacrifice of his pelt after his demise. All he asked for in return was a decent living. Seven times he made the request, lowering his price with every failure. But in vain; each shepherd to whom he applied, remembering the wolf's former depradations, reached for his club and drove the beast away.

"O the merciless fellows!" cried the wolf in fury. "Then I will die their enemy, rather than starve. For so they would have it."

He broke into the shepherds' huts, strangled their children and was slain only with great effort.

The wisest of the shepherds said: "We were wrong to drive the old robber to extremes and to deprive him of all means for reforming himself, however late and reluctant they were."

THE WAR AND THE PHILOSOPHER

By FREDERICK BURKHARDT

Since Pearl Harbor it has gradually dawned on me that I am a member of a lost profession. A professor of philosophy is, it seems, like a gilder of baby shoes, a man whose training may be dispensed with in time of war.

At first, I watched with equanimity as my colleagues in other fields left their jobs for Washington. After all, engineers, psychologists, economists, lawyers and the like had something to offer of immediate and practical worth, and in the hustle and bustle it was natural that they should be called first. But when the first professor of English went off, I began to worry a bit. And when a professor of medieval history who had written a work on the Genoese cloth industry in the twelfth century got a post in the Office of Facts and Figures, I knew the worst: Philosophy was being overlooked, if not deliberately snubbed, by the war effort.

This impression was confirmed by the various occupational questionnaires which I had to fill out. After reading through a list of several hundred occupations I always ended up by checking the square "Miscellaneous." I pictured the Hollerith system machines full of cards with holes punched in them, where by pressing a few buttons one could find in a trice a psychologist who spoke Urdu and played the clarinet. To be tucked away in this omniscient instrument under the heading "Miscellaneous" was oblivion of the most humiliating sort.

There was a revival of hope when I heard that the American Philosophical Association had prevailed upon the National Roster of Scientific and Professional Personnel to include us. The questionnaire arrived and, sure enough, a special sheet attached had on it a list of every conceivable type of philosophical inquiry. But as I filled out the main questionnaire it became clear that we were just an afterthought, for I was soon busy checking "Miscellaneous" and writing in "none" once more. My pique got the better of me when I got to the question which asked me what mechanical devices I could operate and I wrote in "electric razor." I re-

pented of this later when it struck me that this piece of whimsy might create chaos in Washington by upsetting the code systems and causing much time to be lost in consultations and policy meetings, but by that time it was too late to do anything without risking even greater confusion.

Meanwhile those students who had got into the habit of listening to my lectures must have been surprised at the new tone of belligerence which had crept into them. I began to scrutinize my classes carefully for any sign which might indicate an attitude of "what-the-hell's-the-use-of-this-eye-wash-in-times-like-these" and dealt with it severely whenever I thought I saw it.

The climax came when I poured my grievance forth at a lunch with a colleague who is a political scientist. He was rather carefully chosen, too, since he was not only a good friend but he had been wrong on every important prediction he had made on international relations during the past six years. One should have thought that this experience would give him a certain humility, or at any rate make him lend me a sympathetic ear. But no—he merely listened in silence, and, then, when my lament was over, he put on his best "speaking as a scientist" look and said: "But seriously now, what on earth *could* you fellows contribute to a world at war?"

This response shocked me terribly. It also seemed to me to raise issues too large and fundamental to make a satisfactory answer possible at the time. So I was content to give him a look of *et tu, Brute*, and then rapidly changed the subject to political scientists who predicted that Abyssinia would hold out against the Italians, and whose claims to professional esteem seemed to rest on the fact that they read the newspapers a bit more thoroughly than the average man. This gambit met with considerable success and the luncheon ended in mutual disesteem as my friend hurried off to brush up his notes on a lecture he was giving to a woman's club that afternoon on "Hitler's Secret Weapon." Later I was delighted when my wife, who was at the lecture, reported that it was an unusually conservative job, full of qualifications and "ifs" and that the ladies seemed also to be a trifle disappointed to hear that the much publicized weapon of conquest was the soy bean.

But this was inadequate balm for my bruised spirits. The fact remained that philosophy was regarded as a peace-time frill, a dispenser of that dreadful insipidity which sophomores call "Culture," and we philo-

sophers, it was only too clear, were being consigned to cold storage for the duration. The best possible interpretation of this was that we were considered in the same class as *pâté de foie gras* or caviar, but there was a lurking suspicion that it might also mean that we were regarded as just plain ham.

Now if I thought for a moment that philosophers deserved this fate I would take up machine-tooling tomorrow. But I am strongly convinced that a culture in which philosophy occupies a little academic backwater is not in a very healthy condition, and when this is true of a culture which is fighting for its life, as ours now is, this state of affairs may well have tragic consequences. To ignore philosophy at such a time is not only to fail to make use of a very powerful instrument in the conduct of the war, it is to handicap ourselves in the difficult job of gaining anything which intelligent people might call a victory.

This may sound as though I were trying to blow my boat back into the main current instead of straining at the oars, but I think a case can be made for it.

Take the Nazis. When they were cleaning up the universities, they did not ignore the faculties of philosophy. This was not just exaggerated thoroughness, either, but a sign that they were aware that there is dynamite in philosophy and were taking no chances. They know it has power because they have a philosophy themselves. True, it is a way of life which is barbarous and diabolical, but that does not diminish its potency, nor does it alter the fact that philosophy is a source of strength beyond armaments and soy beans.

Not only the Nazis, but the Japanese, the Russians, and the Chinese all have what the journalists call a "dynamic faith," which furnishes them guidance and focuses their energies. But what about the western democracies? Have we any large embracing pattern which unifies our aims and activities as theirs are unified? Have we an aroused understanding of the life we must endeavor to live as a people? The Nazis and the Japanese militarists are clear about the kind of world they are after. We too are clear about the kind of world that would be, at any rate clear enough to be united by our abhorrence of it and to be willing to make great sacrifices in order to prevent its coming. In other words, we have a fairly good idea of what we are against. But what exactly are we *for*, envisaged in the same large terms?

You may be thinking that the democratic people do, after all, have things in common which the Germans and Japanaese have not. You may argue that Democracy sets forth a unity of ideals and efforts and activities. Perhaps you will instance the "Four Freedoms" and the Atlantic Charter. All this is certainly not to be made light of. There is a sense in which we do practice and aspire to a democratic way of life and the sense is a most important one. We enjoy freedom of speech and press, religious freedom, educational opportunities, representative government, and the privilege of making our own way to economic independence. All of these we have to a degree which is unthinkable under the totalitarian system, and this life of practice to which we are accustomed is reflected in our democratic aspirations. Nevertheless, these practices and ideals as they are do not constitute a unified pattern of community life in which we deliberately participate. In so far as our activities as a people make a scheme or pattern, this is due in the main to the external circumstances of our situation, which have permitted and encouraged a tradition of wide individual initiative and free enterprise. This is far from saying that we consciously subscribe to a philosophy of life.

There is no denying that there are individuals and even large organized groups who have a very clear scheme of things which they support. If you walked into the offices of the United States Chamber of Commerce in Washington you would be fairly sure to find someone there who would give you an unequivocal program. The same would be true if you called at the offices of the A.F. of L., the C.I.O., or the farm lobbies, But it need hardly be said that the differences among these answers would be striking. All they would prove is that there is no conception of the ideal ends which cut through the spheres of particular interests. What we lack is a larger vision of what we stand for, not as members of unions, or as farmers or employers but as members of the democratic cultures.

How is such a unifying way of life to be achieved? One thing is clear: we cannot possibly achieve it by the methods utilized in Germany. The democratic way of life is not a dogma to be crammed down the throats of the people. Nor is it a creed to be worked out by some intellectual, political, or moral "elite" and handed out to the "masses" ready-made. If one takes the adjective "democratic" seriously, at least one condition must be fulfilled: it must be a faith that is genuinely public. It must grow out of the life-experience of the people. It must be their philosophy not

only in the sense that they live it, but in the sense that they make it. In a despotism, a way of life is comparatively simple to beget, especially with modern techniques of indoctrination. But the democratic way of life must not only allow the common man freedom of intelligence, it must itself be his creation. As with its government so with its philosophy. The only way to achieve one that is of the people and for the people is to get it achieved by the people themselves.

But if the people are to have a philosophy, they must philosophize; they must be critically concerned with ideal ends. And here we are brought up short by the fact that no such concern exists in the common consciousness. The most evident proof of this is that the ends and standards of our culture are in a state of confusion. Not only are many of the standards of individuals and groups divergent and incompatible, but it is a common phenomenon in the life of many individuals that the ideals of their business practice do not jibe with those of their religion or their family life. The almost anarchic quality of this relativism in our contemporary world is apparent when it is contrasted with the way of life of medieval Christendom. That age achieved a common allegiance to overarching ideals which surpassed vocation, nation, and race; which knitted a mass of individuals into a culture, and integrated the lives of the individuals in that culture. It is this glaring disparity which has stimulated the nostalgia for the Middle Ages so popular today in some intellectual circles. The attraction is understandable, but as a solution to the contemporary confusion it is hopeless because we cannot go back to a prescientific, pretechnological age for our ideals. We must find our own.

Instead of pining for a world beyond recall it would be more fruitful to look into the reasons for the failure of the modern western world to fashion its own way of life. The Greeks, the Romans, and the Middle Ages succeeded in doing so. So too, though to a lesser extent, did eighteenth-century Europe. Why not the twentieth-century western cultures? The immediate reason has already been suggested: The spread of democratic practices during the last three hundred years has placed the onus for creating the way of life upon the common man, and he has not concerned himself with the problem of ideal ends. But this merely brings out the real question: Why has he not taken on the job?

There are some people who would be quick with the reply. "Because," they would say, "your common man hasn't enough intelligence." For

my part, I should like to suggest another, more verifiable answer. I believe the main reason to be that the people in general have developed the habit of regarding concern with ideal ends as "impractical dreaming" or "theory." The separation of this kind of thinking from ordinary, concrete, day-to-day living has become so complete that the very words "ideal" and "idealistic" have come to have an archaic ring, and are even used in a derogatory sense. The "practical" people have left thinking of that order to special groups like the clergy, the philosophers, and the intelligentsia who write for the high-brow magazines. The result has been that the values involved in the moving life of the culture have been allowed to shift for themselves, while the values with which the specialist minority has concerned itself have become more and more remote from that life.

There is nothing mysterious about this situation. In order to explain it, there is no need to indulge in obfuscations about "human nature." It is related in a very concrete and natural way to another great cultural characteristic which marks us off from the rest of the world: science. It is in western culture that modern science has been the great formative force, and the scientific tradition encourages exactly the state of mind which we are trying to explain, for it has actively cultivated the separation of "value" from "fact." The persistent theme running through the last three centuries is that it is not "scientific" to have any truck with ends or values. A culture which is scientific in this sense is one which is fact-conscious and "practical"; and in such a culture values become the province of a specialist minority.

There are historical reasons why this dualistic position was a natural one for scientists, and for those who had the interests of science at heart. It saved them no end of trouble, because it soothed the guardians of the prescientific faith. But now the fruits of it are being harvested; the scientific outlook, thus sheltered, made the old philosophy which united western culture into a fossil by creating concrete conditions in which it could no longer "live," and at the same time it discouraged any new philosophy from growing up. The result is that now, with all our modern techniques and our tremendous mastery over nature, we find ourselves without any clear idea of the ends to which they should be applied.

It might at first sight seem that the case of Germany refutes this argument, for it is a culture which is certainly scientific in the ordinary meaning of the term, and yet it also has a way of life. In reality, however,

it is a horrible example of the traditional dualism. The Nazi way of life did not emerge from the common consciousness but was thrust upon it by a fanatical minority which stopped at nothing in order to prevail. Popular support, in so far as it existed at all, was rooted in national humiliation and despair. The German people had no positive ends strong enough to oppose those of the Nazis. What happened should serve as a warning to every culture which allows ends and values to shift for themselves. Such a culture is at the mercy of any ends which can get enough might behind them to take over.

This is only one way in which the Nazi way of life throve on the separation of values from practical day-to-day living. The other way we can read about in the daily papers. We see a way of life whose ideals fly in the face of science nevertheless utilizing the most scientific means in order to gain a victory. The Nazis are carrying out the logic of the dualism to its bitter conclusion. Science, traditionally unconcerned with ends, now finds itself relegated to the position of the purest of means and in bondage to ideals which ultimately threaten its very life.

Most scientists now realize the danger which lies in store for science when it becomes a means to ends which are unscientific and barbarous. They therefore rightly pin their hopes upon a democratic world-order. But the hope does not lie where they think it does. They think that in such a world-order science will be allied with "civilized" and "decent" ends, but in general they still hold to the dualism which assumes that those ends are distinct from science and the concern of another type of enterprise. The real hope is that in such a world-order the traditional separation will be rejected, that it will be seen at last that there are not two spheres of life, but a single life in which fact and value are fused.

The same dualism which makes clear why the western democracies lack a philosophy also explains why philosophers come under the heading of "Miscellaneous" in that culture. The years during which the tide of science flowed in also saw the rise of philosophy as a separate and distinct professional pursuit. The dualistic attitude created conditions which encouraged philosophers to become specialists and experts. They were not long in becoming an esoteric group, a kind of priesthood with its own ritual and mumbo-jumbo. The title of Ph.D. in philosophy came into being, and no one seems to have bothered about what sense it made to be a doctor of philosophy in philosophy. It was all part of the transition by

which the term "philosophy" came to stand for a highly technical, self-enclosed field of inquiry. The professional journals arose, and the articles in them became more and more unreadable by ordinary mortals who had not spent several years and some thousands of dollars in acquiring the special language needed to decipher them. Yet all the while it was tacitly assumed that these same articles were concerned with issues of the greatest importance to ordinary mortals. If this tendency resulted in an even more rapid decline in general interest than was to be expected, it was compensated by a feeling of selectness and profundity, which, though it might give rise to popular jokes, was nevertheless highly valued. Today, the aloofness of philosophers from the ordinary world has become so complete that there are no jokes about them any more. Not even the clergy have managed to equal this performance.

The upshot of it all is that philosophy is now a department in the universities. There it is tolerated in a good-humored fashion by the rest of the faculty and is usually regarded as a generous gesture to the past. Something of the attitude is expressed in a metaphor which I recently read in Jonathan Norton Leonard's *Enjoyment of Science*. He was discussing logic, which he said was truly a science, but which for some queer reason, had been "shunted off into the philosophy department." The Main Line, you see, is science, and that's the one you take if you want to get some place. Philosophy is a side trip which you can take if you have time and feel in the mood for a little scenery.

It does not seem to disturb anyone not to have the faintest idea where the Main Line goes to, and least of all does it disturb those who ride on it all their lives. And for the most part the philosophers do not give it much thought either. They are thankful that it passes at a distance too remote to break the peace and tranquility of their sequestered hamlet.

In all this the academies are merely reflecting the state of the culture in general. But a culture without a philosophy makes little sense. It is questionable whether it can be called a culture at all. On the other hand, philosophy cut off from its culture makes no sense at all, except for philosophers. If we are to achieve a definite way of life the two must be brought together again. And now that we are beset by powerful enemies who are clear about what they are fighting for, it is more urgent and vital than ever to achieve it.

It may be that the shock of the war will be sufficient to make us come to grips with what we really stand for. But there is still a general feeling that thinking about aims and ends will somehow interfere with the business of winning the war. It is as if the practical activity of training, arming, producing, and fighting were in a separate compartment from thinking about what they are all for, and as if doing one of them necessarily meant neglecting the reason for it. It is the old dualism working still.

To put off thinking out what the war is being fought for until after it is over does not seem very realistic. There isn't going to be any more time or opportunity for doing so then than there is now. And we will, what is more, have to deal with the conditions resulting from our aimlessness. If we have ends in view, however, we will train and produce and fight to create the conditions which will make their realization possible. It is an illusion to think that we can win the war and then start making the peace, because it is not possible to tack ideal ends on to accomplished facts.

The peace is being made right now by the bombs that are falling, by the decisions being made in administrative offices, by the sacrifices in every home. A new order is in the making and nothing can stop it from coming. But is is not inevitable that it will be a civilized new order. That can come only if we beget ourselves a civilized vision now. And that means that we must give up our exclusive preoccupation with "facts" and "things" and shake loose the common prejudice that thinking about ideal ends is something normal people can do without.

It may be objected that shaking loose the prejudice is one thing and doing any worth-while thinking quite another. This objection would have some strength if I were asking that we should all become "intellectuals," but my point is just the opposite. There is nothing intrinsically highfalutin involved in thinking about ideal ends. It is considered so solely because intellectuals have been the only ones doing such thinking, and that is just the trouble. My own experience in introducing undergraduates to philosophy has been that the chief task lies in getting them to see that it is something worth doing in the first place, that it is "practical." Once they have become accustomed to what they call "looking at things that way," I do not find a greater degree of ineptitude than do, say, the professors of chemistry. If once the common man were convinced of the importance of critical thinking about values and were encouraged

to express himself, the results would be surprising. They would be especially surprising to the intellectuals, who as a class have a conception of the life and mind of the common man which borders on the mythological.

If scientists, lawyers, doctors, farmers, businessmen, and workers in all walks of life philosophized in this sense, the external conditions which make for the isolation of philosophers would soon be gone. Then, when men have become philosophical, philosophers will become men again. Some of them may prefer to remain apart, but most of them will welcome the opportunity to apply their discipline and training to the common venture. And they have something to contribute. They have the training and thought-habits for thinking in wide conceptual terms and there is no reason why these should forsake them when the concepts have their roots in the common consciousness. They have a tradition of critical appraisal of ends and aims and their implications, with which is united a professional hatred of dogma. They have had experience in the hazardous venture of large-scale generalization. They can help in the job of uncovering the assumptions which lie behind belief and action and foster a critical attitude toward them. They can help to safeguard against intellectual traps and to create an atmosphere in which passion and prejudice will have a more difficult time.

They will not, it is true, be doing the job which most of them are doing now. Instead of working on the problems which concern the other members of the profession, they will devote themselves to the task of helping men to work out *their* philosophy. They will be sharing in the task of all intellectuals worthy of the name: the statement, clarification, and criticism of what is afoot in the common consciousness.

Let me illustrate what I have been saying about both kinds of philosophizing—public and professional—by reference to one of the problems of contemporary culture. Every year thousands of young men and women leave college to enter the business world. The most common experience they go through is that of shock at the difference between the two environments. But, since they have never been educated to look at the institutions of their cultural environment in terms of what they contribute to a worth-while life, what aims and ends these institutions serve, and whether they are in fact worth-while, most of them make their adjustment in a bewildered sort of way. Having made the transition more or less successfully, they regard the business world and its ways as "real" and

their undergraduate life as a sort of "phoney," in which, paradoxically, they had a marvelous time. Nothing is done to examine the discrepancy between the ideals and values of the two environments because it simply does not occur to most of them that there are any ideals or values involved.

But suppose they had been educated to look at their lives in those terms? Would not the shock become the stimulus for a critical examination of the values involved in each of the institutional patterns? Here is a living, concrete problem in the experience of thousands of people which, if it were taken on, would raise issues which go to the heart of modern culture. If those young men and women took an active critical attitude to it, they would be philosophizing in the sense in which I am using the term, and it would not be long before changes took place in both institutions.

As for philosophers—does not this offer a philosophical problem which is as worthy of their attention as, say, the "Spatial Location of Sensa"? Is it insignificant to try to get as clear a picture as possible of what these two worlds stand for, to look into the reasons for their discord, and in general to help the young men and women to find themselves as they wander between them? In doing so they could make good use of their training and discipline. And think of the excitement! Not only would their colleagues be appraising their contribution, but human beings in every walk of life!

Doing a job of this kind would reinstate philosophers in the position they have always held in a culture in which philosophy was a living enterprise, for they would be active participants in the shaping and criticism of the ideas which give a culture its motive energy. In such a venture philosophy and the common culture would once more be united. And when that comes to pass philosophers will, I am confident, receive that supreme reward: a code number in the Hollerith machines.

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITY

1. The Sociological Approach

By FELIKS GROSS

THIS WAR is certainly an ideological one. It is a war between fascism and democracy. But it is not only an ideological war. It is also a national war in the old sense.

The Germans are fighting other nations in order to establish German supremacy and only German supremacy. The Nazi war aims are national. In occupied countries, hundreds and thousands of Poles, Jews, Slovenes, and other peoples are deported and killed, merely because they are of different nationalities—regarded by the Germans as inferior. Privileges are granted to the Germans—for national reasons.

So, too, the popular resistance, the underground fight has strong national characteristics. The persecuted peoples are taught every day that they are persecuted because of their nationality. They unite not only behind democratic ideals, but also, being persecuted nationalities, behind their national ideals. Thus the principle of nationality becomes an essential ideological factor in Europe—a factor of Nazi policy and of popular resistance. That principle is already strong, it is growing emotionally, and it will play an important role immediately after the war.

Underestimating the national problem in postwar planning would be a mistake for which the coming generation would have to pay with blood. I have seen some ready-made constitutions for Europe, prepared by political medicine-men, which simply do not recognize this problem. The constitutions of future federations must fit reality. To solve European problems, it is necessary to understand national problems—and to plan reconstruction not only in economic terms but also in social, cultural, and political terms.

I

Mankind is divided into many different cultural groups. We call these groups nations. Human culture is not an abstract concept. It is mani-

fested through human activities performed in order to satisfy human needs. And man satisfies not only his animal needs but also his spiritual needs. Biological and spiritual needs we shall find in every society. But the ways of satisfaction will differ. The satisfaction of needs does not differ only in a biological respect. There is also a difference in institutions, in beliefs. Although the family as an institution is built upon the same paternalistic principle in China and in England, the Chinese family does differ from the English family. Even the same religion can not be deprived of national characteristics. There is a difference, for example, between Spanish Catholicism and French Catholicism.

The development of these differences is obviously not of racial origin. They are connected with natural environment and common tradition in all fields—political, economic, social.

The most significant differentiation among nations is evident in language. At first glance, the English and Americans speak the same language; so do the Spaniards and Mexicans. But is the English spoken by a Cockney and the English of a citizen of the Borough of Brooklyn the same language? American slang is reshaping the English language; new words, new phrases are being introduced. So, too, does Portuguese differ from the Brazilian dialect—the latter showing a tendency to become a more national language, "Brazileiro." The German of Germany and the so-called Switzer-Dütsch, the German language of Switzerland, are also different.

How can the differentiation be explained? Divers ways of living of divers nations require special words, special expressions. Language is a system of symbols which correspond to certain natural and social facts—the fundamentals which bring forth the necessity of forming words. Language is implemented by reality. Nations living near the sea have a vocabulary rich in nautical terms. An inland nation is poorer in this respect. A Portuguese sailor who has settled in Brazil has to shift his vocabulary and adjust it to his new profession and to his new environment. Thus, the Portuguese language changes under the impact of Brazilian reality.

A common fate through the centuries, common history, and common traditions form a basis in preserving a national culture satisfactory to spiritual needs. We define a nation, then, as a group which exercises a culture common to all its people—especially common customs, traditions,

and language—but a culture which differs markedly from the cultures of other groups.

Is a nation one and indivisible, or does it consist of many parts? Among some nations there exists a political tendency toward national uniformity. The members of some nations, notably Germany, Japan, and Italy, have acted in order to achieve deliberate national regimentation within a national state. They fought to reduce the rich cultural elements to a single form—to reduce their religious, political, and even linguistic life to one compulsory, imposed form. It was and it is a political tendency.

But the fact is that within a given nation there exists a cultural diversity, or subcultures of different kinds. A nation is actually a more or less united conglomerate of subnational groups. These subnational groups differ in a cultural as well as a linguistic sense, but they have, nevertheless, a coherence with national unity. There is a deep difference between a Bavarian peasant and a peasant from Mecklenburg or a sailor from Hamburg. It is a difference in ways of living and in language. A Bavarian peasant—a German—can hardly understand the "Plattdeutsch" of an inhabitant of Hamburg—also a German. In every nation, we find similar divisions into subnational groups. We find very significant differences in the English islands.

As I have intimated, Germany is a particularly good example in this respect. It is divided into many subnational groups, groups of cultural and linguistic diversity which have not yet overcome their historical hate of each other. It was Bismarck and Hitler who united the German nation in a political sense. But the old resentment of Western and Southern Germans for each other is certainly not entirely dead, and after the debacle of the German army and the fall of Hitler, the substantial differences can certainly be revived.

The nation is, then, subdivided into smaller cultural units which differ from one another in a cultural sense and which we call subnations.

The nation has two main aspects—cultural and political. We can call these two aspects a) the nation-state and b) the nation-culture.

Throughout history, the nation has been the most creative cultural factor. Thanks to the many nationalities and their differences, a great wealth of cultures is concentrated in Europe. Every nation brings something new to humanity by its original cultural achievements. But the nation is performing a political function when it coincides with the

state. The function of the state is to maintain an accepted political order. As such it is invested with power. Without the state, society would be unable to function. France means French culture and the French state. The nation, as an element of power, has also developed the national state. In some cases, one nation has imposed its rule over other, weaker nations; on the other hand, nations have joined together on democratic terms to form multi-national states.

In international relations, the principle of sovereignty is applied to the state. This means that the state as such is the supreme and independent element of power and control. State sovereignty was only slightly limited by international obligations. Thus nations, in those cases where they coincided with the state as the power element in international relations, were truly free and unlimited in their international political activities.

II

We are not defining the nation here as an individual attitude, as so-called national consciousness. On the contrary, we have tried merely to formulate an objective approach to the problem. It should help to find a solution of national problems in Europe, to avoid dangerous conflicts, and on the other hand, to preserve the creative forces of nationality.

The nation, let me repeat, forms the most important factor in cultural progress. Territorial dimensions and number of people are not important in this respect. Small nations have contributed more to human culture than many nations considerably larger in territory and population. The subnational group of Athens in old Greece was a very small one. The population of the province of Attica in the times of Socrates and Plato was certainly not larger than 200,000 or 300,000. Yet, that province produced more in philosophy, natural science, and mathematics than the whole remaining contemporary European population, which lived, then, in the woods. The Dutch, in the seventeenth century, were the masters of European painting, but were numerically and territorially a very small nation. We could mention hundreds of other examples.

Should we, then, destroy the small nations?

Nations as nation-states (large or small), as sovereign nation-states, have been unable to maintain peace for centuries. In most cases, they have been unable to establish security for their own citizens. Hence perhaps some vital functions—now performed by nation-states—should be trans-

mitted to other institutions which are better fitted to perform them. Among such functions certainly belongs the function of international security.

The function of security in an international sense should be shifted to federal bodies. International machinery must be built and international peace maintained by means which are beyond the competence of national states. Thus sovereignty must be drastically limited; otherwise, no lasting peace is possible.

Sovereignty, of course, cannot be limited only in military and security matters. The world now needs a global economy if war and unemployment are to be avoided, and a global economy requires an economic policy which must cut through national borders. We are living in an epoch in which distance is losing its importance. This means that national frontiers can no longer stand as economic barriers.

Thus it is inescapable that the nation-state will lose many of its functions in the process of their transmission to federal institutions. This does not involve the nation as a cultural unit, however. There is no need to destroy cultural nationality. We must not regiment human culture according to one pattern and reduce the creative vitality of mankind.

Full freedom in cultural development must be granted to every nation and such freedom should form a basis for postwar settlements. No one is harmed if a group of people speaks its own language and cherishes its own traditions. Mankind will benefit greatly if, through national diversity, development of many cultural patterns is possible.

In some territories, however, different nations are living together and are so intermixed that it is impossible to draw a borderline between two different cultural areas. In some districts of Jugoslavia, Serbs and Croats live in the same town and village, in the same community. This too is the case with the Ukranian population in certain Polish districts, where Poles and Ukranians live together in the same villages, towns, and communities.

How shall we deal with districts of mixed populations? Full cultural autonomy for each national group will be the chief institution of intercultural relations in mixed areas. This means that each national "minority" has the right to have schools in its own language and to develop all kinds of national cultural institutions. Essential for cultural autonomy are national schools, because teaching in each specific language implies

as much. But in the long run, it also means separation of population according to the nationality in the schools. For instance in the province of Vojvodina in Jugoslavia, there are Serbs, Hungarians, and Rumanians. A strict application of the rule of cultural autonomy would imply schools in the Rumanian language for Rumanians, in the Hungarian language for Hungarians, and so on, calling for the organization of as many schools as there are cultural groups.

Cultural autonomy is claimed by all national minorities, and it is a democratic solution of national problems in mixed areas. We can find nothing better.

But it is also necessary, as a counterbalance, to set up institutions which would bring together the youth of different nationalities. An international or general language might here play an important role. Part of the teaching could be given in "general schools" for all nationalities using a general language—perhaps the English language. High school students, for example, might spend part of their school day in their national schools, learning literature, history, and other subjects in their national languages; the rest of the day they might go to a general school (for all nationalities) to learn various general subjects, especially technical and professional subjects, in the international language.

This is only a suggestion—the outline of a project rather than a final pattern—for the elaboration and improvement of the system of national cultural autonomy. Such a system, which would grant full liberty to national cultures and provide adequate means for international education, is the solution of national problems in mixed areas.

2. *Nationality in the Balkans*

By BORIS FURLAN

In the west the word "nation" is generally used as a synonym for "state." The emphasis lies on the political organization which is supposed to be identical with the ethnic structure of society.

In Central and Eastern Europe things are different. The word "nation" is primarily used in an ethnical sense. It indicates a people forming a unity, distinguished from others by language and other elements, whereas the word "state" is commonly used for the political organization.

To make the difference clear let us consider the situation in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as it existed until 1918. The people of this state were composed of many nationalities, nine in Austria and seven in Hungary. If you happened to ask an Austrian about his nationality you got the reply that he was Polish, Czech, or Slovenian. Only the German-Austrians usually replied that they were by nationality Austrians, identifying to some extent nationality and citizenship. Furthermore, the political organization of Austria-Hungary was considered as something artificial, whereas the nation was looked upon as a natural unit, as something which had grown and developed in a natural way. Since the state had been compiled piece by piece it could also be demolished, leaving the natural national units untouched.

I

The different use of the words "nation" and "state" in the West and in Central and Eastern Europe has its deep origin in history. The nations in the West and especially the English and the French nations were formed differently from the nations in Central and Eastern Europe.. The English and French are mainly dynastic creations. The dynasties created the political units first, and through these units the nations came into existence by amalgamation of different racial groups. In both countries the process of unification radiated from one central point. In France the *Ile de France* was the core out of which the King's authority spread over Burgundy, Lorraine, and Brittany, while in England it was the southeastern part of the island separted from the continent by the sea and by a natural frontier from other more primitive tribes of the island. The authority of the King was built up and strengthened against the feudal nobility. Natural allies of the King in the struggle against feudal particularism and in their endeavor to build a centralized state were the bourgeoisie.

The process of political unification had already begun in France and in England by the eleventh century. Ethnical unification was achieved some centuries later. In its essence the national evolution of the Germans and Italians was identical. Dante symbolized already in the thirteenth century the linguistic, cultural, and historical unity of the Italians. The German literary language was an accomplished fact by the sixteenth century. The fact that the Italians and Germans were politically divided into many conflicting states should not deceive us. The small German and

Italian states helped the ethnic unification of the Germans and Italians in the same way as did the large French and English centers. In Germany and Italy the bourgeoisie played the same role in the process of unification as they did in England and France, with only this difference: Instead of assisting the central sovereign, they assisted the local sovereigns against the local feudal lords. In both cases the importance of the royal bureaucracy administering the territory in the name of the King played the same role.

The late Middle Ages shows us three great attempts in the Balkans to build national states. The Bulgarians under Czar Simeon (893-927) conquered all the territories between the Black and the Adriatic Seas. This state disintegrated under his successors. In the second half of the eleventh century the Croat state embraced, within its boundaries, half of today's Jugoslavia. But in the twelfth century the Croats became vassals of the Hungarian kings. The third attempt was made by the Serbs. Dusan the Mighty (1331-1355) subdued the greater part of the Balkans and assumed the title of "Czar of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Albanians." He tamed the feudal princes and created a strong bureaucracy which administered the country in the Czar's name under uniform laws. With growing material prosperity a strong middle class began to develop. Wonderful monuments of art conserved through all the storms of the following centuries are still a proof of the immense potentialities of the Serbian State. The economic, political, and social situation in the Balkans was quite similar to that in the West. In many ways the Balkans were even far more advanced than the Western countries.

We may therefore assume with full authority that the Serbian attempt undertaken under the same economic, social, and cultural conditions as in the West would have had practically the same results. With the political unification of the Balkans under one dynasty the ethnical unification of the various racial groups would, in time, have followed naturally. One Balkan state would have created one Balkan nation, embracing all the Balkans or at least their greater part.

The Turkish invasion of Europe, starting in 1354 and reaching its first climax in the Balkans in 1389 when the Serbian army was defeated at Kosovo, disrupted this evolution. The Turks were a nation of warriors. They lived by warfare and for war. The duty of the conquered peoples was to support the ruling Turkish nation with their labor. The Turkish national conception was not ethnic but religious. All political rights were

exclusively reserved for Mohammedans, and only by embracing Mohammedanism could anyone become a full-fledged Turkish citizen. The adherents of other religions formed the "raja" ("cattle"). They had no rights at all, but only the duty to pay the taxes and keep alive the Turkish ruling machine. The "raja" was composed exclusively of peasants because the Turks had exterminated all the nobility and made impossible any development of the bourgeois middle class. The Turks who settled in the Balkans were relatively small in number but they dominated the nerve centers of the national life and paralyzed all economic and cultural evolution.

II

Turkish domination halted the evolution of the Balkan people for about four hundred years. The result was that when in the nineteenth century political life was revived, evolution could not continue from the point at which it had been violently interrupted four hundred years before. The nineteenth century saw the Balkan nations already formed as natural ethnic units. These ethnic units found their natural expression in the national state. The process in the Balkans, therefore, rose from the nation to the state, while in the West, as we have seen, the development led from the state to the nation.

National uprisings began to take place in the Balkans at the beginning of the nineteenth century. After much bloodshed and terrible suffering these revolts led, in the course of the next one hundred and twenty years, to the liberation of all the Balkan peoples. The characteristic peculiarities of Balkan national movements can be summarized as follows:

1. The national movement was a mass movement. Turkish exploitation oppressed the nation as a whole and thus provoked the resistance and uprising of the whole people.

2. The leading elements of this movement came from the peasant class. The Turkish domination had annihilated all the other classes, and the social structure of the Balkan peoples had undergone no differentiation from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. The process of national liberation had to develop at the same time all other classes which in the West had played such an important role in national progress.

3. The national movement was a liberation movement: it aimed at liberation from the foreign yoke, first Turkish and then Austro-Hungarian.

This characteristic distinquishes most clearly the Balkan national movement from Western nationalism. It is in particular contrast to German and Italian political unification in the second half of the nineteenth century. When the twenty-five independent German states united in 1871, not a single part of the German territory was occupied by the foreigner. In Italy only certain northern provinces were under Austrian rule. But Austrian domination can in no way be compared with Turkish domination; the majority of the Italians always lived a free national life in their national states.

Strange was the role played by the West in regard to the Balkan national movements. The Western powers hampered rather than helped these movements. The Balkan nations had to fight on two fronts at the same time, militarily against the Turks and diplomatically against the great Western powers. Many a success on the martial front was counterbalanced by defeat on the diplomatic front.

The first to raise the banner of revolt were the Serbs (in 1804), who had been the last to be conquered by the Turks. The first nation to achieve independence were the Greeks in 1829. But the liberation process moved slowly. Some independent states arose, while others became semi-autonomous states still obliged to pay yearly tribute to the Sultan. It was not until after World War I that Turkish (and Austro-Hungarian) domination was completely overthrown in the Balkans.

As an example of the development of the Balkan states let us consider the case of Greece. The territory of the state continually expanded. After each war its boundaries extended further into Turkish territory. This may convey the impression of imperialistic territorial conquests. But such was not the case, at least not until the most recent times. A great number of Greeks remained outside the frontiers of the first Greek state. To liberate them from Turkish rule was the first aim of the Greeks. Thus the first Greek state created the Greek irredentists. It was the same with all the other Balkan states. The best forces had to be devoted to the liberation of enslaved national brothers instead of to internal consolidation.

Another peculiarity common to all the Balkan states, except Serbia, was the importation of foreign, most frequently German, rulers. This practice started with Greece in 1832 when a Wittelsbach was presented to the Greeks by the London conference as King. History has shown that this practice was very detrimental to the national development of the

Balkan peoples and to European peace. Particularly fateful was the influence of the German dynasty on Bulgaria.

An analysis of the reasons for this strange attitude of the West towards the Balkan national liberation movements leads us into the game of international politics.

Peter the Great (1689-1725) proclaimed in his testament as Russia's historic mission the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In 1768 Catherine the Great put this program into practice. She forced the Sultan to give up Crimea, to accept the Russian protectorate over Valahia and Moldavia (Rumania) and to acknowledge the Russian right to intervene as protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Turkish Empire. Russia's aims could be achieved only by disrupting the Turkish Empire. For these reasons Russia became the natural ally and protector of the oppressed Balkan peoples advocating their right to self-determination. In this policy the government was largely supported by the Russian masses, eager to fight for Christendom against the foreign miscreant who oppressed religious brothers.

Russian plans crossed the interests of other European powers. From 1683 on, Austria had waged three offensive wars against the Turks. Austrian dynamism found its natural field of expansion in the Balkans. This is why Austria looked suspiciously at increasing Russian influence in the Balkans.

Another power greatly interested in the Balkan region was England. The land road to India ran through Balkan territory. Russian domination of this road would have imperiled England's most vital interests of free communication with India. And this is why England became an opponent of Russia.

The crossing of all these interests had the strange consequence that while Czaristic Russia pleaded for the progress of the Balkan nations and for their self-determination, the so-called liberal and progressive West supported the *status quo* in the Balkans. The West tried to prolong, as long as possible, the life of the "sick man of Europe," as Turkey was commonly called.

The Balkan peoples had to pay heavily for this policy. May I mention in this regard the treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin? In 1875 the Serbs rebelled once more, this time in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey to help their national

brothers. Another revolt broke out in Bulgaria. In the repression of the latter the Turks massacred 15,000 men, women, and children. Public resentment in Europe, headed by Gladstone and Victor Hugo, reached its climax. Russia intervened and occupied Adrianople. In the following peace treaty of San Stefano, Russia forced the Sultan to accept the creation of a Great Bulgaria, to grant Rumania independence, to enlarge Serbia and Montenegro, and to give Bosnia autonomy. The mounting tide of Russian prestige in the Balkans and the growing force of the Balkan nations provoked the reaction of the West. The Great Powers met at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. None of the Balkan nations was invited. (As can be seen, Berlin was a worthy forerunner of Munich.) The Congress annihilated all the fruits of the Russian victory and all the bloody sacrifices of the Balkan nations. The principle of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire was once more confirmed. Instead of a great independent Bulgaria a small autonomous Bulgaria was created, to remain under Turkish supremacy until 1908. Only Serbia and Rumania achieved their independence. But the Great Powers took for themselves the lion's share. England acquired the Isle of Cyprus, France got the protectorate of Tunisia, while Austria-Hungary was granted the right to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is to the Congress of Berlin that we can trace the source of unrest in Europe in the following decades and the causes of World War I. In 1908 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina provoking the fiercest reaction in Serbia. Six years later the fateful shots echoed at Sarajevo which gave Austria-Hungary the expected and long wanted pretext to declare war on Serbia.

The end of the first World War meant for the Balkan peoples a step forward in their national self-affirmation. The Balkan nations had already in the war of 1912-13 dealt crushing blows to the Turks, and the first World War eliminated them as a Balkan power. It eliminated, too, another historical anachronism, Austria-Hungary, which was an autocracy composed of two states, Austria and Hungary held together by the Hapsburg dynasty. In Austria a German minority and in Hungary a Magyar minority ruled over majorities largely made up of Slavs. The attempts at Germanization and Magyarization provoked great resistance. In the southern territories of Austria-Hungary, where Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs live, the idea of common political organization gained more and

more support. The oppressed Jugoslavs claimed the right of self-determination and unification in one political body with the Serbs of Serbia, and at the end of the first World War, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes united in the state of Jugoslavia. Outside of Jugoslavia remained half a million Slovenes and Croats in the so-called Julian March on the Italian border, and other Jugoslavs in Austria and Hungary.

Italy was granted strategic frontiers in the peace treaties. It was supposed to be a bulwark of democracy against autocratic Germany. But the strategic foothold of Italy on the gateway to the Balkans made her heir to Austro-Hungarian imperialism. As, before the first World War, Austria-Hungary considered Serbia as its main enemy, so did Italy consider Jugoslavia as its main hindrance for the realization of the economic and political penetration of the Balkans. By a net of diplomatic intrigues Jugoslavia was encircled and isolated. With one arm of the pincers in the Julian March and the other arm in Albania, Italy considered Jugoslavia doomed. Other strongholds were established in Bulgaria where an Italian princess was placed as the wife of the Bulgarian king, and in Hungary. Italy encountered a strong rival in Germany, a second heir of Austria-Hungary. Italian and German plans in the Balkans were contradictory, but both partners decided to balance their accounts later when the expected booty would be greater and the division easier.

The present war has temporarily destroyed everything the Balkan nations had achieved in more than a century of unceasing struggle and in many centuries of suffering. But the victory of the United Nations will free the Balkan peoples again. It is for this moment that we must be prepared.

III

At the beginning of modern times Francis Bacon laid the foundations of the theory of modern science by emphasizing the importance of the experimental method. By clearing our minds of all kinds of prejudices and misrepresentations, the unbelievable achievements of modern science were made possible. The field of modern political science is today even more encumbered by all kinds of prejudices and misrepresentations than was the field of natural science in Bacon's time. If we want to achieve results, comparable in some degree to those of natural science, we must clear our minds of all kinds of idols, as Bacon called them, idols which are only

obscure creations of the brain. By studying the history of the Balkan peoples we are able to recognize these idols.

The first idol to be destroyed is the idea that the struggle for freedom of the Balkan peoples has created in them an exaggerated nationalism which poisons the whole Balkan atmosphere and prevents good relations among the Balkan peoples. The Balkan peoples, it is said, simply can not get together, and they are not mature enough to manage their own affairs. The Balkans will always be the powder-keg of Europe. The truth is, with regard to the powder-keg, that the Balkan peoples furnished only the keg, while the powder came from the Great Powers. In the 150 years prior to the first World War the Balkan nations fought only two wars among themselves. Both lasted only some weeks, and originated in instigations from abroad. Think only of the wars fought in the same period by the other European powers; quite a number of them were fought strictly over Balkan interests, which means *over* the interests of the Great Powers in the Balkans, not *in* the interest of the Balkan peoples.

Furthermore, let me repeat, the liberative character of Balkan nationalism clearly distinguishes it from the nationalism of the West. The West is too much inclined to judge national phenomena in the Balkans by its own pattern. And as I have stated, nationalism in the West has been much more imperialistic from its very beginnings than nationalism in the Balkans, which until recent times had to struggle for the most primitive right of self-affirmation. The distribution of national groups in the Balkans is commonly shown as very confused: the intermixture of nationalities making the establishment of frontiers difficult. On the contrary, the bulk of the population of the Balkans is formed by the Jugoslavs. There is less difference between the Slovenians in the most northwestern part of the Balkans and the Bulgarians in the southeast, in spite of developed literary languages, than exist among the various dialect groups of Germany and Italy. Some ethnic islands in otherwise homogeneous populations are the unfortunate remnants of the dramatic and tragic history of the Balkans. Under normal political conditions these minority groups are not a problem.

Another idol to be destroyed is the widespread idea of the "civilizing mission," which Europe calls the "white man's burden." Let me say outright, that we in the Balkans are fed up with these civilizing missions which were only a clean cloak to cover indecent economic exploitation. We

have experienced all the forms of economic exploitation, from straight colonization to the more "refined" capitalistic subjugation.

In close connection with the idol of the civilizing mission is the phantom of leadership. By reasons of superior economic, political, and cultural experience some nations claim a right to lead the more backward nations to a better future. In this field too, we Balkanites have had our experiences. The leadership of the Balkans must remain in the hands of the Balkan peoples. In regard to their specific historical evolution the natural form of government would be a federation of Balkan states. Federal political unity will solve almost all problems which today are presented as without solution.

The destruction of these idols clears the field so that we may see distinctly what can and should be done. And it is to self-determined, democratic action after the war that we hope and expect to address ourselves, as free national members of a free world.

3. Nationality North of the Danube

By OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

LIKE MANY VITAL PROBLEMS with which students of Central European affairs have been and will be confronted, the nationality problem can be traced back to the early Middle Ages. Why, one asks immediately, did not people in the area under discussion grow into a political unit, a nation, long before the differences of language and other factors began to play an important part in international relations?

European nations are products of a successful integration of numerous tribes into large units. With a few exceptions such unifications were achieved by local wars. There was a period—I hesitate to give an exact or even an approximate date—when the Slav tribes held almost the whole Middle Danubian area, while their kinsmen were spreading over the Balkans. But the Slavs were never strong enough to absorb older settlers in the Balkans—the Greeks, the descendants of Roman colonists and forefathers of modern Rumanians, the Albanians and smaller units—so that those areas always figured on the ethnical map of Europe like a checkerboard. In the northern areas the course of national unification was deflected by two major events:

1. The penetration of the Germanic tribes along the Danube eastward and organization of the Eastern March or *Ostmark* (this early medieval name was substituted by Hitler for Austria after the occupation of the country in March, 1938). The frontier of the Eastern March varied from time to time, shrinking and expanding until it became stabilized after a succession of conflicts with neighboring tribes.

2. The coming of the Magyars into the Hungarian plains during the ninth century and formation of the Hungarian kingdom in which the Magyars secured and retained the upper hand. Thus the Slav tribes north of the Danube were separated from their kinsmen in the Balkans. The possibility of amalgamation of the Slav tribes into a nation, large and strong enough to unite Central and Southeastern Europe, disappeared forever. These facts, dating back to the early Middle Ages (before 1000 A. D.), form the historical background of the nationality problem in the Danubian basin.

I

It is our task to examine objectively both the integrating and disintegrating forces which have been at work in the area north of the Danube, to project them both into the past and future, to study their interplay, and to evaluate their respective influence on the trend of affairs.

The settling of the Germanic tribes north and south of the Middle Danube, as well as the formation of the Hungarian kingdom brought about division of the population of Central Europe into three ethnical groups, the German-speaking Austrians, the Magyars, and the Slavs; the latter have their own subdivisions. The three ethnical groups differ in many respects and could merge only under very special conditions and a propitious climate.

Austria formed, in the early period of its history, an integral part of the Holy Roman Empire. Local administrators and rulers gradually emancipated themselves from the subordinate position but had not attained full sovereignty. Medieval Austria was a conglomerate of smaller units and never became a kingdom. For several centuries, from 1273 on, members of the House of Hapsburg, ruling over Austrian lands, maintained high position in the Germanic lands as Emperors. Only during the latter half of the nineteenth century, did the ascendancy of the Hohenzollerns overthrow the scale.

The decline of prestige of the Hapsburg family was to a large extent balanced by the growth of Pan-Germanic tendencies among the German-speaking Austrians. Especially the middle class but partly also the working class were fascinated by German success in the Franco-Prussian war, by Germany's role in international politics, by the enormous development of German industry, overseas trade, improvement of housing, higher standard of life, as well as by military preparations for settling accounts with other powers of the world. Ardent Austrian admirers of Germany's achievements already wanted amalgamation within the Reich. Political parties which advocated the *Anschluss* after 1918 grew organically from groups which prior to 1914 fervently promoted close collaboration between the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Germany, even if it meant subordination of Austrian policy to German designs.

The Austrians have never completely severed the ties binding them to the large family of German-speaking people. They have not arrived at the stage of development which has made the German-speaking Swiss a unit, fully loyal to the homeland, deeply rooted in the democratic tradition and therefore inaccessible to any kind of propaganda emanating from sources beyond the frontiers of the Swiss confederation. The mere fact that Hitler, a native from the Austro-German border, integrated into his program both Austrian and German elements speaks against a simple assumption that the Austrians have been in the course of their history so differentiated from the Germans that they will be able immediately after the destruction of Nazism to become full partners in any federation of Central Europe. Austria and its future position must still be considered as a rather complicated problem to which the answer must come primarily from its inhabitants when they have evaluated their recent experiences and again acquired freedom to voice their aspirations.

The case of the Magyars is of a different nature, though it also has its similarities. The Magyar people had their original homes in Asia, somewhere on the western boundary of Southern Siberia. They migrated westward until they reached the Hungarian plains, their new and permanent homes. They are "unlike any other race in Europe. In them, two continents have fused into a compound which has something of each, yet is not identical with either."[1] Their origin and the total difference of their lan-

[1]C. A. Macartney, *Hungary* (London, 1934), p. 13.

guage from those spoken by their neighbors constitute a considerable obstacle to peaceful and undisturbed collaboration.

The medieval kingdom of Hungary owed its existence to the military preponderance of the Magyars over other races in the Hungarian territory. In modern times efforts to absorb those races and to create out of various ethnical groups a Hungarian nation—Hungarian being identical with Magyar—fomented unrest in the country and precipitated its downfall in 1918. Moreover, in their desire to enhance their power and enforce acceptance of far-reaching demands presented to the Vienna Court, Magyar political leaders looked for support in Prussia. These friendly connections with Berlin paved the way for intimate collaboration during the first World War. The present alignment of the Magyar ruling class with Nazi Germany, manifested by Magyar active participation in the campaign against Russia, is by no means accidental. The Prussian Junkers and the Hungarian landlords are natural allies, interested in preservation of their privileges and profoundly disinclined toward any social or political reform.

The present co-operation on Russian battlefields has a historical background. It originated in the nineteenth century; to be exact, between 1848 and 1867, when the Hapsburg monarchy was being transformed from absolutist to constitutional rule. Instead of joining other racial groups and helping to bring about a federal system, the Magyars chose their own line. They counted on moral backing by the Prussians and wrested from the Vienna Court a privileged position not only in Hungary, but in the whole monarchy, influencing more and more its foreign policy. To the old seed of discord new causes of friction had been added during the first World War. The period of twenty years between 1918 and 1938 was truly an armistice as far as the relations of Hungary to her neighbors were concerned; the Magyars never accepted the peace treaties as a final solution and were working not only for local readjustment, but for a complete change of the postwar system.

The third ethnical group, the Slavs, are numerically stronger than both the Austrians and the Magyars together. The mere fact that the Czechoslovaks and the Poles are of the same origin and speak similar languages has not brought about their union. The Slav tribes on the Czechoslovak territory were passing through the initial stage of coalescence, when their country, known in those times as Great Moravia, began to feel the impact of Magyar expansion. They were not sufficiently strong

and centralized to resist the aggressive neighbor and crumbled about 907 under her fierce attacks. When consolidated units had emerged from the chaotic conditions along and north of the Middle Danube, the kingdoms of Bohemia and of Hungary were in the forefront, the former comprising the Czech lands, the latter including within its borders the Slovak areas. For about nine hundred years the Slovaks were separated from the Czechs to be reunited only in 1918 in the independent republic of Czechoslovakia. Their integration into a nation, initiated in the early period of their history, had been frustrated by the disruption of Great Moravia. A period of twenty years of independence after the first World War was not long enough to obliterate vestiges of division and estrangement and to reduce centrifugal forces to insignificance.

Although, according to legend, they are descendants of two brothers, Czech and Lech, the Czechs and the Poles more often resembled discordant than loving brothers and on more than one occasion stood in opposite camps. The line dividing the Poles from the Czechs has never been clearly drawn. Between them there is no such barrier as the Carpathian mountains, which separate the Poles from the Slovaks. The territory of Silesia often was their battleground because Silesian dialects formed a transition from Czech to Polish and vice versa. The conflict over the Teschen area, which has hung like a cloud over the Czecho-Polish horizon since 1918, is to be considered the last instance of the disputes, during which most of the Silesian territory was lost to the Germans, who invariably profited from every centrifugal tendency in the Danubian area.

II

Tourists, superficial observers, or would-be experts covering Central Europe in less than ten days have easily gained the impression that there are no elements of stability in that region and that its inhabitants are not willing to co-operate, hating each other and opposing every scheme of stabilization. There is no use denying that elements of discord have existed —elements of unrest, of efforts to revise the peace treaties and recapture social and political privileges, of press and radio campaigns, of public speeches and diplomatic manuevers to foment antagonisms and eventually prepare ground for the German advance.

Yet I venture to say that an overwhelming majority of the population in every country would have wholeheartedly supported peace ef-

forts and endorsed any project for pacification of Central Europe. I believe also that all sound elements in the occupied countries, if given the chance, would welcome today a thorough reconstruction of the whole area to provide for such a smooth collaboration as exists between the 48 states of the American Union. For they are aware of many integrating forces which have been at work from the dawn of the Christian era. Such forces really exist. Relations have been sometimes correct, sometimes even friendly. Hostilities have alternated with long periods of peace and normalcy. Through the efforts of many generations common ground has been created for future collaboration. Only good will is needed to discover that common ground and to enlarge it with the progress of general pacification.

Since the early Middle Ages the population of the whole area, irrespective of origin or language, has professed the same ideals and has embraced the Christian faith. People there established schools and institutions of learning. They participated actively in forming and enriching the common civilization with the European nations of the west and south. The Renaissance and the Reformation notably influenced the intellectual and religious life of the peoples of Central Europe. The new ideas spread all over the territory and found in each of the four countries both followers and adversaries. In a similar way the Counter-Reformation left its visible marks on people's lives, reminding us of the victory of the Roman Church over the Protestants, of the growth of absolutism in the Hapsburg monarchy, of the ascendancy of the Jesuit order in the church and in education. In the period which they symbolize many unifying forces worked both among the privileged social classes and the peasantry. Poland preserved its independence almost to the end of the eighteenth century. Its cultural development proceeded, however, along similar lines with Bohemia, Hungary, and Austria; these three countries were independent in the Middle Ages and were united under the Hapsburg rule in 1526.

The long period of independence during the Middle Ages, the differences of language and social structure, belong in the category of disintegrating factors. Their effects, however, were to a large extent counterbalanced by integrating factors, especially apparent during the nineteenth century. Modern ideas, political theories coming from the West, emancipation of the peasant class, industrialization of certain areas, and gradual improvement of living conditions changed people's outlook and transformed their way of life.

The degree and intensity of their influence depended on many factors and varied from territory to territory. Central Europe with its enormous natural variety, with ice-capped peaks in the Alps and monotonous lowlands (*puszta*) in Hungary, with coal mines in Silesia and vast forests in Eastern Poland, was not adaptable to quick standardization of economic or social life. The highly developed state control of every sphere of public life helped to invalidate historical survivals and reduce traditional preferences or class prejudices. The interplay of centrifugal and integrating forces produced results on which it would have been possible, if good will had prevailed, to build a superstructure providing for harmonious relations of the people concerned.

III

If good will had prevailed! It was not lacking in certain hours during the time of peace, but it never became a decisive factor or the dominating force. It was difficult at once to bury memories of the long and vain struggles for reorganization of the old Hapsburg monarchy which collapsed in 1918; to forget overnight injustices and grievances; to align in a new and constructive work former enemies; to settle local conflicts to mutual satisfaction. Central Europe suffered from the lack of mutual help and confidence. Its inhabitants let pass the right moment when a general revision of conflicting interests and claims was both advisable and possible. That was some time in the middle of the 1920's when memories of World War I ceased to obsess people and before Mussolini had thrown over Central and Southeastern Europe his net of intrigue.

Although the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe must accept a large share of responsibility for the slow progress of pacification in that region they cannot be blamed for all shortcomings and failures. Whenever Central Europe was drawn into the conflicts and jealousies of the Great Powers, whenever it became a testing ground of two hostile fronts, it suffered inevitably and it suffered immensely. The rivalry of France and Italy during the 1920's was followed in the 1930's by a duel between the two dictators, Mussolini and Hitler, skillfully camouflaged until 1938 by professions of sympathy, assurances of friendship, and proclamations of identity of interests. The world has witnessed the ruthless subjugation of Central Europe by Hitler and almost forgot that the second

partner of the Axis began to sow dragon's teeth there, thus frustrating its integration and preparing ground for the German advance.

Some inveterate optimists believe they have discovered some constructive aspects in the Axis drive against freedom-loving peoples. They believe that the enforced unification of the conquered countries will make people realize that former dissensions and barriers weakened cohesion and resistance and eventually opened the way to invasion and conquest. People who argue like that see, however, only one side of the picture. It is undoubtedly correct that common danger, common misery, common expectation of the hour of deliverance have obliterated many prejudices and psychological barriers. Of rules and regulations which have been imposed upon occupied countries this or that perhaps will remain in force after the collapse of Nazism and Fascism, if found compatible with the principles of the postwar order. Why destroy a railroad or a highway which may be easily converted from its present use into an instrument of postwar rehabilitation?

The reverse of the picture is, however, far more discouraging and has so far received little attention. In 1918 a fair chance had been given to small nations in Central and Eastern Europe to build their national states, to consolidate them and to stop the process of differentiation along linguistic, racial, or religious lines. The peacemakers refrained from such drastic actions as mass transfers of population and accepted the existence of minorities as an inevitable fact.

The presence of German-speaking minorities in almost all countries of Central and Southeastern Europe must be noted here. When Germany began to prepare for a new war—which had occurred at least mentally before Hitler appeared on the scene—these minorities were assigned an important role in the coming campaign. Through systematic work of thousands of innocent-looking professors, lecturers, students, businessmen, and tourists those minorities were made conscious of their German origin; their loyalty to the country in which they lived was shaken by the putative obligations toward the German race. The difference between *Staat* and *Volk*, which, if tolerated, would undermine the foundations of even the United States, was made a fundamental article of the postwar German creed in those countries and incorporated into the Nazi program.

The part of those minorities in the Nazi conquest is sufficiently known and needs no elucidation. Their future position is one of the vital

problems of postwar reconstruction. While a loyal and co-operative minority is an asset, a racial group imbued with the ideology of an aggressive neighbor must be considered a destructive element. To put it in the mildest way: the German-speaking minorities in Central and Southeastern Europe by allying themselves with Nazism jeopardized their positions. They helped Hitler to sow dragon's teeth all over their countries. Their status will have to be so defined that recurrence of their disloyalty is made impossible.

Another fact must be mentioned in connection with our picture of the effects of the Nazi conquest. The well-known Latin saying *divide et impera* directed Hitler's dealing with the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. It has been noted that different methods were applied in breaking the opposition of nations to occupation or "protection." The choice was dictated partly by the degree of resistance, partly by a well meditated plan to create antagonism between the favored and the incorrigible nations, the former being given hope of admission into the "new order," the latter being doomed to enslavement or even extinction. Such a discrimination has inevitably produced jealousies and further estrangement.

It is obvious from information we receive that the process of disintegration has been accelerated by the new methods of resistance to the tyrant. Suppression of all organizations forced people to develop underground activities and to operate in small groups or individually. The hatred of the enemy and of Quislings is undoubtedly a uniting force. But the longer this desperate struggle lasts, the more difficult it is to preserve a generally recognized leadership and identity of program for the current campaign and for future reconstruction.

While examining the picture of the Nazi-dominated countries, let us always pay adequate attention to both sides, to the face and to the reverse. The peacemakers will have to take into account both the progress of unification and the splitting of existing groups into many fractions under duress and in desperate struggle for survival.

IV

It will be imperative to introduce the four freedoms into Central and Southeastern Europe immediately after its liberation from foreign rule. It is obvious that without freedom of speech and of worship pacification would make no headway. The terrible conditions in which masses

of people are starving have been revealed; no doubt exists that it will be extremely important to provide for speedy and effective rehabilitation of the plundered countries. But is is the fourth point, freedom from fear, upon which we should like to conclude.

Living in a free country, we fail to realize to what extent people under the Nazi regime have become infected by animosities and suspicion. It goes without saying that all representatives of the regime are hated, in many cases even by those who seemingly co-operate. But there the infection does not end. The Nazi regime triumphs only when an all-embracing wave of mistrust has swept over society so that everybody loses the feeling of security and safety from persecution. To suppress this infection will be one of the primary tasks of rehabilitation. It must be clearly enunciated that the Nazi methods of terrorization have been buried with the fall of Nazidom; that imprisonment or even execution without trial, that concentration camps or mass deportation will nowhere be tolerated, for fear and personal uncertainty would be formidable enemies in planning and planting the postwar order.

It will, however, be just as necessary to eliminate causes of friction between various countries and thus promote freedom from fear of aggression. Excessive nationalism which has caused so much trouble in Central and Southeastern Europe is a child of both fear and uncertainty as to the designs of a not too friendly neighbor. Iron out the conflicting interests, provide for good will and mutual tolerance, create supranational agencies and courts where disputes can be amicably settled, and you have laid foundations for durable peace and economic prosperity. Without those general measures there will be no end to local conflicts concerning boundary lines and similar matters, and no prospect of gradual integration of heterogeneous elements into a higher and sufficiently strong unit.

We have pointed out the unfortunate role of some of the Great Powers in keeping Central Europe in a state of unrest. Should the area again become a hotbed of jealousies, or a testing ground of two hostile camps, then this war has been, at least as far as Europe is concerned, lost, before it is really won. Should countries like Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland be employed as tools of foreign powers, then streams of blood have flowed in vain. Freedom from fear must be so expanded and interpreted that it will mean freedom from disturbances to perpetuate the existing estrangements and prepare the ground for a new war.

Central and Southeastern Europe is not ripe for a union, for centralistic government, for establishment of a regime which would simply ignore the existing differences and work for uniformity. Even the most ruthless regime has not achieved the desired results.

But Central Europe is ripe for a thorough reconstruction and reorganization along federal lines. It is not our task to deal in detail with the form and extent of such a federation. We wish, however, to emphasize that nothing would offer a more just and durable solution of the nationality problem in the Danubian basin than the determination of all concerned to tone down voices of discord, to strengthen elements of cohesion, to enlarge common ground, and to cultivate in school, in church, in press, and on the radio the spirit of mutual respect. Only by great effort, whatever the environmental circumstances, can a country overcome religious and political intolerance, fight racial discrimination, and base public life on freedom, justice, and equality.

BERNARD SHAW, CAESAR, AND STALIN

By ERIC RUSSELL BENTLEY

The brute force of the strongminded Bismarckian man of action, impatient of humbug, will combine with the subtlety and spiritual energy of the man of thought whom shame cannot illude or interest.—G. B. S.

I HAVE GIVEN the name Heroic Vitalist to many writers of the past hundred years who have, without being Nazi racists, rejected democracy in favor of a religion of Life and an ethic of Heroism. Among them are Carlyle, Nietzsche, Stefan George, and D. H. Lawrence. Now it has been suggested that Bernard Shaw, for all his Fabianism, belongs with this group, and in this essay I try to refute this suggestion. The reader should hold in mind that Shaw looks forward to a New Order in which heroism —redefined—will have a part to play. The world struggle of the twentieth century is not two- but three-sided. The three sides are, first, the old order of what is called capitalism or plutocracy or democracy; second, the new order of fascism or Nazism; third, the new order of communism, Stalinism, social realism, heroic socialism, or what you will. Shaw's whole career, however much he may have wavered, however he may seem to have championed capitalism or complimented fascism, is a striving after the third order. Liberals who all along have misinterpreted the third order, believing it to be "idealistic," have been equally impatient with the Soviet Union and with Bernard Shaw. It can be admitted that Shaw has given the fascists some encouragement.

"Of the moderns," writes Mr. James Drennan, a spokesman of the British Union of Fascism, "both Shaw and Bergson have had their influence on the development of the Fascist conception, and the former . . . has shown in his more recent writings that he has both sympathy for Fascist action and belief in the Fascist future."[1] The authoritarian bent of

[1] *Oswald Mosley and British Fascism* (London, 1934), p. 291.

Shaw's mind is not confined to such obvious essays in illiberalism as *On the Rocks* (1933). It is a permanent characteristic.

Shaw is a vitalist, he admires the hero, he praises Caesar, Napoleon, Bismarck and has on occasion praised Hitler and Mussolini. Yet the matter cannot be left there, for as Shaw wrote thirty-six years ago: "It is assumed on the strength of the single word Superman (Ubermensch), borrowed by me from Nietzsche, that I look for the salvation of society to the despotism of a single Napoleonic Superman, in spite of my careful demonstration of the folly of that outworn infatuation."

One could speak harshly of Shaw. One could charge him with Benthamite callousness and melodramatic diabolism, irresponsible frivolity, and recurrent defeatism. As an artist he ventures too often outside his own preserve of critical comedy; as a devil's advocate he is too often led to praise the pernicious; as an Irishman he too often imagines that because England is bad there is nothing worse. Yet when one has said his worst of Shaw, one is bothered with compunction. Has the old man no qualities but parlor trickery? Supposing one grant that the Shavian ship has steered a zigzag course, has it not covered any distance or reached any port? I think it has, and Mr. Edmund Wilson's hostile essay in *The Triple Thinkers* only strengthens my conviction. For Mr. Wilson has gone altogether too far in portraying Shaw as a great artist with a scrappy and ever-changing philosophy. Mr. Wilson is shy of socialists who are practical men, for in practice the neatness and purity of theory are lost. If Shaw overstrains his admiration of practicality, Mr. Wilson is one of those who would keep his hands clean rather than soil them by action. His own cleanliness would confer the right to censure the dirtiness of others only if one believed the virgin to be the best critic of the mother.

Mr. Wilson has cited the incidents in Shaw's career which make him appear fascist: notably his praise of Hitler (which Mr. Wilson exaggerates) and his repeated praise of Mussolini. Shaw overlooked Mussolini's faults in order to expose the folly of the liberals who believe that the world, in current cliché, should not be "dominated by force." What should it be dominated by? What else is domination but enforced order? Power and politics are of necessity one. The ultimate political failure is absence of power, the creation of such political vacuums as were created by democracy in Italy in 1922 and in Germany in 1933. Nature abhors a vacuum, and Mussolini and Hitler were natural forces. Hence there was more

reality about their regimes than about the chaos which preceded them. Not power but powerlessness is nihilistic. A regime which *can* be overthrown deserves to be overthrown. Perhaps it *has* to be overthrown.

This is Shaw's argument and it oversteps the mark because it ignores the fact that much better regimes than Mussolini's might have filled the vacuum. Shaw's praise of fascism is valuable only as a warning against the liberal attitude which tends to be hostile to all power, to all commanding and obeying. His praise of Soviet Russia is quite another matter. Russia is neither a liberal's Utopia nor a fascist state. The Russian government is friendly to many liberal causes such as peace, racial equality, prosperity; it is hostile to fascism, exploitation, racism. The fools who expected Russia to be dreamlike have lost their dream; the international journalists who preferred America still prefer America; the liberals who hate situations with which only repressive measures can deal are affronted.

If only Marxist philosophy could be liberalized, and if only the Russians were liberal intellectuals, the Soviet Union might please Edmund Wilson. If Russia had been more easy-going and pacifistic she would now be—a German colony. In the liberal rejection of Russia one can see Shelley's nihilistic attack on all government:

> *The man*
> *Of virtuous soul commands not, nor obeys;*
> *Power, like a desolating pestilence,*
> *Pollutes whate'er it touches; and obedience*
> *Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth,*
> *Makes slaves of men and of the human frame*
> *A mechanized automaton.*

One would suppose that Shelley had read Gide on Russia.

To the liberals, Shaw's praise of Stalin is akin to his praise of Mussolini, and insofar as Shaw prefers government frankly understood as the exercise of power this is so. But Shaw does not believe that communism and fascism are the same. In communism there is hope; fascism, where it is not conservative, is regressive. In 1931 Bernard Shaw visited the Soviet Union. In 1933 he wrote that the Moscow experiment was "the only really new departure from Tweedledum and Tweedledee." Shaw remarked that his old scheme for an anthropometric machine for the selection of qualified rulers was not working out in ideal perfection (i. e. in the void) but that the Soviet System "hammered out under the sternest pressure of circum-

stances supplies an excellent provisional solution." This was no passing whim, and Shaw has defended Russian policy through the vicissitudes of the past ten years. Clearly this allegiance has more significance than a few flippant bouquets flung to Mussolini.

Shaw remains unintelligible to liberal idealists on the one hand and to fascists on the other. Both parties suspect that he ought to have been one of them; each is irked, on the other hand, by abundant heresies. To those, however, who belong to neither of these camps, Shaw's inconsistencies appear fewer. There is even a certain persistency in Shaw's chief attitudes and beliefs.

Shaw is neither a fascist, nor an academic protofascist. He is not an aesthetic hero-worshipper like Carlyle, Nietzsche, Stefan George, D. H. Lawrence. Friedrich Gundolf, an authentic Heroic Vitalist, came away from a performance of *Caesar and Cleopatra* sick at heart. He considered it antiheroic; and unless we redefine heroism, he was right. Shaw has not turned liberal values on their heads as Nietzsche did; he has not spat in the face of civilization like D'Annunzio or Hitler. He has discarded those liberal values which are mere ideology—applesauce on the bourgeois pork—and has retained those which are good instruments in the creation of a desirable future. Quite correctly the fascists have noted the materialistic potential in democracy. Democracy does respect men's stomachs and men's purses. Democracy *is* irreligious in that while Jesus's equalitarianism was based on an equal repudiation of worldly goods, the democrat's equalitarianism is based on an equal acceptance of worldly goods. Democrats who speak of spiritual values, eternal verities, and great intangibles, are usually conservatives, that is, people who wish to return to the nineteenth century, not progressives, that is, people who wish to advance to the twentieth and the twenty-first. The fascist either denies material progress or dislikes it. Like the aesthete who is often on the verge of fascism the fascist fears or hates materiality. Shaw on the other hand declares that money—the chief bugbear of aesthete and fascist—is "the greatest thing in the world" and that the crucial moment in his life, was when "the economic basis dawned" on him. Shaw's antipodes is Robinson Jeffers:

> *We must adjust our economics to the new abundance . . .*
> *Of what? Toys: motors, music-boxes,*
> *Paper, fine clothes, leisure, diversion.*

I honestly believe (but really an alien here: trust me not)
Blind war, compared to this kind of life,
Has nobility, famine has dignity.

Shaw takes from fascism and democracy the realistic element and rejects the rest. He rejects fascist racism, fascist corybantism, the fascist cult of unreason; he accepts the fascist view that politics is power, that action, swift and ruthless, is often necessary, that ideals must be subordinated to inexorable realities, that the basic human reality is the life-force. He rejects universal values, *a priori* democracy, democracy as religion, democracy as the *Ding an sich,* democracy as panacea; he accepts as a goal the happiness of the majority of people in the world; the gifted minority, in his view, should be sought after and not persecuted for heresy; he does not prefer "nobility and blind war" to prosperity; he believes in the possibility of progress; he believes that increasing popular control and the immediate abolition of private property would make government more responsible; because he has gone hungry, he does not believe that "famine has dignity"; he is too close to the European melee to defend war on moral grounds. These points add up to the fact that Shaw's belief is founded on common sense, or—if his mystical vitalism is an exception—at least that there are fewer such exceptions in Shaw than in the real reactionaries. There is nothing in Shaw to correspond to Carlyle's rhapsodies on the Everlasting Yea, to Nietzsche's doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, to Wagner's Buddhism, Stefan George's religion of Maximin, D. H. Lawrence's fantasia of the unconscious. His criticism is satiric, and the touchstone of satire is sanity. His view of life is exemplified much less in the fanatic heat of Hitler's rhetoric or the foxy pettiness of Mussolini's politics than in the regime of Josef Stalin. Stalin is not a disciple of Shaw, as Hitler is of Wagner; a jester does not have disciples. Shaw is a disciple of Stalin's. His praise of Hitler and Mussolini was on two counts only: their domestic efficiency and *their proletarian origin*. Stalin has both these attributes and many others pleasing to Shaw. He is brilliantly successful in practice alike in domestic and foreign affairs. His success is Caesarean in that the chief job has been bringing order out of chaos, turning decadence to discipline, removing rivals, securing the boundaries of empire, and resisting the foreign barbarian. Caesarian temperament combines with socialist theory in recognizing the economic basis of society. Stalin succeeds without heroics and without oratory; like all talkative wits,

Shaw admires the silent man of action. And manifestly it is Stalin and his regime that attract Shaw, not doctrinaire communism. He has never joined the Communist Party, for he would be shy, I imagine, of dialetical materialism and discipline.

Major Barbara is probably the most concise statement of Shaw's social philosophy, though reviews of the recent screen-version showed how easy it is to miss the point. Some have thought that Shaw was defending the character of Undershaft, the father of Major Barbara, a bourgeois armament manufacturer who is utterly without illusions about anything, cynical, capable, beyond good and evil, recognizing the potentialities of ambitious individuals like himself. The irony of the play is that all the Marxist arguments—recognition of the class structure of society, of the dependence of ideals upon economics, of the consequent inadequacy of bourgeois ethics—are advanced by Undershaft himself. Undershaft is a realist, but he is also a devil's advocate. He diagnoses the struggle but he takes the wrong side in it. The real protagonist is Cusins, Barbara's lover, who unites in a truly Marxist dialectic the social purpose of Barbara with the social analysis of her father.

The play describes the development of Cusins. He needs Barbara, that is, love and faith, but he needs also to listen to her father who believes that salvation lies in money and gunpowder.

> CUSINS: Excuse me: is there any place in your religion for honor, justice, truth, love, mercy, and so forth?
>
> UNDERSHAFT: Yes: they are the graces and luxuries of a rich, strong, and safe life.
>
> CUSINS: Suppose one is forced to choose between them and money or gunpowder?
>
> UNDERSHAFT: Choose money and gunpowder: for without enough of both you cannot afford the others.

In the scenes that follow, Undershaft's realism passes into Nietzschean bravado. He is right when he scorns those who love poverty; he is right when he says that the Salvation Army draws the teeth of the poor; but when he asks loftily what people of his sort have to do with "the common mob of slaves and idolaters," when he professes that his best friend is his bravest enemy, vanity has the better of vision. Cusins catches him off guard. As the vain bird in the fable drops the cheese into the waiting mouth of the fox who has lured him to sing, so Undershaft finds that he has dropped much more than he planned into the waiting pocket of Cusins. The play ends with Cusins' realization that power—money, guns,

and propaganda—is the basis of business and politics. Morality is rejected because the moralist will not touch pitch, will not master life. The moralist is bent on saving souls. But: "What is all human conduct but the daily and hourly sale of our souls for trifles? What I am now selling it for is neither money nor position nor comfort, but for reality and power."

Cusins, the Shavian hero, represents a New Order. He is working for the common man. The common man is to be vested with power, not with ideals which merely conceal or prolong his impotence. Cusins has to free himself of ideals as has every man brought up under plutocratic democracy; he is not religious because he knows that he cannot have power for good without having power for evil too. Though not the highest power, military action is ultimate in the most relevant (i. e., the pragmatic) sense: the most you can do with your enemy is to coerce him. The power of base gunpowder can destroy the "higher" powers just as a tiger can destroy a man. With this necessary knowledge, Cusins plans to make war on war. His philosophy is a retort alike to the liberal pacifism of ten years ago and to the liberal militarism of today. To the liberal pacifist, Cusins says: Unless all worldly hopes are abandoned, power is fundamental and struggle necessary. To the liberal militarist, Cusins says: Your illusions—ideals and universal values—stand in the way of the progress in which you believe.

Shaw has been a satirist of the Old Order, or rather the old disorder. Satirists in modern times are forced into the position of devil's advocates, which means that they are usually nihilists. Unlike the medieval satirist whose criticism was based on an affirmation of divine values, or the eighteenth-century satirist whose criticism was based on an affirmation of reason, the nineteenth-century satirist bases his criticism on nothingness. He is critic *pur sang,* and such values as he implies are hangovers from the eighteenth century (Anatole France) or carry-overs from the values which are ostensibly being attacked: Samuel Butler was above all a Victorian. Shaw feels the plight of his generation. Struggling, he tries vantage point after vantage point. He writes now from a Bergsonian, now from a Butlerian, now from a Nietzschean standpoint; and his "versatility," "indecision," "irresponsibility," to cite well known descriptions of Shaw, are a result. There was in 1900 no ground for a satirist to stand on. He had to dodge swiftly on the shifting sands from one point to another; Shaw planted steppingstones across the quicksands. A set of values, to abandon

the metaphor, is established in his own works, different from the values of contemporary society, premonitory, rather than expressive, of a New Order. *Major Barbara* embodies these values: a synthesis of a businessman's ethics and a salvationist's religion. The realism of the men of action is combined with the purposes of the men of thoughts: the synthesis is what Plato and Nietzsche were after. Shaw rejects heroism, if heroism means remoteness from the masses, sublimity, individualism. He is completely indifferent to any *separate* race of supermen; he rejects the Heroic Vitalist doctrine that there are two types of men, the Great and the Small. He is not an aesthete seeking perfection; he is a realist in search of a *modus vivendi*. He has not like the Heroic Vitalists abandoned all hope of happiness. For Shaw happiness is both an empirical fact and a future prospect.

The hero of Shaw's New Order is perhaps as much patterned after Caesar as Nietzsche's. But different qualities are admired. Not *hubris* but capability is the test. Heroic Vitalism is a philosophy of courage. Shaw offers an analysis of courage which disposes of it once for all. Courage is not a mysterious possession which a soldier carries with him in his pack. Courage is a flattering label given to a man's ability to *ignore* danger. He may ignore danger because he is stupid. He may ignore it because he is ambitious and his mind is fixed on a goal; Shaw's Napoleon is courageous when he is determined to cross the bridge at Lodi. He braves danger because he is inattentive to it; he is inattentive because he is busy with other thoughts.

This sort of analysis—realistic yet in its implications liberal—corrodes all myths of heroism. Does it corrode all human value? To say so would be to reject the striving after self-conquest by reason which has been the major endeavor of mankind during the past two hundred years.

THE CHRISTIAN MYTHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM

By WILL HERBERG

THE essentially religious nature of Socialism (or Communism) is widely recognized. It plainly exhibits all the earmarks of organized religion. It is a faith, emotional and mystical. It has its dogma, creed, and scripture; its theology and apologetics; its orthodoxies, schisms, and heresies; its mythology, hagiography, and cult. It serves all the vital social and psychological functions of religion. And its authoritarian, hierarchical forms of organization find a close counterpart in many ecclesiastical structures. So much is well known and fairly obvious.

But the parallel goes deeper; it reaches down to what might be called the religious scheme of human destiny. The orthodox Socialist scheme of salvation (emancipation) exhibits the most startling likeness to the traditional Judaeo-Christian scheme, and the analogy covers not merely the general outline but the entire pattern and many important details as well. This inner similarity seems at least as significant as the more familiar resemblance in external feature and function.

I

Both Christianity and Socialism have their "doctrine of first and last things." The Judaeo-Christian drama of human destiny and salvation takes place in three acts; so does the Socialist. And the three acts of the one are like those of the other in some essential respects.

Both dramas proceed in three phases that may be described as follows: (1) a primitive state of harmony, justice, and happiness; (2) an intermediate stage (in which mankind generally still finds itself) of conflict, injustice, and misery; and (3) a final or ultimate state of regained harmony, justice, and happiness forever and ever. Anyone familiar with the Judaeo-Christian and Socialist schemes will recognize how well and how completely they fall into this triadic pattern. Let us examine these three phases in some detail.

1. *Primal Innocency.* In the traditional Judaeo-Christian drama, the curtain rises on man's estate of primal innocency and perfection in Eden. It is the Christian version of the "state of nature" of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism and the "golden age" of classical antiquity. In this state, of course, freedom, virtue, and harmony reign supreme; happiness is universal; private property, coercive government, and strife are unknown. It is Paradise indeed.

The exact counterpart in the Socialist scheme is the so-called Primitive Communism that orthodox Marxism posits as the initial stage of human social development everywhere. This Primitive Communism, still another version of the "state of nature" and the "golden age," is a veritable social paradise—harmonious, truly democratic, bound together by tribal solidarity, free from exploitation of man by man, free from classes, private property, and government. Except that one is described in anthropological terms and the other in theological, Christianity's Eden and Socialism's Primitive Communism can hardly be told apart.

2. *The Fallen State.* Man sinned and was driven from Eden. Private property and emerging class divisions brought Primitive Communism to an end. In both cases, man fell and entered upon his fallen state. In traditional Christian theology, the necessity for private property, class inequalities, and coercive government—institutions utterly unknown in Paradise—is traced to the sinful nature of man after the Fall. In Socialist doctrine, these institutions are themselves manifestations of man's lapse from Primitive Communism. In one case, it is the spiritual self-alienation of man; in the other, his social self-alienation—the self-alienation of society.

It is of interest to note that both Christian and Socialist theologians have always had some difficulty in accounting for the Fall. How could man, in the perfection of his goodness, succumb to temptation? How could private property and class society emerge from the bosom of Primitive Communism and tribal solidarity? The wide variety of answers advanced by the one group of theologians or the other are of little direct interest in this connection; what is of significance is the similarity of the problem.

3. *Regained Innocency.* In the end, man is redeemed. Mankind, transfigured, is restored to primal innocency, or rather elevated to a new innocency. Happiness, harmony, virtue, and perfection again pre-

vail. Man's spiritual self-alienation is overcome. It is the Kingdom of Heaven, Paradise Regained.

The third and final stage in the Socialist scheme of salvation is the stage of Communism. (Here the term is used to represent not a movement but a type of social order.) Under Communism, mankind is restored to primitive social virtue but on a "higher" level. Private property, social classes, and coercive government are done away with. The new stage marks the end of the social self-alienation of man; it is the social innocency of Primitive Communism regained.

The parallel extends to the conception of human nature, which at first sight may seem widely different in the Christian and Socialist systems. But the difference is due primarily to differing frames of reference. The traditional Christian doctrine regards human nature as deeply tainted with evil and corruption *in its fallen state,* but as having been pure and good in Paradise, and, with Paradise regained, destined to become so again in the future state of grace in the Kingdom. Socialism, too, looks upon human nature as debased and corrupted *in class society,* but holds it to have been very noble indeed in the original state of Primitive Communism and bound to become so again in the future Communist society. In both systems, human nature was originally good, became evil through the Fall, and will be restored to goodness and virtue in the future state. Both sets of theologians, Christian and Socialist alike, are therefore realistic, pessimistic, even cynical about human nature as it is, but boundlessly optimistic and utopian about human nature as it will be "after the revolution," when strictly speaking it will no longer be mere human nature. In Socialism, however, the "revolution" is conceived as within history; in Christianity, as at the end and outside of history.

With the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven, an end is put to the spiritual adventures and history of mankind; with the inauguration of Communism, an end is put to its social history. Both are ultimate stages in which time is annihilated, stages of final perfection.

It cannot have escaped the reader that these three phases of man's life, destiny, and salvation fall into the familiar triadic pattern of the Hegelian dialectic:

I. Thesis: Paradise—Primitive Communism.

II. Antithesis (Negation): The Sinful World (Fallen State)—Class Society.

III. Synthesis (Negation of the Negation): Kingdom of Heaven—Communism.

The triadic pattern is quite explicit in Marxian theory, which, of course, swears by the Dialectic. It is equally pertinent to the Christian theme, as certain keen Hegelian theologians, including Hegel himself, have noted.

The Kingdom of Heaven (Communism) marks the end of man's spiritual (social) adventures and history. But the Kingdom of Heaven is itself ushered in by the most tremendous event in history—a great apocalyptic catastrophe in which the Son of God appears leading the legions of Light against the hosts of Darkness. The ultimate denouement, the triumph of the Kingdom of Heaven, comes only after a titanic final struggle with the forces of Anti-Christ, who will have reached the summit of his power and glory on the very eve of his annihilating defeat. (The Jewish apocalypses follow a somewhat similar pattern.)

Just so in the orthodox Socialist apocalypse. The new social order of Communism is to be ushered in through a sudden, cataclysmic proletarian revolution marking the culmination of a gigantic final struggle with the forces of capitalist reaction, which, in the form of fascism or its equivalent (Engels spoke of Bonapartism), will have reached their highest point in this last stage. " 'Tis the final conflict . . . . " could well serve as the hymn of struggle and victory for both.

The dreadful chaos, confusion, portents, wars, and disasters marking the reign of Anti-Christ just before the great culmination, as described in the visions of the Biblical and apocryphal writers of apocalypses, are faithfully duplicated in the accounts to be found in the apocalyptical writings by Socialist revolutionaries, of the horrors of fascism, war, imperialism, and the "imminent collapse of capitalism."

All this is the orthodox or "classic" version. But just as "reformist" Socialism, following bourgeois liberalism, attempts to reduce the cataclysmic social revolution to a slow, gradual accumulation of social reforms, so does "liberal" Christianity, taking its cue from secular modernism, attempt to reduce the grand catastrophe that ushers in the Kingdom of Heaven to a steady, gradual advance of mankind toward moral and spiritual perfection. The dogma of Progress through the "inevitability of gradualism" lies at the root of both types of "revisionism."

Returning now to the orthodox version, perhaps the most curious similarity relates to the so-called "transitional stage." We know that, according to orthodox Marxism, the final installation of Communism is preceded by a transitional period of indefinite length, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," during which the victorious proletariat (in actual fact, the Party) holds sway. Is it possible to miss the parallel between this doctrine and Christian millenarianism according to which a thousand years of rule on earth by Christ and his Saints must supervene as a transitional and preparatory period before the final and ultimate inauguration of the Kingdom of Heaven?

We may pursue the analogy further with results quite as instructive. The Kingdom of Heaven, in its power and glory, is prefigured in this sinful world in the Chosen People, the Saving Remnant, the Saints, the Church; just so is the Communist social order of the future prefigured in this capitalistic world in the class-conscious proletariat, the Socialists (or Communists), the Party. In popular Christian theology, the world is the scene of an unceasing, all-pervading struggle between the forces of good and evil, of God and the Devil, a struggle which permeates all spheres of life; in popular Socialist doctrine, society is the scene of a similar struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, a struggle that likewise permeates all spheres of life. One struggle culminates in, and is resolved by, the Last Judgment; the other culminates in, and is resolved by, the Proletarian Revolution. The conflict is not merely in the world as such but in each and every Christian soul, a conflict between the Flesh and the Spirit, between the "old" and the "new" man; so does a conflict rage in the breast of every worker between bourgeois and proletarian influences, between the "old" and the "new" order. The individual struggle is merged into the universal in both cases. And in both cases, the "new" man (regenerate man, class-conscious Socialist), though of course *in* this world, is not really *of* it but of the new order to come.

It is through spiritual suffering that the Christian soul wins the gift of grace and becomes a member of the Communion of Saints and a bearer of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is through material, economic, and social suffering that the worker achieves to class (or Socialist) consciousness and becomes a bearer of the Communist society of the future. In the great prophetic vision, Israel (or the Messiah), despised, rejected, crushed, is the Suffering Servant of the Lord, and thereby the instrument of the

ultimate salvation of mankind. In Socialism, the proletariat, exploited, despised, oppressed, is the Suffering Servant of History (or Progress) and thereby the instrument of the ultimate emancipation of mankind. Both gospels are passionately Messianic, and "the poor shall inherit the earth" is the promise of both.

The familiar Christian doctrine that men must die on the sinful human level in order to live again on the divine level, the level of grace and salvation, finds its counterpart in the well known Socialist doctrine that the proletariat must dissolve itself as a class of bourgeois society in order to rise to the higher social level of nonclass producers in Communist society. The predestinarian and free-will schools of historic Christianity are mirrored in the deterministic and voluntaristic tendencies in traditional Marxism. Divine Providence in the theodicy of the one becomes the Dialectic in that of the other. Even the transcendence of the Law of Justice on a lower level by the Law of Love on a higher is duplicated in Socialist theology in the transcendence of the earlier stage of Communist society with its "equal wages for equal work" by the final stage with its "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Just as Christian theologians stress that grace cannot be achieved through mere human effort but must come from above, so do both Kautsky and Lenin insist that Socialist consciousness cannot be achieved by the proletariat through its own efforts but must come to it from the outside. These suggestive parallels could be extended indefinitely. Plainly, they point to something fundamental.

II

The problem of interpreting these results presents considerable difficulty. There seem to be two main aspects: the basic affinity between the Christian and Socialist patterns; and the role of myth and mythmaking in social movements. Some remarks on these questions may be ventured.

Whatever other factors may be involved, the similarity of conception must be due, in large part at least, to the tendency of West European thought to follow the fundamental patterns marked out by the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Until the close of the Middle Ages, European culture was almost entirely Christian. The breakup of medieval civilization did indeed destroy the unity of European culture, but it by no means eradicated its basically Christian character. The significant philosophies and ideologies of modern Western civilization are in the last analysis derived

from this source. There is little difficulty in interpreting Spinoza, Descartes (in his metaphysics), Kant (in his ethics), Hegel, Rousseau, and other outstanding modern thinkers in this light. Nor is it hard to detect the Christian doctrine of man and society, shorn of its supernaturalism, in the social philosophies of the last three centuries. Socialism reflects another side of this process.

Christianity, both in its Hebraic and its Greek aspects, has ploughed deep into the collective consciousness of the West and has marked out patterns that condition the form of cultural expression to this very day. It has very largely molded even our customary vocabulary of philosophic and social thought. When the Socialist thinks of the ideal society of the future, he almost invariably thinks of it as the Promised Land or as the Kingdom of Heaven and often speaks of it in those very terms. He thinks of "his" class as the Chosen People, of his party as the Church Militant. In denouncing social and economic abuses, he "naturally" falls into the pattern of the Hebrew prophets calling down divine judgment upon an evil generation. So profound and ubiquitous is the influence of the Christian heritage, so effectively does it operate at the unconscious levels of the mind, that even those consciously most hostile to it cannot really escape it. It has, in very truth, become second nature to us. It has put its stamp upon all our thinking, especially in ethics and social philosophy.

These considerations are offered without any prejudice to interpretations at a deeper level. It might, for example, be contended that the very nature of reality determines the dialectical-dramatic structure of both Christianity and Socialism, so that the two become at bottom variant mythological transcripts of a single essential reality, saying the same thing in different languages, on different levels of experience and meaning. But such considerations would take us too far from the subject matter of this paper.

The second problem relates to the role of mythological thinking in social movements. Why cannot such movements be content with the bare verifiable facts? Why need they go beyond and resort to mythologizing, as they always seem to do and as we have seen that Socialism unquestionably does?

Mythological thinking, it seems, arises out of the very necessities of action. The transition to action is a process in which mythology—the

imaginative filling out and transformation of experience into a dramatic struggle of personalized forces—is necessarily evolved.

Action implies reference to ends, and ends of a far-reaching, enduring character are projected as ideals. These ideals, linked with creed and faith on the intellectual and emotional sides, provide the dynamic of social action. Indeed, it is only in terms of ideal, creed, and faith that sustained social action makes sense and acquires meaning and significance.

Every vital social movement, particularly a movement of large scope and reach, is, in one of its aspects, a religious movement. Its dynamic is rooted in a faith, in an energizing myth and creed.

In the formation of creed and mythology, scientific ideas and facts of experience may well be utilized. But matter-of-fact reality is in itself generally too meager, too unsatisfactory, too uncertain and precarious to serve the purposes of action. Dynamic social action requires the certainty and fervor of faith—"the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen"; it requires an assertion of values, a wholeness of view, a promise of final achievement, a vision of ultimates far beyond the poor, bare facts. The usable elements of factual experience are therefore transformed, filled out, elaborated into an appropriate mythology which serves to idealize, rationalize, and justify the aims of action, to dramatize the struggle, to secure the values and to guarantee the ultimate triumph of the cause.

Mythological thinking is thus a form of wish-thinking, which may be regarded as the normal type of thinking that is not rigidly held down to the rules of logical inference (as it is in such special fields as science, technology, and certain types of philosophy). It is apparently impossible to eliminate the mythological element from the ideology of a social movement without destroying its sources of power. Mythology is the dynamism of great social movements as it is of great religions.

WE NOTE . . .

THE HORRORS OF TOTAL SECURITY

The leading editorial of *The New York Times* for March 14, "Which Path, America?" is a bitter denunciation of the report of the National Resources Planning Board on total security and full employment for postwar America.

In clichés reminiscent of the most reactionary anti-New Dealers, the *Times* obfuscates the true issue. It asserts that furnishing full employment and guaranteeing total security is but the entering wedge to totalitarianism. To quote explicitly: "It is an axiom of political economy that liberty depends on ability to choose one's work and one's employer," and further, "The schemes of the N. R. P. B. . . . mark the beginning of the Europeanization of America."

It is not true that the demise of liberal governments followed the furnishing of full employment. Quite the reverse. It was the chaotic state of Italian industrial employment which paved the way for the Fascist march on Rome; in Germany the membership in the National Socialist Party fluctuated almost directly with the index of unemployment, and Hitler came to power only after the people of Germany had endured years of unemployment and industrial stagnation. On the other hand, Sweden, which avoided the worst effects of the depression of the 1930's, did not go totalitarian because her democratic government showed itself strong enough and intelligent enough to cope effectively with the threat of unemployment and industrial stagnation. In fact, ten years ago the Swedes were already operating under a scheme of things not essentially different from the proposal of the N. R. P. B. over which the *Times* expresses such horror. If America is Europeanized through the imitation of the highly successful middle way of Sweden, then by all means let us become Europeanized.

In the process of strewing the path leading to total security and full employment with innuendo, perversion of historical fact, and the totalitarian bogyman of foreign isms, the *Times* editorial neglects to show what the alternative to the proposal of the N. R. P. B. might be. What alternative to government responsibility for the welfare of our economic system is there except *laissez faire*? Unfortunately for the peace of mind of the proponents of this nineteenth-century economic orthodoxy, present-day economists of repute have come to accept the state as a necessary agency in the maintenance of full employment and maximum utilization of our productive resources. Indeed, the ideas of Hansen and Keynes, which are rapidly becoming economic orthodoxy, accept the necessity of large-scale government projects if anything approximating full employment is to be achieved.

The full utilization of our highly developed modern technology can only occur if we have an adequate supply of purchasing power. Only effective government action can achieve this desideratum of our economic system.

V. C.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE DEMOCRACY

The recent concerted drive against the federal "bureaucrats" who have been directing our war effort has had its diabolical side—the endeavor to destroy effective government action. But concealed in it has been a core of fact which in the rush of charges and counter charges has been too much neglected. The federal agencies, under the pressure of war-time emergency, have had to act with an exceeding arbitrariness. In that arbitrariness there waits a danger to our democracy which must be gradually alleviated if the vigor of federal control and direction is not to be generally discredited by the time the war ends. What we need, and need speedily, is more administrative democracy.

The danger in such an agency as the O. P. A. as it has existed or as it has been exaggerated for political purposes lies in the feeling which the common garden variety of American has, first, for federal government, and second, for modern life in general—a feeling usually described as of being "pushed around." You will find this feeling behind much of what was the apathy and what is still the coolness toward the war. The common American sees the growing centralization in Washington (he sees much less clearly the same phenomenon in business and in other institutions though it contributes nonetheless to his vague uneasiness) and he places that growth against his conception of the democracy that everyone says we are fighting for. For the life of him he cannot see any connection between the two.

His idea of democracy runs deep in him, but it flows out of a simplicity not so abundant as once upon a time. It frequently means little beyond three things—a neighborly relationship in a small community (from which he is probably now removed) and the vote and the right to protest. Something of the recent importance of the vote can be seen in the result from the less than 50 per cent of the electorate who went to the polls in the last national election—as well as among the greater number who stayed away. If the disturbed or interested citizen writes his congressman, that gentleman often turns out to be as ineffective (sometimes for other reasons) as himself; in any event, he seldom comes to grips with the federal actions which have affected him. The acts of the federal government press upon him today with greater weight than ever before and they are further removed from his control. Everywhere he feels a greater helplessness and a more desperate inability to influence events.

Such widespread impressions cannot be allowed to continue. After the war, for example, we shall need a federal consumer agency to tell us the facts about consumer goods and to offer us protection. Logically it should spring out of our experience with O.P.A. But the popular support for such an agency will hardly be possible, if the total experience with O.P.A. or federal administrative agencies in general has left the great majority without a feeling of confidence. And no such agency would be effective without some more direct method of communication than we have yet discovered. So far as federal administration is concerned, the good, democratic phrase "the consent of the governed" must be imaginatively reconsidered and its implications made concrete wherever possible. Consent to

the hardest of facts, we might be reminded, can come from "mere" discussion and exchange of opinion.

For the problems in democratic implementation, many of the planners and top administrators have accepted their proper responsibility. But up to the moment other matters have had to take precedence over those problems. Furthermore, to question the planners about the place of the administrative agency in the federal structure is usually to receive the stock answer that "government must be responsible"; which, being interpreted, frequently means that the citizen must be largely content with the vote and a three-cent pipeline to his congressman. There is still room for better understanding of the fact that the vote would take on greater importance and be used with greater confidence if it were supplemented with other politically democratic techniques; and further, that planners within and without the government must make their plans favorably understood by the common American before they can grasp the power for which they have been struggling.

Another group must also bear part of the responsibility for the general ignorance and misunderstanding of the new political needs. These are the middlemen of our culture—the social workers, teachers, librarians, newspapermen, labor leaders. They have some understanding of the common man, for it is frequently their job to deal intimately with him. Their weakness has been that they have allowed themselves to partake too much of his own helplessness. They sense the national trend toward centralization, but they seek to avoid it or slow it down by giving too much attention to palliatives, by reaching back into the American past for old formulas, or by unwonted grumbling. Their failure, if it may be called that, is one of nerve and imagination.

Fortunately there are signs that these problems may receive more attention in the near future. Recently a series of meetings under the auspices of the American Library Association have been called throughout the country to consider how librarians may further the public understanding of war and postwar problems. These librarians have discussed such new techniques as the radio forum, the film forum, and the small discussion group.

There are stirrings within the government also. Under the block plan of Civilian Defense, the discussion group has already proved its widespread usefulness in Colorado and Michigan. This method, which in the end should carry the discussion of public issues to every crossroads in America, is now to be encouraged in each of the other 48 states.

The most exciting of new techniques is the film forum, which is only in its beginnings. One of the chief obstacles here is the passivity to which the usual Hollywood product has conditioned movie-goers. What is called for is not only a more active participation on the part of the audience and community leaders but also a new kind of film which will stimulate discussion rather than allay it. The Office of War Information is now beginning to produce the right kind of film (see *The Price of Victory* built around Vice-President Wallace's famous speech of a year ago) and is digging into the job of broad distribution.

These are straws in the wind. But the lag in public understanding is too great to be solved either quickly or without great effort. Let us not mini-

mize the difficulty. The American is a political animal, and he expects to stand in undimmed dignity before his national government (in which the commision, the office, the bureau plays an increasingly dominant role). He has been told, and he frequently believes, that the government is his, and who is he to accept being pushed around (or the feeling of being pushed around) for long without doing something—not necessarily a wise something—about it? It is not his genius to be law-abiding; and it may be unfortunate, but the law which he knows and cares for least is administrative. The film forum, the radio forum, the discussion group in adult education and in the blocks of Civilian Defense should be pushed to the utmost. Other techniques should be invented or adapted also. All this because a basis must be laid for the peace which is to come, and because planning can be overthrown by the public if understanding is lacking. These are imperatives which should contribute to a new political development—an administrative democracy.

P.B.

COMES THE COLD, GRAY DAWN

In the *New York Times Magazine* for February 14th, Arthur Koestler sings a quiet dirge over the war aims and the revolutionary hopes of the leftist intellectuals. As victory comes closer for the Allies, he says, it becomes increasingly clear that the war is being fought and won for essentially conservative, nineteenth-century ends of nationalism and survival. The shining new postwar world was a dream several generations ahead of its possible actuality and the liberals had better swallow their disappointment and settle down to make the most of the breathing space that will precede World War III.

If these sentiments had come from Eugene Lyons or Congresswoman Luce we would not find them notable. But Arthur Koestler has a long leftist background, he has had direct experience with war and fascism of an intensity that few commentators can match, and he has written some of the most penetrating books of our time. He is not a man who would write off the major idealisms of his time (and of his own life's work) because of minor petulance, and his reasons for doing so are worth studying.

The main trouble, says Koestler, is that the great mass of the common people think in nineteenth-century terms, they have no interest in dying for "the democratic way" or for any similar abstraction, in England and America they have no real conception of what fascism is or of what their taken-for-granted freedoms will cost to maintain, and in Europe they hope simply for survival and revenge. Hitler's European conquest has revived nationalist hates and provincialism tremendously and set back the possibility of a democratic united Europe by at least fifty years. The people distrust leftist leadership because of its long record of failure (and in spite of its rational vindication by events) and instinctively follow the Tories—who have the power and the habit of using it, and who speak in terms which may be logically obsolescent but yet remain part of the common language.

It is quite possible that Koestler has called the turn on a significant downswing in the war hopes of the leftist intelligentsia. In the dark days after Pearl Harbor there was hope and

strength in the conviction that the compulsives of the war effort worked in double harness with the objectives of social and economic reform, and that nothing less than a brave new world could summon the material and spiritual strength needed to win the war. It begins to look now as if the war might be won with considerably less than this —won in spite of resurgent Jim Crowism, the State Department, the National Manufacturers' Association, Eddie Rickenbacker, and the special interest blocs, spoilsmen, and assorted blatherskites of a Congress with ominous potentialities. Having granted this possibility we can also assume that the peace treaties following such a victory would be no more decent or workable than might be expected.

But, having followed out this gloomy forecast to a logical stopping place, what conclusions does it really boil down to? First, that the leftist intellectuals are not likely to be given carte blanche to remake a suddenly malleable world. Second, that a new world will be made only as rapidly as the common people will visualize it, want it, and find ways of achieving the power necessary to build it. There is nothing new or devastating in either of these conclusions. Neither is there any reason for putting intelligence and idealism carefully away in a Time Capsule.

The flaw in Koestler's argument, it seems to us, is that he assumes that a victory by a hold-what-we-have England and a disunited, full-of-fine-talk-and-dirty-work-in-the-clinches America is going to mean the indefinite preservation of Tory imperialism and old-style ragged individualism. Along with this assumption goes a more basic one: that the common man will not only fight and bleed and win the war without any very profound understanding of what goes on (which is probably true), but that he will remain unaware and docile afterwards. And this latter assumption seems to us to be nonsense. The social and economic dislocation and the suffering and personal uprootings at home, combined with the global education being received by the armed forces, are going to produce a postwar tidal wave of susceptibility to revolutionary change. Any conservative government simple-minded enough to expect to relax into the enjoyment of victory, long weekends, and Normalcy will get itself washed into the storm sewer. What kind of leadership this potential flood will develop and what channels it will follow remain to be seen. The liberals and leftist intellectuals have as much stake in the outcome and opportunity for leadership as any other group.

F. C.

PRIVATE DOGFACE GOES TO COLLEGE

The war has caused a bad case of flutters in the dovecotes of higher education. Accounting for this state of nerves has been the long period of uncertainty as to how the government intended to use the colleges, plus the certainty that for military reasons the technical and scientific subjects would have to be emphasized at the expense of the humanities and social sciences. Now the situation begins to shape itself. The majority of the colleges will be used by the Army and Navy to prepare student soldiers for military tasks. The courses of study announced indicate clearly that the military leaders have used well balanced judgment. Physics, mathematics, and other technical subjects bulk large, of course. But the potential officers to be trained are

to be educated, too. History, geography, and English appear in significant amounts in the various curricula, particularly in the basic programs.

Now it is up to the colleges to go to work and do an effective job on the Army and Navy programs. There isn't much doubt that they will. All institutions are required to specialize, which simplifies the problem of absorbing quickly large numbers of new students. Of course there will be more problems than just teaching and housing, such as working out social relationships between the civilian and military students. But with intelligent administration on both sides they can be solved too.

Streamlining the programs and offerings for the civilian students will be a natural consequence of devoting a large part of the colleges' efforts to the student soldiers. Much intelligent pruning and combining of courses will be necessary, so that the most important purposes of the institution may carry on. Both the military and civilian programs for the duration present difficult but quite soluble problems. Only small colleges which are left out of the military programs will have to worry about self-preservation, and most of them probably will find special functions related to the war such as training women for advanced work in industry. After all these functions are performed there still ought to be energy and thought available for planning the colleges' postwar programs.

Two generations of college students will swamp the admissions offices when the war ends. This demand will be even bigger proportionally and will last longer than the dammed-up demand for consumer goods. Twelve to fifteen million men will have served in the military forces. It is a safe guess that the government will finance further training for three to five million of them and that at least a third of this training will be of college grade. Two or three times as many men as were in college before the war will want to resume or begin college work after leaving the service. Fortunately the demand will not all come at once because demobilization will be gradual. For five years after the war the veterans may equal or outnumber the college students of normal age.

This considerable period of peak demand will give the colleges, especially the private ones, more freedom and elbow-room than they have ever had. Then they need not try to be all things to all men to attract the last possible student to their doors. Rather they will be able to survey the social scene and their own purposes and resources and plan their own functions with relative assurance. It will be easy to establish the many short vocational courses that the returning soldiers will call for in large numbers. That function must be performed. Not so easy will it be to set up new long-range programs and to find the time and energy to work them out against the insistent demands for the "quickie" courses.

This job must be carried on now. Each college must re-examine its purposes in the light of postwar needs and design the program by which it can best serve society. This challenge particularly confronts the champions of liberal education who have been wringing their hands over its demise. There was something wrong with their old formula. The pragmatic test was its rejection by so large a proportion of college students. The new formulas must relate liberal education to life so closely

and unmistakably that no student or parent can miss the connection.

W.B.A.

THE STRENGTH OF CHINA

It is beginning to be apparent that for the long run the reconstruction of Asia will take precedence over the reconstruction of Europe, yet that fact is by no means well understood in this country. Americans think they know something of Europe and its political and economic troubles, but about Asia they frequently have not even reached the point of realizing that they are ignorant. Europeans are vocal about themselves and their countries, but Chinese, Japanese, and Indians seldom can make themselves understood to the occidental mind, and when they are articulate, we do not have the background for a full understanding of the more elementary truths. Our ignorance, moreover, is implicit in the treatment we have accorded the colored minorities in this country—the Negroes, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos. In Asia these colored "minorities" become overwhelming majorities. How are we to appreciate their need for hegemony in their own lands when we are not willing to understand them as next-door neighbors?

The situation is the more extraordinary when we realize, as Nathaniel Peffer so admirably points out,[1] that our national policy toward the Far East has been positive, consistent, and of long standing. More than a hundred years ago, before our first settlements had reached the Pacific Coast, we were already declaring ourselves interested in trade across the Pacific. And we have continued to look toward Asia through the era of the clipper ships, through recognition of Hawaiian independence, through annexation of Hawaii and the Philippines, through the declaration of the Open Door in China, even to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The fact is that we have always looked toward Asia without really seeing what was there. And today we not only misunderstand the oriental mind —which can be quite as clear about freedom and independence as the occidental—but we do not yet recognize our Asiatic opportunity. That opportunity is fundamentally the chance for a fruitful and lasting peace. In Europe the arrival and maturation of the Industrial Revolution have given civilization four hundred years of turmoil and war. Asia is now entering upon *her* Industrial Revolution. Is she now, like the Western countries, also to enter upon an era of bloodshed, involving necessarily all the rest of the world? The answer is principally up to us, for in the East we command not only power but what Mr. Willkie has called a reservoir of good will.

Mr. Peffer thoughtfully points out that the key nation in Asiatic reconstruction must be China. Because of her central position in geography, history, culture, and in the war itself, she will inevitably and rightly take the lead. Theoretically she will be on a par in the postwar world with Britain, Russia, and the United States. Yet for a number of reasons she will not be able to wield the influence at the peace table which by right belongs to her. For one thing, China's economic and political machinery is put together out of odd parts. Only with our watchfulness and our indirect aid can that machinery be reassembled or rebuilt into a unit powerful enough to take its proper place among the community of nations.

[1] In his *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, Harper, 1942. 277 pp., with index. $2.50.

In order to bring peace to Asia and the world, China must be strong. Fortunately, under the stress of war China's strength is growing; in the end she will drive the Japanese from her territory with the force of her own army—a fact which Mr. Peffer duly celebrates. This is as it should be, for if the armed forces from America or elsewhere had had to help in the job of Japanese expulsion, then China's future independence would have been seriously endangered, or lost outright. Now, when the war is won, China can maintain the full integrity of her territory and of her national personality—if we help by shifting our weight to that end. This truth we do not yet understand, but we must understand it if peace in Asia —and in the world—is to be firmly established.

China is central. As she goes, so eventually must go the rest of Asia. And the strength and integrity of China turns upon the control of her own development. Inevitably China's industrialization will attract many technicians, businessmen, and professionals from the West. Concerning their influence the key factor is this: Will they be working in "International Settlements," under special "rights," and for foreign corporations; or will they be employed by corporations under Chinese control and be subject always to the desires of a strong Chinese government? If the latter, we can have a long peace. If the former, we shall certainly in the end have war. This is the choice for the West—and particularly for the United States.

P. B.

LOOK TO THE PEACE!

When the democratic world was in danger of military defeat the air was golden with the promises of a new fair world to come. The progressive forces were flushed with the expectation of a comparatively easy political victory after the military victory was won. The reactionary forces either kept quiet or said, "Me too," for popular enthusiasm was necessary to win the war. Now that the war is being won reaction speaks up and claims its right to order the world as it sees fit. It speaks for colonial empire, for territorial acquisitions, for world power while it sneers at the "idealism" that was all right when it was necessary to win the war. So the air is gloomy with predictions of a disastrous peace. The mood is now one of defeatism, of a despair that will help reaction because it takes the heart out of the progressive struggle to win the peace.

The new pessimism is as dangerous as the old optimism. It was clear that democracy could not survive a fascist military victory; but it was also clear that a defeat of the Axis simply provided democracy with the chance to rebuild the world on new foundations. It was nowhere ordained that reaction would give up the ghost without a fight. But where is it ordained that reaction *must* shape the peace? The progressive forces can do it if they recognize the need for realism, for clear objectives and sound strategy, for the indomitable will to fight on.

Yes, reaction has been speaking up. It gave voice in Congress (and in the press) to the dark forces in this country against democracy and labor, against a democratic peace. But theirs was not the final word. The progressive and liberal-conservative forces in Congress fought back. Toward the end of February came the renewal of Lend-Lease, and the resolution of the House For-

eign Affairs Committee which sanely recognized that Lend-Lease aid should not be repaid because of moral reasons and because "the method of settlement by payment in gold or in goods has in the past proved self-defeating and destructive." And several weeks later, in March, came the Senate resolution pledging American aid for a democratic peace and American participation in a world organization to maintain the peace.

The background of the Senate resolution is interesting. When the peace picture was darkest, in February, Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, in opening United Nations Month, called for organization of the United Nations for peace action *now*, and said:

"There could be no surer road to disaster, no surer means of bringing about unmitigated havoc in the future, than for the United Nations to enter the postwar world as rivals and opponents in their commercial and financial policies, rather than as collaborators in a common task of seeking and achieving international economic stability and general well-being."

Later in the month the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, of which James T. Shotwell is chairman, issued a report and held a meeting urging immediate action to call a United Nations Conference to set up subordinate agencies to plan for postwar needs and to decide on political questions as they arise. All the United Nations should participate, the Commission urged, including "the small states which in the past have made so much intelligent contribution to international cooperation that their aid should be eagerly sought."

Events now moved swiftly. On March first Sumner Wells announced that the United States would ask representatives of all the United Nations to meet in this country and seek a basis for agreement on postwar economic, territorial, and political problems. Within a few days the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, came to Washington for a series of talks to prepare the conference. And several days later the Senate resolution was introduced. It was introduced by two Republican senators, Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota and Harold H. Burton of Ohio, and two Democratic senators, Carl Hatch of New Mexico and Lister Hill of Alabama. They consulted with other senators on the resolution's wording. It urged the United States to "take the initiative in calling meetings of representatives of the United Nations for the purpose of forming an organization of the United Nations with specific and limited authority," as follows:

1. To assist in co-ordinating and fully utilizing the military and economic resources of all member nations in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

2. To establish temporary administrations for Axis-controlled areas of the world as these are occupied by United Nations forces, until such time as permanent governments can be established.

3. To administer relief and assistance in economic rehabilitation in territories of member nations needing such aid and in Axis territory occupied by United Nations forces.

4. To establish procedures and machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and disagreements between nations.

5. To provide for the assembly and maintenance of a United Nations military force and to suppress by immediate use of such force any

future attempt at military aggression by any nation.

That the Senate further advises that any establishment of such United Nations organization provide machinery for its modification, for the delegation of additional specific and limited functions to such organization, and for admission of other nations to membership, and that member nations should commit themselves to seek no territorial aggrandizement.

The resolution is quoted in full because it offers the framework within which peace action can go on now and in the future. It is a basic minimum on which an enduring structure can be erected. Of course it is general, but the Conference can fill in. There are many problems and issues to be decided—among them, whether an international peace force is workable unless the big powers decide on a large measure of disarmament. The United Nations must still agree after the Conference is called, but if they accept the proposal the basis for agreement is there, *now,* to prevent disastrous dissensions if the war ends with no agreement on the basic terms of peace and world organization.

Most important, the Senate resolution would bind the United States to participate in a world organization after the war. The Senate has the constitutional power to make or break any treaty; for it to agree now to accept a world organization and to co-operate with the President in shaping the peace would prevent a repetition of the repudiation of Woodrow Wilson in 1919. It would end the uncertainty of other nations about where the United States stands. The dangers of this uncertainty have been thus expressed by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace:

> The British will hesitate to commit themselves to a new colonial or commercial policy if they fear that the United States will again retire into isolation after this war. The Russians may feel it necessary, in self-defense, to seize important points in Europe unless the United States will accept her share of the responsibility for collective security in the world. The Chinese do not care for hegemony in the Far East, but they may find it necessary to protect themselves if there is no international system which can give them protection. The American Republics must delay their planning for the future until the policy of the United States is made clear. The harmonious future development of the United Nations depends largely upon the decision of the American people.

The decision is up to the American people. It means a fight, but progressives can win the fight if they call for action on a sober program to mobilize labor, the farmers, and the middle class for democratic peace. The progressives should press a maximum peace program; but they must have, too, a minimum program on which to compromise for a world organization to keep the peace. Any compromise or co-operation with any group or nation for international security is worth the price if it gives the world peace for two generations, for in that period the world can unscramble the compromises. The peace will not settle all problems at one swoop: it cannot. Progressives made the mistake a year ago of placing too much dependence on the argument that we cannot win the war unless a "revolution" is made: we *are* winning the war. Let us not now make the mistake of

setting absolute conditions for peace; let us fight for the minimum basic conditions on which there can be majority agreement providing of course that they *will* bring peace. A social revolution is going on; but it takes many directions and it will go on for a generation or two before it works itself out in terms of economic reconstruction and world organization. L. C.

CONTRIBUTORS

Few writers dealing with ideas get as much continuous suspense into their work as CLARENCE E. AYRES. The closely-argued "Technology and Progress" is a chapter from a forthcoming closely-argued book, *The Theory of Economic Progress.* Mr. Ayres professes the considerable influence of Veblen and John Dewey; the inception of his book goes back more than twenty-five years to the time the author spent at Amherst in the era of Alexander Meiklejohn. A one-time member of the editorial staff of *The New Republic,* Mr. Ayres has been for some years professor of economics at the University of Texas. He is the author of a biography of Thomas Huxley, *Science the False Messiah,* and *The Problem of Economic Order.*

Anyone at all acquainted with American literary criticism needs no introduction to GRANVILLE HICKS. He was the literary editor of *The New Masses* from 1934 to 1939, and he is the author of *The Great Tradition, Figures of Transition,* and other books. At present he is at work on a novel.

After completing "Counterattack in Congress," HERMAN SCHNURER is convinced that traveling through the *Congressional Record* with gun and and camera has its occupational hazards, of which no small part is eyestrain. Mr. Schnurer is an editor of the *Review* and Professor of French at Antioch College.

Australia is a familiar subject to C. HARTLEY GRATTAN. His authoritative *Introducing Australia* is now in its sixth printing, and the Australian edition has just appeared at Sydney. Early in April he is to publish (through the Webster Publishing Company of St. Louis) a pamphlet dealing with Australia and New Zealand for use in high schools. Mr. Grattan is a frequent contributor to *Harper's* and other magazines.

The source of HARRY STEINHAUER's "What Can We Do With Germany?" is the feeling "that policies of revenge will not solve our postwar problems" and distress over "much of the hysteria which is being printed these days." In spite of his name, he has no German blood in his veins. He is professor of French and German at the University of Saskatchewan, and has published extensively both in book and periodical form, in learned and popular journals.

FREDERICK BURKHARDT's entertaining "The War and the Philosopher" contains more autobiographical material than most *Review* articles. Readers will remember his "Democracy as Philosophy" in the Winter, 1941 issue. He is assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Wisconsin.

The three articles combined here under the general title of "The Problem of Nationality" were originally delivered as papers in the Institute on Reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe at Antioch College in the early weeks of this year. FELIKS GROSS is Secretary General of the Central and Eastern European Planning Board. BORIS FURLAN, chairman of the Board's educational committee, was professor of political philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia, until forced into exile by the Germans. OTAKAR ODLOZILIK is director of the Masaryk Institute and lecturer in literature and history at Columbia University.

ERIC RUSSELL BENTLEY won the John Addison Porter prize at Yale University for his Ph. D. thesis on the modern cult of the hero. He has recently contributed articles to *The Partisan Review* and *The Nation,* and is now teaching at Black Mountain College.

Little in "The Christian Mythology of Socialism" will prepare readers for the fact that its author is a good union man. WILL HERBERG for some years edited a socialist weekly, *Workers Age*. He is now research and educational director of the New York Dressmakers Union of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.